Fail-Safe Testing of Web Applications by Boukhris, Salah
University of Denver 
Digital Commons @ DU 
Electronic Theses and Dissertations Graduate Studies 
1-1-2015 
Fail-Safe Testing of Web Applications 
Salah Boukhris 
University of Denver 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.du.edu/etd 
 Part of the Computer Sciences Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Boukhris, Salah, "Fail-Safe Testing of Web Applications" (2015). Electronic Theses and Dissertations. 
1011. 
https://digitalcommons.du.edu/etd/1011 
This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the Graduate Studies at Digital Commons @ DU. It 
has been accepted for inclusion in Electronic Theses and Dissertations by an authorized administrator of Digital 
Commons @ DU. For more information, please contact jennifer.cox@du.edu,dig-commons@du.edu. 
Fail-Safe Testing of Web Applications
A Dissertation
Presented to










c© Copyright by Salah Boukhris, 2015
All Rights Reserved
Author: Salah Boukhris
Title: Fail-Safe Testing of Web Applications
Advisor: Anneliese Andrews
Degree Date: August 2015
Abstract
This dissertation introduces an approach to generate tests to test fail-safe behav-
ior for web applications. We apply the approach to a commercial web application.
We build models for both behavioral and mitigation requirements. We create miti-
gation tests from an existing functional black box test suite by determining failure
type and points of failure in the test suite and weaving required mitigation based
on weaving rules to generate a test suite that tests proper mitigation of failures. A
genetic algorithm (GA) is used to determine points of failure and type of failure that
needs to be tested. Mitigation test paths are woven into the behavioral test at the
point of failure based on failure specic weaving rules. A simulator was developed
to evaluate choice of parameters for the genetic algorithm. We showed how to tune
the tness function and performed tuning experiments for GA to determine what
values to use for exploration weight and prospecting weight. We found that higher
defect densities make prospecting and mining more successful, while lower mitiga-
tion defect densities need more exploration. We compare eciency and eectiveness
of the approach. First, the GA approach is compared to random selection. The
results show that the GA performance was better than random selection and that
the approach was robust when the search space increased. Second, we compare the
GA against four coverage criteria. The results of comparison show that test require-
ments generated by a genetic algorithm (GA) are more ecient than three of the
four coverage criteria for large search spaces. They are equally eective. For small
ii
search spaces, the genetic algorithm is less eective than three of the four coverage
criteria. The fourth coverage criteria is too weak and unable to nd all defects in
almost all cases. We also present a large case study of a mortgage system at one of
our industrial partners and show how we formalize the approach. We evaluate the
use of a GA to create test requirements. The evaluation includes choice of initial
population, multiplicity of runs and a discussion of the cost of evaluating tness.
Finally, we build a selective regression testing approach based on types of changes
(add, delete, or modify) that could occur in the behavioral model, the fault model,
the mitigation models, the weaving rules, and the state-event matrix. We provide
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Web applications have became the backbone of today's business life through e-
commerce and the communications industry. According to [24], in 2008, 73% of
the population used the internet in the United States resulting in over $204 billion
dollars in on-line sales. This also implies that failures in critical web applications
could result in losses of millions of dollars. For example, eBay lost more than $3
million in customer credits and $4 billion in market capitalization because of 22
hours of system outage. The real cost of system failure is in lost revenue, frustrated
customers, and the negative impact on a company's value [59].
This makes it imperative that an adverse impact of failures be avoided. In other
words, external failures such as a server or database crash must be properly miti-
gated. The web application must also be tested whether mitigations work according
to requirements.
Unfortunately, existing Model-Based Testing (MBT) techniques emphasize func-
tional testing, but not the testing of proper failure mitigation. Given the large
potential losses these failures can carry when they are not properly mitigated, test-
ing failure mitigation is quite important. It is conceptually possible to add failure
transitions and mitigation behavior to an existing functional model and then use
1
whatever MBT has been developed for it. One strategy for testing fail-safe behavior
alongside functional behavior is to integrate fault models with behavioral models:
Marisa et al. [28], [70] integrate Fault Trees (FT) and State Charts (SC) while
HyeonJeong et al. [41] integrates UML State Diagrams and FTs. These approaches
have their limitations and challenges: Possible mismatches between notations and
terminologies used in the behavioral vs. the fault models, requiring a step to make
them compatible. In the not so unusual case where a decent number of failures can
occur in many behavioral states, when multiple fault trees exist and when mitiga-
tion behaviors themselves are non-trivial, this can lead to large, cumbersome, highly
connected models that obscure primary functionality. In other words, this can lead
to scalability problems. These approaches also cannot leverage an existing test
suite. Finally, there is no explicit mitigation model or mitigation patterns. Hence
integrating failures and their mitigation into existing models has its drawbacks.
This dissertation proposes a method to enhance an existing MBT technique,
FSMWeb [9] that leverages a test suite derived from the model and transforms it into
a series of mitigation tests for various failures. This does not require merging primary
functional behavior descriptions with mitigation behavior in the face of failures.
Rather, mitigation tests are woven into various stages of an existing behavioral
test at various points of failure based on weaving rules specically dened for each
mitigation type. This is not unlike weaving code aspects into primary code in aspect-
oriented programming [33], although the specic weaving rules dier, of course and
we are weaving mitigation test aspects into behavioral tests rather than working
with code.
Besides avoiding potential model bloat, this approach also has the advantage
that we can proceed with functional testing as usual, so existing test suites do not
have to be regenerated, failures can be injected at selected points in the existing
2
test suite, and a mitigation test is created by modifying the functional test at the
point of failure with required mitigation behavior.
Web applications also tend to evolve overtime. This requires regression testing
of the software, including proper failure mitigation. Rather than testing the entire
web application from scratch, it would be useful to have a selective regression testing
of proper failure mitigation.
This dissertation has as its major goal to develop a black-box MBT technique
for web applications that is able to:
• Leverage an existing testing approach for web applications (FSMWeb [9])
• Systematically models required mitigation behavior for failures via mitigation
patterns.
• Generates fail-safe mitigation test requirements (via a genetic algorithm).
• Builds a fail-safe mitigation test suite.
• Develops a selective regression test suite.
We also validate this approach via a case study and simulation experiments and
compare it to other approaches.
This dissertation is a combination of dierent ideas that are related in testing
web application and background to build our models (see Figure 1.1):
• Model-based testing:
 Using nite state machine (FSM) testing [21] [37] [38] [60].
 FSM in modeling the design of web application [42] [48], especially FSMWeb
[9].
 Testing web applications [64] [66] [50] [9] [8] [61].
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• Fail-safe behavior:
 Failure types and classications [3] [59] [10] [51] [34].
 Failure-Exception handling patterns [77] [49] [15] [18].
 Exception handling patterns for process and work ow models [46] [35]
[55] [31] [71].
 Testing Exception handling [56] [39] [69].
 Testing Fail-safe behavior [72] [27] [70] [41] [28].
• GA and software testing [2] [58] [68] [53] [13] [74] [54] [43] [23] [75] [40].
Figure 1.1: Topics related to our approach.
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Table 1.1 illustrates how this work is related to similar work [6], and describes
the overlapping areas in more detail.
Table 1.1: Collaboration: Comparison, Basic Strategy
Domain Model Test Regression Tools Experiments
Requirements testing
Other work [6] Safety-critical (C) EFSMs Coverage Cri-
teria
Basic Strategy None Comparison (GA,CC)
This work Web App. FSMWeb GA Basic Strategy/ Simulator Comparison (GA,CC, R),
Full Formalization Tuning GA,
Evaluate initial Pop. vs. R,
Single vs. multiple runs
This dissertation is organized as follows: Chapter 2 describes related work in
functional testing of web applications, fault and failure taxonomies for web applica-
tions, exception handling as a means of failure mitigation and general approaches
to test fail-safe behavior. We also discuss the existing work in Genetic Algorithms
(GA) used to nd defects in software via black box testing, since part of our ap-
proach uses a GA. Chapter 3 describes our MBT approach to fail-safe testing of
critical web applications, including a testing process. Chapter 4 evaluates the per-
formance of the GA approach with a series of experiments. Chapter 5 presents a
comparison with respect to eectiveness and eciency (using GA, coverage criteria
[6] or random selection to generate mitigation test requirements). Chapter 6 applies
the approach to a major case study. Regression testing is introduced in Chapter 7.




2.1 MBT Web testing
Two major techniques have been proposed for functional (black box) testing of
web applications, Di Lucca et al. [50] and Andrews et al. [9, 8, 61]. The rst revolves
around the creation and use of decision tables. It is suitable for unit and integration
test. The second is based on a hierarchical collection of compressed FSMs that,
in conjunction with a test database, allow both integration and subsystem testing.
The FSMWeb model combines both behavioral and structural characteristics (as
dened in Di Lucca et al. [50]), since it models web inputs and navigation between
pages, in addition to behavioral characteristics. Its attempts at compression make
it a desirable candidate to investigate for fail-safe testing of web aplications. The
FSMWeb approach falls into the larger category of FSM based techniques used for
testing. Testing with FSM models has a long and varied history [21, 37, 38, 60].
In addition to FSM models used for testing, there is also extensive work on testing
FSMs for correct behavior. For a survey on the latter see David and Mihalis [44].
Other methods use non-FSM models for testing web applications such as using a
UML meta model [64], but the model neither validates the scalability nor claries
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the dierence between static web sites and dynamic web sites. Some other studies
use user session data for initial test data generation such as in Sreedevi et al. [66].
FSM-based test generation has been used to test a large number of application
domains including compilers, real-time process control systems, networking, data
processing, and telephony. FSMs have also been used to model the design of web
sites and web applications [42, 48]. Kung et al. [42] propose to generate test cases
from an object-oriented test model that uses FSMs to model functional behavior.
A key limitation of many of these nite state approaches is state explosion which
limits their scalability. FSMWeb addresses this issue through FSM compression with
savings of orders of magnitude in size [8]. This advantage is one of the reasons why
we chose to investigate the use of FSMWeb for fail-safe testing.
2.2 Fail-Safe Behavior
As dened in Ammann and Outt [3], a fault is a static defect in a software
artifact, e.g. incorrect instructions or requirements. Failures can also be events that
are external to the software under test, such as a database crash, loss of network
connection, or unavailability of a server on which the software depends. Fail-safe
mitigation testing is interested in the latter.
Several papers try to classify failures or provide a fault taxonomy, some as-
sociate required mitigation actions with types of faults or failures. Pertet and
Narasimhan [59] address causes and eects of web failures. Most failures are caused
by: software failures, human/operator errors, hardware/environmental failures, and
security violations. Their eects are unavailable systems, exceptions, access viola-
tions, incorrect answers, data loss and corruption, and poor performance. Several
papers have attempted to classify faults in web applications. Ardagna et al. [10] clas-
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sies web fault types into infrastructure and middle-ware faults, web service faults,
and web application faults. In addition, they specify types of recovery actions as
retry services, substitute services, completion of missing parameters, reallocation of
services and changing process structure. Similarly, Ma and Tian [51] categorize
web service failures as host, network, or browser failures, source or content failures,
and user errors. Underlying error types include permission denied, no such le or
directory, stale NSF le handle, etc. Guo and Sampath [34] consider logic faults and
compatibility faults. Logic faults include subcategories: browser interaction faults,
session faults, paging faults, server-side parsing faults, etc. While these papers are
useful in classifying web faults and failures, only one ([10]) considers both failures
and recovery.
Zeng et al. [77] addresses recovery in the form of exception management for
composite web services. They consider application exceptions and process dened
exceptions. A service can be unavailable or fail. Service execution can be delayed,
time out, or experience QoS degradation. Recovery action types include retry, skip,
replace, try alternative, compensate, and time out. Lu et al. [49] provides a formal
denition of exceptions and exception handling policies for state charts. The policies
include skip, abort, retry, try alternative, compensate, replace, and timeout. Finally,
Brambilla et al. [15] classies exceptions as user-generated, application generated or
infrastructure related. Exception handling follows ve policies: accept, reject, abort,
ignore, and resume. Cabral and Marques [18] provides an analysis of how often
Java and .Net applications use the following types of exception handlers: empty, log,
alternative, throw, continue, return, rollback, close, assert, delegates, and others.
In addition to recovery and/or exception handling policies (which are almost al-
ways informally dened), more formal exception handling patterns have been dened
for process and work ow models ([46],[35],[55],[31],[71]). However, none of these
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address testing exception handling (or fault/failure mitigation). In Oprisa [56] an
exception handling FSM is constructed and the W-method is used to generate test
cases. Jiang and Yuanpeng [39] construct an exception control ow graph and use
DU coverage criteria on variables related to an exception. Sinha and Harrold [69]
also investigates white box testing of programs with exception handling constructs
using control ow and data ow analysis. However, no exception handling poli-
cies or patterns are dened in these studies. Moreover, these categorizations overlap
without being comprehensive or consistent in the absence of a set of widely accepted
failure-mitigation testing models. Unmitigated or improperly mitigated failures can
be costly.
2.3 Testing Fail-Safe Behavior
Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) is commonly used in safety critical system analysis
to recognize the potential causes of unsafe conditions. FTA is a top-down deductive
analysis technique used to detect the specic causes of possible hazards [72][27].
The top event in a fault tree is the system hazard. FTA works downward from
the top event to determine potential causes of a hazard. It uses boolean logic to
represent these combinations of individual faults that can lead to the top event [27].
However, Constructing a Fault Tree (FT) can be a time consuming task[41]. One
strategy for testing fail-safe behavior alongside functional behavior is to integrate
fault models with behavioral models: [28] and [70] integrate State Charts and FTs,
while [41] integrates UML State Diagrams and FTs. These approaches have a vari-
ety of limitations and challenges. These include: (1) possible mismatches between
notations and terminologies used in the FT vs. the behavioral model, requiring a
step to make the FT and the behavioral model compatible; (2) potential scalability
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problems when multiple or large FTs exist or a fault can occur in a large portion
of behavioral states; (3) they cannot leverage an existing behavioral test suite; and
(4) there is no formal mitigation model, nor exception handling patterns.
2.4 Genetic Algorithms and Software Testing
Genetic algorithms and Genetic programming are based on Evolutionary Algo-
rithms (EA). These algorithms are soft computing techniques inspired by Charles
Darwin's principle of the survival of the ttest [63]. There are four well-established
main types of EA and most widely used techniques: Genetic Algorithms (GA), Ge-
netic Programming (GP), Evolution Strategy (ES), and Evolutionary Programming
(EP) [1]. Genetic algorithms (GA), which were originally developed by John Holland
in the 1960s, are search algorithms based on natural selection and natural genetics.
Genetic programming (GP) was introduced by John Koza [63], who had the idea
to allow a computer to solve problems without being explicitly programmed to do
so. Genetic programming can be seen as an expansion of Genetic algorithms. GP
creates a computer program as the solution while GA will create a string that rep-
resents the solution [63]. Evolution strategy (ES) and Evolutionary Programming
(EP) allow varing length of individuals in the population; the selected individuals
are subjected to mutation to produce children with no crossover [63]. The main dif-
ferences between the four kinds of algorithms are the representation of the solutions
and the use of variation operators [1].
GA has been used in dierent areas such as optimization, automatic program-
ming, machine learning, economics, immune systems, ecology, population genetics,
evolution and learning, and social systems [63]. The main goal of GA is to develop
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successive generations of ever better combinations of parameters which improve the
overall solution. The GA as adaptive search technique is not guaranteed to nd the
optimal solution, however it often nds a good solution in a brief time [63].





Evaluate(population) using Fitness function;






Figure 2.1: The pseudo code for GA
The GA usually performs the following cycle [63] [52] (see a basic algorithm for
a GA as shown in Algorithm 1 ):
1. A randomly initialized population of individuals is generated. Each individual
is usually represented as a string of bits called a chromosome. Each bit is a
gene. A chromosome is a possible candidate solution of a given problem.
2. A tness function is associated with each individual. It is used to evaluate the
adequacy and quality of an individual.
3. A selection process is used to extract a subset from the current population.
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4. A new generation is created by a crossover operation that takes two individuals
and exchanges their information at a randomly selected position.
5. In order to prevent individuals from becoming too similar, a mutation process
is applied by randomly modifying some information of a selected individual.
6. Each individual of the new population is evaluated again, and the procedure
is repeated (step 2) until a specic termination condition is fullled.
The key to the successful use of a GA is to represent the problem as well as
its solution in terms of a chromosome. The most commonly used representation is
a binary string. However, representations with a more complicated data structure
have been used [63]. Crossover is used to increase the quality of the reproduction
populations and force convergence while mutation processing guarantees the entire
search space will be searched and restores lost information or adds information to the
population. The balancing between exploration where bad solutions have a chance
to go to the next generation, and exploitation where good solutions go to the next
generation more often than bad ones, is more important within the mechanism of
the selection. Dierent selection strategies signicantly aect the performance of
the GA [62]. Tournament selection, roulette wheel, and rank-based roulette wheel
selection are the most common selection schemes. In tournament selection, the
number of individuals are selected randomly from the population, and the selected
ones will compete against each other based on the highest tness to be included in
the next generation. In proportional roulette wheel, the selection of the population
is based on a proportion of their tness values which corresponds to a portion of
a roulette wheel. Finally, in rank-based roulette wheel selection, the selection is
based on its tness rank relative to the whole population and a selection probability
according to their ranks instead of their tness values.
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The use of GA in software testing is known as a type of search-based software
testing (SBST) that includes many other meta-heuristic optimizing search tech-
niques. Meta-heuristic search algorithms have been used to automate a variety of
software testing activities such as test case generation, test case selection, and test
case prioritization. There are several reasons that make the use of GA popular in
software testing [2]. First, based on the survey paper Harman et al. [36], GAs have
been widely studied, experimented and applied in software testing. Large amounts
of empirical data are available for dierent parameter settings. This helps to se-
lect the appropriate parameters for solving a specic problem making it easier for
researchers to learn how to adapt a GA to a given problem [2]. Second, the per-
formance of GA has shown better results than local search algorithms, although
there is no proof indicating that GA outperforms other global search algorithms [2].
Finally, GA has many well-known implementations and resource tools that signi-
cantly facilitate their practical application [2].
Ali et al. [2] analyze the use and results of search-based algorithms in test
generation, including Genetic Algorithms (GA). They report that the majority of
techniques (78%) have been applied at the unit level and do not target specic faults
(as we are interested in), but focus on structural coverage criteria like node, branch,
or path coverage. By contrast, our goal is to target specic fault types and to test
at various points of the test suite whether mitigation works properly.
Patton et al. [58] suggest a GA approach for focused software usage testing.
Their goal is to test based on usage frequency with the objective of nding failures
and then suggest further similar, but dierent test cases that reveal faults. Their
work is inspired by the failure pursuit sampling of Schultz et al. [68]. The latter
generated fault scenarios for testing intelligent controllers for autonomous vehicles.
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Patton et al. try to maximize two objectives: the likelihood of occurrence (usage
frequency) and failure intensity (consisting of a combination of failure density and
severity). This requires a multi-objective GA technique. They avoid creating single
dominant individuals using niching [53]. A niche represents a subpopulation that
is similar, but dierent.
Berndt and Watkins [13] and Watkins et al. [74] also introduce a multi-objective
tness function that changes based on results from previous testing cycles, i.e a
relative tness function changes as the population evolves, based on the knowledge
gained from prior generations (the "fossil record"). Individuals are rewarded based
on novelty, proximity, and severity. Novelty encourages new areas of the search
space to be explored, regardless of the type of error generated. Proximity measures
how close an individual is to previously found defects. Severity measures its impact
valuing detection of defects with severe consequences more highly. Three types of
tests are generated: explorers (high uniqueness), prospectors (some uniqueness, but
also close to a found defect), and miners (close to found defects). McCart et al.
[54] attempt to reduce the computational burden of the tness function calculation
(such as distances from entries in the fossil record and distance calculations from
individuals in the fossil record that detected errors) by using sampling, adjusting
the frequency of sampling, dening defect boundaries and keeping individuals with
similar distance to the origin in a bin.
While this test generation approach has only been used for system testing of
complex distributed systems via long sequence testing, its goals have similarities
with our objectives and we decided to see whether a similar strategy could help in
selecting positions in a test suite and failure types to inject at that position so as to
generate tests that explore the search space, prospect in the larger vicinity of found
mitigation defects, and mine for further mitigation defects in the immediate vicinity
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of a found defect. It is worth exploring whether a similar strategy that combines
exploring with prospecting and mining using a fossil record might be useful for our
purposes.
Last et al. [43] describe an extension of GA algorithms that uses a varying
probability of crossover depending on the age of an individual (young, middle, old).
Age is represented as a Fuzzy Logic function. Very young and old o-spring have
a lower probability of crossover, thus enabling more exploration in the young and
avoiding a local optimum due to premature convergence in the old. A Fuzzy Rule
base directs crossover of mixed age populations. The inputs to the programs un-
der test are 100 Boolean expressions using AND, OR, and NOT. A single error is
injected by randomly selecting an AND or OR operator and ipping it. Test cases
consist of 100 bits (one for each expression). The tness function of a test is one,
if it can distinguish between the correct and incorrect expression, zero otherwise.
Experiments showed an increased capability of recognizing the erroneous expression.
While our testing problem is very dierent, this approach represents another way
to distinguish between exploration and searching in the vicinity.
A series of papers [23, 75, 40] have addressed generating tests for a path through
an EFSM using GA, such as Kalaji et al. [40]. Since we assume that the test suite
exists, this is less applicable to our problem. However, any of a number of search-
based or non-search based technqiues could be used to nd inputs for the mitigation
paths once they are woven into the behavioral test suite (cf. Chapter 2.1). Partial
regeneration as suggested in [4] from the point of failure injection is also an option.
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2.5 Regression Testing
Web applications maintenance cycles are similar to those of other software sys-
tems. They include corrective, perfective, or adaptive maintenance as well as
product evolution through enhancements. The Standard for Software Engineering-
Software Maintenance, ISO/IEC 14764 [14] includes four categories of maintenance:
• Corrective maintenance: unscheduled modication to correct discovered faults
of a software product in order to keep a system operational, e.g. the removal
of errors in the code.
• Adaptive maintenance: modication of the software product due to changes in
the environment or changes to requirements, e.g. the modication of software
for a new operating system.
• Perfective maintenance such as improving eciency and performance to pre-
vent problems in the future, e.g. modication of code to improve performance.
• Preventive maintenance: Modication of a software product after delivery to
detect and correct latent faults in the software product before they become
eective faults to prevent malfunctions in the future.
ISO/IEC 14764 [14] classies adaptive and perfective maintenance as enhancements,
and groups together the corrective and preventive maintenance categories into a
correction category. Regression testing is a very vital task after each maintenance
round in order to verify and validate the modied web application and ensure that
both new and existing features are working properly. This process is often done
with existing test cases from previous release(s). Regression testing can be very
expensive especially for very large web systems, for which a retest all approach [73]
is too costly. Corrective maintenance does not change any of the models used in
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our approach. Hence, one could simply rerun the entire fail-safe test suite. Given
its expense, this wastes resources. A better approach is to trace model elements to
code modications and execute tests that include these model elements only. The
other types of maintenance activities cause model changes. This can cause some
test paths and associated test cases to become obsolete. In addition, new tests may
have to be generated to cover added model elements. Rothermel and Harrold have
dened ve steps for selective regression testing [65]:
• "Select T ′ ⊆ T (T ′ is a set of test cases after modication of the program P ′ ,
and T is a test suite).
• Test P ′ using T ′, establishing P ′'s correctness with respect to T ′.
• If necessary to achieve coverage requirements, create a set of new test cases
T ′′ for P ′.
• Test P ′ with T ′′, establishing P ′'s correctness with respect to T ′′."
In our case, depending on which parts of our models change, T can be the behavioral
test suite BT , mitigation test suite MTj, or even the failure mitigation test suite
FMT and hence T ′, T ′′ can be also refer to any of these. This dissertation describes
a method for selective regression testing of fail-safe testing in web applications based
on the test generation methodology used in chapter 3. We also adopt the classi-
cation of test cases and the formalization of the changes to the FSMWeb models
based on Leung and White [47] and Andrews et al. [7]. The framework is based
on classifying behavioral tests as retestable, obsolete, and reusable. Retestable tests
are those that are still valid and test portions of the application that may be aected
by the change. Obsolete tests are those that are no longer applicable. Behavioral
tests that do not test software modication and produce the same result are reusable
tests.
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Andrews and Do [4] explain in detail how to use partial regeneration for an
FSMWeb model. The goal is to replace obsolete test cases with tests without full
regeneration. In the study, they dene thresholds to determine whether partial or
full regeneration is warranted. Our goal here is to also develop an approach for





The black box test generation process for testing fail-safe behavior consists of
the following steps (see Figure 3.1)
1. Generate test cases from the behavioral model (section 3.2).
2. Identify failure events and their mitigation (section 3.3).
3. Generate mitigation tests from the mitigation models (section 3.4).
4. Generate test requirements using a GA (section 3.5).
5. Apply weaving rules at the points of failure in the behavioral test suite to
generate fail-safe test paths (section 3.6).
6. Generate, execute and validate tests (section 3.7).
7. Evaluate Fitness (section 3.8).
8. If necessary, generate more test requirements (section 3.9).
The proposed failure mitigation test process assumes that a technique for black box
testing of required functionality exists via a behavioral model (BM), associated
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Figure 3.1: Test Generation Process
behavioral testing criteria (BC), and behavioral test paths (BT ). In our case we
will use an existing web application MBT approach, FSMWeb [9]. We assume that
system requirements exist that identify types of failure events and any required
mitigation actions, e.g via hazard and risk analysis [30]. This is used to build
failure mitigation models (MM) for which mitigation coverage criteria (MC) can be
identied and mitigation test paths (MT ) can be created. Since all external failures
are not possible in all behavioral states, a State Event Matrix (SE) determines
which failure types are possible in which behavioral states. This matrix and the
test paths BT are then used in a heuristic search (GA) to determine mitigation
test requirements. The failure mitigation test paths (FMT ) are then created based
on selecting an appropriate mitigation test (m ∈ MT ) and weaving it into the
behavioral test according to the weaving rules associated with the selected mitigation
test. These are then transformed into executable tests, executed, and validated.
This is a process external to the GA and partly manual, hence orders of magnitude
more expensive than generating test requirements. The result of validation is used
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to determine values of the tness function and to determine a new generation of
test requirements, or to determine that enough tests were generated (i.e. the GA
terminates). The following sections describe each of these steps in more detail.
3.2 FSMWeb: the Behavioral Model
Functional testing for web application follows the approach in [9]:
• Build a hierarchical model HFSM:
 Partition the web application into clusters (Cs).
 Dene Logical Web Pages (LWPs) and Input-Action constraints for each.
 Build FSMs for clusters as a multi-level hierarchy.
 Build an Aggregate FSM (AFSM) to represent the top level of the appli-
cation.
• Generate tests from the HFSM.
 Generate paths through each FSM that meet the coverage criteria.
 Aggregate paths to form abstract tests.
 Choose inputs along the paths to create executable tests.
The term cluster is used to refer to collections of software modules/web pages
that implement a logical, user level function. The rst step partitions the web
application into clusters. At the highest level of abstraction, clusters represent
functions that can be identied by users. At a lower level, clusters represent cohesive
software modules/web pages that work together to implement a portion of a user
level function.
Many web pages contain HTML forms, each of which can be connected to a dif-
ferent back-end software module. To facilitate testing for these modules, web pages
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are modeled as multiple Logical Web Pages (LWPs). A LWP is either a physical
web page or the portion of a web page that accepts data from the user through an
HTML form and then sends the data to a specic software module. FSMWeb is
a functional model meant for black-box testing. Hence the web application can be
written in any language appropriate for web applications(e.g. HTML, JavaScript,
.. etc.). LWPs are abstracted from the presentation dened by the HTML and
are described in terms of their sets of inputs and actions. All inputs in a LWP are
considered atomic: data entered into a text eld is considered to be only one user
input symbol, regardless of how many characters are entered into the eld. There
may be rules about the inputs. Some inputs may be required; others may be op-
tional; users may be allowed to enter inputs in any order; or a specic order may be
required. Table 3.1 shows the input constraints for both types while Table 3.2 shows
how typical input types found in web applications are represented as constraints on
(single) edges in an FSMWeb model.
Table 3.1: Constraints on inputs
Input Choice Order
Required (R) Sequence (S)




This edge annotation via input-action constraints is one of the saving sources
for an FSMWeb model because options for input selection and sequencing no longer
need to be coded explicitly (which would inate a traditional state-based model).
Figure 3.2 shows how an FSM model that represents a selection with only three
choices is reduced to two nodes and one transition in FSMWeb.
The lowest level cluster FSMs are generated with only LWPs and navigation
between them. Input-action constraints annotate each edge [9]. Higher level FSMs
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Table 3.2: FSMWeb constraint of typical input types
Input Type FSMWeb Edge Annotation
Text Field R (input name)
Text Area Field
Optional Text Field O (input name)
Optional Text Area Field
Optional Checkbox
Radio Box C1 (option 1, ..., option n)
Drop Down Box
(with n options)
Optional Radio Box O (C1 (option 1, ..., option n)
(with n options)
Set of Checkboxes O (Cn (option 1, ..., option n))
Multi-Select Box A (option 1, ..., option n)
(with n options requiring 0 to n selections)
represent FSMs from a lower level cluster by a single node and may contain LWP
nodes as well. Ultimately, a top level Aggregate Finite State Machine (AFSM) is
formed and represents a nite state model of the application at the highest level of
abstraction.
Test sequences are generated during phase 2 of the FSMWeb method. A test
sequence is a sequence of transitions through the application FSM and through each
lower level FSM. FSMWeb's test generation method rst generates paths through
each FSM based on some graph coverage criterion such as edge coverage. These
paths are then aggregated based on an aggregation criterion for each FSM's paths,
such as all combinations or each path at least once [9].
This process results in a set of aggregate paths. We call them abstract tests. The
nal step of test generation is selecting inputs to replace the input constraints for
the transitions of the aggregate paths.
Input selection uses a technique [61] that builds two databases: a synthetic
































Figure 3.2: Three Optional Inputs, Any Order
cation database, which contains values previously inserted by the application being
tested. Values are saved into the application database during execution and saved
into the synthetic database during testing. Details about the database creation and
input selection can be found elsewhere [61].
Hence, an HFSM = {FSMi}ni=0 with a top level FSM0 = AFSM . Each FSM
has nodes that represent LWPs or clusters. Edges are internal or external to an
FSM. External nodes span cluster boundaries. (They become internal at the next
higher level.) External edges can either enter or leave a cluster FSM.
The FSM Tool parses HTML les and builds a FSMWeb model. The user
can select coverage criteria such as node, edge, edge-pair, simple round trip and
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prime path coverage. The FSM Tool then generates test paths through each cluster
that satisfy the selected criteria. For aggregation criteria, FSM Tool oers all-
combinations, each choice and base choice coverage.
3.2.1 Example
Figure 3.3 shows three FSMs and two levels of hierarchy1. This is an exam-
ple of a behavioral model (BM). Solid circles represent LWP nodes, the others
are cluster nodes (i.e c1 and c2 in AFSM). It also shows FSM1 and FSM2 for c1
and c2 clusters. Table 3.3 shows paths through each FSM that achieve edge cov-
erage. These test paths are aggregated to form abstract tests through the AFSM.
As aggregation coverage criterion we use all combinations [9]. We illustrate this on
t01 = n1c2n2. Substituting t21 and t22 for c2 results in two paths: p1 = n1n5n7n2
and p2 = n1n5n6n7n2. Both paths consist of LWP nodes and do not have to be
aggregated further.
Figure 3.3: Behavioral Models BM
1For simplicity, we omitted input predicates
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Table 3.3: Test paths through AFSM,FSM1,FSM2
FSM Test paths
AFSM t01 = n1c2n2, t02 = n1c1n2
FSM1 t11 = n3n4n3
FSM2 t21 = n5n7, t22 = n5n6n7
Aggregation of t02 which visits cluster node c1 requires aggregation of one test
path through FSM1. This results in one path. There are 3 paths when test paths
are fully aggregated. Table 3.4 shows these paths, including derivation rules used
and test path lengths.
Table 3.4: Test Paths for BM
Test Test Paths BT Derivation Rules Full test path Length
t01 : n1c2n2
bt1 n1t21n2 c2 → t21 n1, n5, n7, n2 4
bt2 n1t22n2 c2 → t22 n1, n5, n6, n7, n2 5
t02 = n1c1n2
bt3 n1t11n2 c1 → t11 n1, n3, n4, n3, n2 5
3.3 Failures (F), State-Event matrix (SE)
External failures can occur in web application as a result of physical (net-
work and system domain) failures, application failures, or client error (user gen-
erated/Interaction) [20, 32]. Examples of fault-type taxonomies related to web
applications are described in [34, 10, 51]. Many systems, including safety critical
systems and web applications have requirements for mitigating failures. This may
include specied exception handling such as retry or exception-driven rework.
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Examples of possible external failures are:
• f1: Unavailability, e.g. no network connection.
• f2: Time out, e.g. web session has no activity for a period of time.
• f3: Parameter incompatibility, e.g. input data mismatch (e.g. integer vs.
string).
• f4: Response error, e.g. Database server is busy or does not save the data.
• f5: Misunderstood behaviour, e.g. try to access web service that requires a
dierent user type.
• f6: Workow inconsistency, e.g. client using back and forth browser naviga-
tion.
• f7: Incorrect order, e.g. some service should have been completed before a
specic step.
• f8: Browser incompatibility.
• f9: Interface change, e.g. data mapping of an external web service is changed.
• f10: Incorrect service, e.g. wrong response from accessing an external web
service .
We only need to test proper failure mitigation for those failure types that have mit-
igation requirements. Let F = {f1, ..., fk} be the failure types, and S = {s1, ..., sn}
be the behavioral states. Failures may not be applicable in all behavioral states.
For example, a failure type such as no network connection is applicable in all states,
but a failure type such as expired session is not applicable in the entry portal state.
Hence, we need to dene which failure types can occur in which behavioral states.
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We express this in a State-Event matrix SE where element seij is given by:
seij =

1, if failure type j applies in node i in S
0 Otherwise.
Using our example in section 3.2.1, we assume 4 failure types are applied. SE is
dened as shown in Table 3.5.
Table 3.5: State-Event Matrix SE
Behavioral States
(N)/ Failure Type (f )
n1 n2 n3 n4 n5 n6 n7 dpe
1 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 0.58
2 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 0.43
3 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 0.72
4 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0.29
dps 0.25 0.50 0.25 0.50 0.75 0.50 0.75
3.4 Mitigation Requirements and Mitigation Mod-
els
We assume that the failure events and any mitigation actions are stated explicitly
in the requirements. If they are not, two situation may occur:2
1. Mitigation requirements are implicit and the tester needs to take the extra
step to make them explicit.
2Ammann and Outt [3] mention these situations as not uncommon, hence causing issues for
many testing techniques.
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2. The requirements document is silent about whether mitigation is required. In
this case, a tester may assume that mitigation is not required and proceed
accordingly.
Mitigation requirements can be expressed in the form of mitigation models. For
example, try other alternatives is shown in Figure 3.4.
Figure 3.4: Try Other Alternatives: Mitigation Model.
Each failure fj is associated with a corresponding mitigation model MMj where
j = 1,. . . ,k. We assume that the models are of the same type as the behavioral
model BM (e.g. an FSMWeb model). Graph-based [3], mitigation coverage criteria
MCj can be used to generate mitigation test pathsMTj = mtj1 , . . . ,mtjhl for failure
fj. Assuming MC as "edge coverage" for the mitigation model in Figure 3.4, the
following three mitigation test paths fulll MC: MT={mt1, mt2, mt3} where mt1 =
{n11, n12, n15}, mt2 = {n11, n13, n15}, mt3 = {n11, n14, n15}.
Mitigation models can be very small for some failures and the mitigation can be
an "empty action". For example, if there is a rollback to state sb with immediate
stop, the mitigation action only consists of adding a transition from sb to sf , the
nal state. The weaving rule would specify what node to rollback to, in this case
sb. On the other hand, some mitigation models may consist of a full set of alterna-
tive behaviors that completely replace the remainder of the original test. We will
illustrate this in the section 3.6.
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Using the example of failure types in section 3.3, the corresponding mitigation
requirements are summarized in Table 3.6 with the corresponding mitigation models.
Figure 3.5: Mitigation Models.
Table 3.6: Mitigation Requirements
MM Explanation Model
MM1 Go to Fail Safe State: keep the
system running even if there is no
connectivity
see Figure 3.5-a, MT1 = {mt11}
where mt11 = si, sg and sg =
LWP : errorpage
MM2 End All: session expire, so start
over from the start node
MT2 = φ and sb = n1,where sb is
the start node
MM3 Fix & proceed: parameter incom-
patibility such as data mismatch
see Figure 3.5-b, MT3 = {mt31}
where mt31 = si, si
MM4 Alternative: incorrect service see Figure 3.5-c ,
MT4 = {mt41,mt42} where
mt41 = si, s1, s2, si+1 and
mt42 = si, s1, s3, si+1
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3.5 Determine Black Box Test Requirements
The goal in this step is to dene what types of failures should be injected at
which point in the behavioral test suite. Since large test suites and many failure
types oer a sizeable number of combinations to chose from, it makes sense to use a
genetic algorithm (GA). We want to emphasize here that we use the GA to search
for test requirements, not for test cases. The test requirements state where in the
execution of the behavioral test a failure f ∈ F needs to be injected. These test
requirements need to be transformed into test paths, executable test cases and then
need to be executed and validated. The result of validation provides necessary
information to compute the tness of the test requirements. This makes tness
evaluation expensive compared to generating test requirements and hence we need
to carefully consider this cost of tness evaluation. The next subsections describe
each step in more detail.
3.5.1 Representation of Population
The black box test requirements need to dene:
• A test path where a failure event occurs
• A position in the test where the failure event is injected during test execution.
Since the test paths vary in length, a 3-dimensional population is not ideal. However,
the length of the Behavioral test paths (BT) is xed. The behavioral test path suite
(BT) is a set of test paths:
BT = {bt1, bt2, ..., btl} where l is number of test paths.
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We arrange the behavioral test path suite (BT) into a single dimension (I) by
concatenating the test paths: I = (bt1 ◦ bt2 ◦ ... ◦ btl)
Each test path is a sequence of nodes. Thus,
I = (s11, ..., s1n1 , s21, ..., s2n2 , ..., sl1, ..., slnl)
Length(I) =
∑l
i=1 len(ti) where 1 ≤ i ≤ l
Hence, we encode the test path suite rather than individual test paths. Now,
the position in the test path suite identies both test and position in a particular
test. This leads to a two-dimensional representation. The rst dimension of the
search space is the number of possible positions p in I (1 ≤ p ≤ Length(I)). The
second dimension is the possible number of failure types where the types of failures
are given by:
F = {f1, f2, ..., fk} and 1 ≤ e ≤ |F | are the possible values for dimension 2.
Individuals in the population are then dened as a pair of one position p in the
test path suite and one failure type e: (p, e).
The search space is the cartesian product of all possible positions p in the test
suite and failure types e. The search space is: (p, e) where 1 ≤ p ≤ Length(I) and
1 ≤ e ≤ |F |.
Feasible Region: Not all combinations of (p, e) are feasible, since it is possible
that some failures are not applicable in some behavioral states. To account for this,
we use the SE matrix dened in section 3.3 to help dene the feasible region. Let
node(p) be the index of the behavioral state at position p, then the Feasible Region
is dened as:
{(p, e)|1 ≤ p ≤ Length(I), 1 ≤ e ≤ |F | , se(node(p),e) = 1}
Using the example in Figure 7.2 and Table 3.4 in section 3.2.1, the concatenation
of behavioral tests BT results in I = bt1 ◦ bt2 ◦ bt3, and length(I) = 4 + 5 + 5 = 14
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where I = bt1 ◦ bt2 ◦ bt3 = n1, n5, n7, n2, n1, n5, n6, n7, n2, n1, n3, n4, n3, n2 .
The index of the node in position p = 2 is node(2) = 5.
Given the 4 failure types, the search space size is: SP = 14 ∗ 4 = 56 (see Table
3.7). There are 27 feasible pairs.
Table 3.7: Search Space SP
I bt1 bt2 bt3
Position (p) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14
F/N n1 n5 n7 n2 n1 n5 n6 n7 n2 n1 n3 n4 n3 n2
f1 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0
f2 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 1
f3 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 1
f4 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 1
3.5.2 Initial population selection
We use defect potential to create the initial population. Higher defect potential
is assumed to carry a higher probability of nding a defect. We use the defect
potential of an individual (p, e) for selecting the initial population. It is a measure
of the likelihood of a mitigation defect to occur. A mitigation defect is more likely
to be found if the failure that triggers the defective mitigation occurs. Hence, the
probability of a failure occurring contributes to the defect potential. Likewise, the
more types of failures can occur in a state, the higher its defect potential. We
compute defect potential as the percentage of possible states and failures types that
can occur respectively. For state si ∈ S, the defect potential is:




where |F | is the number of failure types and seij is an element in the state-failure




where |S| is the number of behavioral states and seij is an element in the state-
failure event matrix SE. In section 3.3, Table 3.5 represents an example of the SE
and values for dps and dpe.
Algorithm 3.6 species how to select the initial population creates individuals
(p, e) that give behavioral state coverage and failure type coverage. It begins by
determining for each failure type j the behavioral state si with the highest dps(i).
It then determines the earliest position p where this state occurs and adds the pair
(p, j) to the initial population. It removes si from further consideration. After all
failure types have been matched with a position, if there are still states left whose
index i′ has not been chosen, we determine the failure type j′ with the highest
dpe(j′), and the earliest position p′ where the state occurs and add (p′, j′) to the
population until all states are covered.
Back to our example, I = (n1, n5, n7, n2, n1, n5, n6, n7, n2, n1, n3, n4, n3, n2), 1 ≤
p ≤ 14. Note that indexing is required, since state n1 occurs three times (in p = 1,
p = 5 and p = 10). The example from Table 3.5 has 4 failure types, hence 1 ≤ e ≤ 4.
By applying (Algorithm 2) to this example, the initial population is selected
as follows:
1. Determine each failure type with Max dps(s) and select the rst position p in
I where s occurs: (2,1); (7,2); (8,3); (4,4);
2. For the remaining states determine state with Max dpe(e) and select rst
position p in I: (1,1); (11,2); (12,3);
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Algorithm 2: Algorithm for selecting initial population
Require: seij matrix, dps, dpe, I
Ensure: Compute Initial Population (p, j) for GA
Cover all failures, all states
Pop=φ
Set S of states in BM
for j=1 to |F | do
Determine state s with max|S|i=1(dps(i)) for failure type j and SE(s, j) = 1
p ← Select rst such position p in I
S=S \ {s} /* remove s from S */
Pop=Pop ∪ {(p, j)}
end for
while S 6= φ do
Select s ∈ S
Determine failure type j with max|F |j=1(dpe(j)) for s
p ← Select rst position p with s in I
S=S \ {s} /* remove s from S */
Pop=Pop ∪ {(p, j)}
end while
Figure 3.6: Algorithm for selecting initial population
To ascertain whether using defect potential as dened here actually is reasonable
(rather than multiple runs with a random initial population), we performed a series
of experiments where we compared both. These are reported in section 4.2.
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3.6 Generating the Failure Mitigation Test Paths
(FMT)
Now that we have the initial test requirements, (i.e the position -failure type
pairs (p,e)), we know where (p) in the test suite to inject which type of failure (e).
We use mitigation test pathsMTe for the failure and weave them into the behavioral
test at position (p) subject to weaving rules. The weaving rules are based on the
type of mitigation. F is a set of failure types: F = {f1, f2, .., fk}. Each failure is
linked with a mitigation model such that:
fj :: (Mj,MTj, wrj)
where fj is a failure of type j
MMj is a mitigation model for it
MTj is a test suite for Mj
wrj is a weaving rule based on mitigation Mj
Assume we have t ∈ BT , p ∈ I, fe ∈ F and mt ∈ MTe. We now build a failure
mitigation test path fmt ∈ FMT using this information and the weaving rules wre
∈ WR as follows:
• keep path represented by t until failure position p.
• apply failure of type e (fe) in p.
• select appropriate mt ∈MTe. For example, if the aggregation criteria species
that all mt ∈ MTe need to be covered, we need to select each and create a
mitigation test for each.
• apply weaving rule wre to construct fmt.
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We now explain weaving rules more formally for each type of mitigation. Let
t = {s1 . . . sb . . . node(p) . . . sf . . . sk}. let sg be a fail safe state.
1. Fix
Option 1: Compensate ( (Partial) Fix and proceed ) mitigates a failure and contin-
ues with the remainder of the behavioral test. So, fmt =s1 . . .node(p) mt node(p)
. . . sk. mt may be zero, if mitigation does not require user involvement (inputs). See
rule 4.
Option 2: Go to fail-safe state (Fix and stop) mitigates a failure and ignores the
remainder of t: fmt =s1 . . .node(p) mt sg. mt may be empty if there is no x.
2. Rollforward
Option 1: Rollforward mitigates the failure, and proceeds.
fmt =s1 . . .node(p) mt sf . . . sk where sf is the node in t to which we rollfor-
ward. If only rollforward and no other actions are required mt is empty and fmt
=s1. . .node(p)sf . . . sk.
Option 2: Deferred xing. If the failure can only be xed after reaching the rollfor-
ward node sf then smt becomes: fmt = s1 . . .node(p) sf mt sf+1 . . . sk.
Note that further variants of this weaving rule can exist, like a state sdf between sf
and sk at which the failure mitigation mt is inserted. t = s1 . . . sb . . .node(p) . . . sf
. . . sdf . . . sk. fmt = s1 . . .node(p)sf . . . sdf mt . . . sk.
3. Rollback
Option 1: Rollbackward. Apply mitigation path mt from point of failure and roll-
back to node where failure occurred and continue with remainder of behavioral test.
fmt =s1. . .node(p) mt sb . . . sk where sb is a node before node (p).
Option 2: Rollbackward and stop.
fmt =s1. . .node(p) mt sb.
Option 3: Retry once. fmt = s1 . . .node(p) node(p)r . . . sk where r=1.
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4. Internal compensate (no user action required)
Test immediate system x. For example, this can happen if a system switches auto-
matically to dierent backup web server. To test this merely requires applying the
failure and continuing to execute the original test t. In this case, we do not have
to modify the original test at all (note that the assumption is that the system deals
with the failure internally without any change in black-box behavior).
We analyze the fault taxonomy for web applications in [34, 59] for possible mit-
igations. As a result, it is found there are eight themes or patterns of mitigations
(see Figure 3.7). Some of them show similarity to [49, 46, 15].
Figure 3.7: Mitigation Patterns.
While weaving rules in this section are representative, they are not meant to be
comprehensive. We expect that, over time, we may nd some more or nd that
some are more common than others. Table 3.8 summarize all weaving rules.
38
Let PE = {(p, e)| pair selected by GA}. Weaving mti ∈ MTi into a test at
position p (pair(p,i)) results in a failure mitigation test path fmt. However, in case
of multiple mitigation test paths (i.e |MTi| > 1), we need to decide what weaving
criterion for MTi to use. We have two options:
• All combinations, that is we weave each mti ∈ MTi for every occurrence of
pair (k,i) , 1 ≤ k ≤ length(I), (k, i) ∈ PE.
• We merely cover all mti ∈MTi, but not at every possible position (k, i) ∈ PE.
The rst option results in at least |MTe| fail-safe mitigation test cases for each (p,e)
pair, hence is more costly. If there are x such (p,e) pairs in PE the number of fmts
is |MTe| × x. The second criterion results in max{|MTe|, x} fmts.
Using the example in section 3.2.1, Table 3.9 shows the selected pairs and the
fmts created based on them. The rst column in Table 3.9 numbers each failure
mitigation test (fmt1 − fmt9). The second column lists each (p, e) pair in PE.
The third column refers to the failure type whose mitigation is tested. The fourth
column states the node at position p. The fth column identies the behavioral
test used in constructing fmti (i = 1, · · · , 9). The sixth column identies which
mitigation model is used as described in Table 3.6. The seventh column lists which
mtij is used as described in Table 3.6. The last column shows the failure mitigation
tests.
3.7 Generate Executable Tests, Execute and Vali-
date
The set of failure mitigation test paths now have to be transformed into exe-
cutable tests. For the FSMWeb model, this means resolving the input predicates
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Table 3.8: Mitigation Patterns and Weaving Rules
Mitigation pattern Weaving Rule Name WR#
Alternative Fix - option 1 1
FMT =s1 . . .node(p) mt node(p) . . . sk
Retry Rollback - option 3 2
FMT =s1 . . .node(p) node(p)r . . . sk
Fix and Proceed Fix - option 1 3
FMT =s1 . . .node(p) mt node(p) . . . sk
End Activity Rollforward - option 1 4
FMT =s1 . . .node(p) mt sf . . . sk
End All Rollback - option 2 5
FMT =s1 . . .node(p) mt sb
Rollback Rollback - option 1 6
FMT =s1 . . .node(p) mt sb . . . sk
Ignore No user action required 7
Internal compensate
Go to fail-safe Fix - option 2 8
FMT = s1 . . .node(p) mt sg
(cf. section 3.2). The sequences of inputs form the executable tests. These are
now executed. The failure is injected at the proper position in the test execution.
Execution monitoring is used to reveal mitigation defects. We record any failure
mitigation defects found for each test requirement (p, e). This information is used
to determine the value of the tness function.
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Table 3.9: Selected (p, e) Pairs and resulting FMT .
# pairs Failure Node BT used MM used mtij used FMT
1 (2,1) f1 n5 bt1 MM1 mt11 n1, n5, sg
2 (11,2) f2 n3 bt3 MM2 mt21 n1, n3, n1
3 (7,3) f3 n6 bt2 MM3 mt31 n1, n5, n6, n6, n7, n2
4 (8,4) f4 n7 bt2 MM4 mt41 n1, n5, n6, n7, s1, s2, n7, n2
5 (8,4) f4 n7 bt2 MM4 mt42 n1, n5, n6, n7, s1, s3, n2
6 (12,3) f3 n4 bt3 MM3 mt31 n1, n3, n4, n4, n3, n2
7 (8,1) f1 n7 bt2 MM1 mt11 n1, n5, n6, n7, sg
8 (6,2) f2 n5 bt2 MM2 mt21 n1, n5, n1
9 (4,3) f3 n2 bt1 MM3 mt31 n1, n5, n7, n2, n2
3.8 Fitness evaluation and determination of next
generation
3.8.1 Fossil Record (FR):
For each test requirement and its associated test case(s) test validation results
indicate whether it helped nd a failure mitigation defect or not. For each genera-
tion, we record this information in the fossil record. A fossil record entry is a triplet
(p, e, d) where (p, e) is a test requirement from a given generation and d is a boolean
value that is 1 if a mitigation defect was found through the test requirement and 0
if it was not.
The fossil record stores the old population of test requirements for further com-
parison with new population data. The tness function uses this information when
it tries to determine either very novel test requirements (compared to those from
prior generations) or mine around test requirements that helped nd mitigation de-
fects (i.e. generate new test requirements that are similar). This makes the tness
function relative, rather than absolute.
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3.8.2 Fitness Function:
Similar to James et al. [54], it provides for exploring, prospecting and mining.
Exploring rewards novelty as being farther away from individuals in the fossil record,
while prospecting and mining use functions that either measure the distance from
known mitigation defects (farther is better) or search closely around existing defects.
First, the tness function is using the novelty (S) of an individual (p, e). It is











where pc is a position (point of failure) to be evaluated
ec is a failure type at the point of failure to be evaluated
pq is the position of the fossil record
eq is the failure type of the fossil record
length(I) is the total number of positions
|F | is total number of failure types
FR = {(pq, eq, dq)|(pq, eq, dq) in Fossil Record}
|FR| is the total number of (p, e) pairs in FR
The second part of the tness function uses proximity (R) of individuals to
individuals with known mitigation defects. It helps the search to focus attention
on error-weighted regions of the search space. Based on the individuals in the fossil
record that triggered defects, R is calculated as the distance for the new individual











where p, and e are the position and failure type in the fossil record that triggered a
mitigation defect. FRd = {(p, e, 1)|(p, e, 1) ∈ FR and (p,e) found mitigation defect}
After executing the test cases associated with a given individual (p, e), R is used as
follows, depending on whether (p, e) triggered a mitigation defect:
R(pc, ec) =





That is, if a mitigation defect was found, we prospect away from the known
defects, if (p, e) did not trigger a mitigation defect, we mine around individuals that
are known to trigger defects. The overall tness function tries to balance exploration,
prospecting and mining as in James et al. [54] as follows:
Fitness = (ws × S1.5)2 × (wr ×R1.5)2
where ws is a weight for exploration and wr is a weight for prospecting and mining.
3.8.3 Generate New Generation
This step consists of 3 parts. First, the GA ranks the individuals in the current
population by their tness values and selects the top half (i.e. we use the median of
the tness values as a cut o). These are candidate pairs for the new generation.
Second the GA selects a proportion of these most t individuals for crossover,
based on a crossover rate (CR). We chose a CR=0.5. That means the GA selects
50% of the most t individuals and exchanges their positions. Crossover between
two individuals (p1, e1) and (p2, e2), is accomplished by exchanging the positions,
thus creating new individuals (p1, e2) and (p2, e1).
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The third step is to mutate a certain percentage of the current population. This
percentage is called mutation rate (MR). For example, if the mutation rate is 30%
to mutate (p, e) into the (p′, e), the GA randomly selects 30% of the individuals and
randomly selects a p′ 6= p as the new position for them. The algorithm removes
duplicates and individuals that are infeasible based on the SE matrix.
Note that the population sizes of successive generations are dynamic similar to
[57, 12].
3.9 Stopping Criteria
The GA will continue as long as new generations are created, or the number of
test requirements has not reached its limit (i.e we have a limited test budget). If the
test budget has not been exhausted, we attempt to create a new generation, subject
to the following condition: there is at least one individual in the current generation
with a higher tness function than individuals in the fossil record.
If the mutation and crossover do not produce new individuals (i.e. because the
test requirements are not feasible according to the SE matrix, or are duplicates of
individuals in the Fossil Record) the algorithm also stops.
Algorithm 3.8 shows the pseudocode of the approach and algorithm 3.9 shows
the pseudocode of creating a new generation.
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Algorithm 3: GA Approach
Require: State-Event Matrix (SE), Novelty Weight ws, Proximity
Weight wr, Crossover rate (CR), Mutation Rate (MR), Failure
types F, Concatenate of behavioral test (I)
Ensure: Selected Best Pairs (p, e)
1: Generation of pairs Gen = φ /* Gen is an Array of (p, e, d, FF )
where d is defect found and FF tness function Initial ∀(p, e) : d =
false and FF = null */
2: Fossil Record FR = φ
3: NoGeneration = 0
4: while More Generation Needed do
5: if NoGeneration = 0 then
6: /* compute initial population based on dpe, dps */
7: Gen ← ComputeInitialPopulation(SE) /* see Algorithm
No. 4 */
8: else
9: /* Generate New Generation */
10: /* use crossover rate, mutation rate, old Gen and search space
to generate new Gen */
11: /* if i>1, Gen is the best individual selected on line 46 */
12: Gen← GenerateNewPopulation(Gen,CR,MR, I)/* see Al-
gorithm No. 3 */
13: end if
14: NoGeneration = NoGeneration+ 1
15: Results = φ
16: End Loop
Results← (p, e, d) /* Enter (p, e, d) into Results */
d = true
IF defect found using (p,e) Then
/* Record Defect (p,e,d) where d is defect found */
Evaluate Tests (p, e)
Execute Tests (p, e)
Generate Tests (p, e)
Loop ∀(p, e) ∈ Gen
∀(p, e) ∈ Gen : d = false
/* External Process */
17: if NoGeneration > 1 then
18: /* Compute Fitness Function */
19: for c = 0 to length(Gen) do
20: S = 0 : R = 0
21: /* Compute Novelty S */
22: Sum = 0
23: for l = 0 to length(FR) do
24: Sum ← Sum + ([(Gen[c].p − FR[l].p)2/length(I)] +
[(Gen[c].e− FR[l].e)2/length(F )])
25: end for
26: S ← SQR(Sum)
27: /* Compute Proximity R */
28: Sum = 0









37: Fitness value for individual
38: Gen[c].FF = (ws × S1.5)2 × (wr ×R1.5)2
39: end for
40: /* Select individuals with highest FF for crossover and mu-
tation */
41: /* These individuals will be used for crossover and mutation
*/
42: Gen← {Gen|Gen.FF ≥Median(Gen.FF )}
43: end if
44: /* Store best Selection in FR */
45: FR← Gen
46: DefectFound = 0
47: for f1 = 0 to length(FR) do
48: for f2 = 0 to length(Results) do
49: /* defect found */
50: if FR[f1] = Results[f2] and Results[f2].d is true then
51: /* Keep defect index position to be used in Fitness Func-
tion */
52: IndexDefect[DefectFound]← f1





58: Output: FR includes Best Pairs
Figure 3.8: GA Approach
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Algorithm 4: Algorithm for creating New Generation
Require: Generation of pairs (Gen), Crossover rate (CR), Mutation Rate (MR),
Length of concatenate a behavioral test (I)
Ensure: Generate New Population for GA
/* Crossover */
Split← Integer(length(Gen)× CR) /* Split index position in Gen */
/* Swap positions */
p1[]← φ
p2[]← φ
/* Split the position vector from rst position to Split index position in Gen */
p1 ← Slice(Gen.p, 0, Split)
/* Split the position vector from Split index position to the end in Gen */
p2 ← Slice(Gen.p, Split, length(Gen))
/* Merge two position vectors p1 and p2 */
Gen.p←Merge(p1, p2)
/* Mutation */
Number of Mutation positions MutP ← Integer(length(Gen)×MR)
for pm = 0 to MutP do
SelectedPair ← Random(Gen) /* Random Selection of individual from Gen /
Selected position p′ ← Random(length(I)) /* Random Selection of position
from I /
/* Replace position p in selected individual with p′ */
Gen[SelectedPair] ← {(p′, e)|p′ ∈ I ∧ p′ 6= Gen[SelectedPair].p, 1 ≤ p′ ≤
length(I)}
end for
Figure 3.9: Algorithm for creating New Generation
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Chapter 4
Validation of GA approach
There are several parts of this approach that need to be analyzed and evaluated.
The most important is the GA approach, since it is at the core of the proposed test
approach. In this section we address the following questions:
1. What mitigation defect density rates occur in practice and what are good
weights wr and ws to use for them?
2. For commonly occurring mitigation defect densities, does the GA algorithm
generate individuals which when converted to fail-safe mitigation tests trigger
mitigation defects?
3. Is the approach scalable?
4. How do the results compare with random generation of individuals both in
terms of eectiveness and eciency.
4.1 Description of Simulator
We built a simulator that allows to vary the following variables:
1. Test suite size (length(I))
47
2. Failure types (|F|)
3. Mitigation defect density (D)
4. Applicability level (AL)(percentage of 1 entries in the state-event matrix)
5. Duplication factor (DF). This variable is dened as DF = length(I)/|S|. that
is, the length of the concatenated test suite divided by the number of states in
the behavioral model. It computes the average number of times a state occurs
in I.
6. Crossover rate (CR)
7. Mutation rate (MR)
8. Exploration weight (ws)
9. Prospecting and mining weight (wr)
10. Number of runs per problem (NR)
11. Type of (p,e) pair (test requirement) generation. The simulator supports the
following approaches: GA, Random, and CC (Coverage Criteria).
The rst two variables describe the problem size and characteristics. length(I) and
|F| determine the size of the search space. The mitigation defect density is used to
determine how many mitigations are defective. These are marked with (d), so it can
be determined later whether a selected (p,e) pair uncovers a mitigation defect or
not. The applicability level is used to determine the number of '1' in the state event
matrix which is generated next. Using the duplication factor, the simulator deter-
mines the number of states in the behavioral model and generates a concatenated
test suite as a sequence of nodes.
The remainder of the variables are used to congure the GA and to determine
the number of runs for each problem.
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The simulator selects one or more of the (p,e) pair generation approaches (GA,
Random) and determines the set of test requirements ((p,e) pairs). Then it deter-
mines whether or not they found a defect and computes defect coverage for each
approach. We use the following dependent variables:
• Test requirements ((p,e) pairs)
• The number of test requirements.
• The set of mitigation defects found
• The number of mitigation defects found
• The percentage of mitigation defects found.
The simulator computes the (p,e) pairs needed for testing, determines how many
mitigation defects were found and the proportion of mitigation defects found. It also
selects the same number of (p,e) pairs randomly and determines the number of mit-
igation defects found through random selection so we can compare GA performance
a against random selection.
We use the simulator to tune the weight of the tness function, compare our (de-
terministic) initial population to random selection, and compare GA against random
selection of test requirements (section 4.4). Finally, since the cost of tness evalua-
tion on an actual case study is expensive and caused us to abandon the traditional
GA approach of multiple runs, we compared single run performance against multiple
runs.
After we set up the simulator's parameters values, the simulator will automati-
cally build the state-event matrix (SE) based on applicability level percentage value
(AL). The value of 1 entries in the state-event matrix will be distributed randomly.
Next, the simulator constructs a defect state event matrix based on the mitigation
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defect density (D) by multiplying the number of '1' in the SE matrix with the defect
density D and rounding to the next integer. The result is the number of defective
mitigations. For example, if the SE matrix contains 100 of '1' entries and D=5%,
there are 5 mitigation defects. These are randomly selected and marked in the de-
fect state event matrix. Whenever a (p,e) pair's tness is evaluated, the simulator
looks up the node in position p and checks whether the defect state event matrix
for (node(p),e) is marked as having a defect.
4.2 Initial Population
Since we determine the initial population deterministically, rather than randomly
using multiple runs, we need to evaluate how good the initial population is. Table
4.1 shows the results comparing initial population selected via defect potential (Al-
gorithm ??) against multiple runs of randomly selected initial populations (10 runs).
The rst column lists the number of generations generated. The second and third
columns list results for using defect potential for selecting the initial population
(pairs needed in each generation and cumulative percentage of defects found, re-
spectively). Columns 4 and 5 list the results for selecting the initial population
randomly.
The simulator's parameters values are selected based on our case study (section
6) as follows:
1. Test suite size (length(I))=169
2. Failure types (|F|)=10
3. Mitigation defect density (D)=5%
4. Applicability level (AL)=42%
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5. Crossover rate (CR)=0.5
6. Mutation rate (MR)=0.3
7. Exploration weight (ws)=3
8. Prospecting and mining weight (wr)=1
9. Number of runs=10
The results show that using the defect potential is more ecient. Using defect
potential nds all mitigation defects in fewer generations with fewer (p, e) pairs
(last row of Table 4.1). The results show that random selection of initial population
needs 5 additional generations and 182 additional test requirements compared to
using defect potential. In addition using defect potential nds earlier (rst defect
found in generation 1 vs. 3).
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Table 4.1: Random vs. defect potential
(based on 10 runs)
# of Generation
Initial population based on defect potential Random Initial Population
# of pairs Defect Found % # of pairs Defect Found %
intial popluation 16 33% 12 0%
2 20 33% 15 0%
3 21 33% 18 33%
4 23 33% 21 33%
5 26 33% 23 33%
6 29 33% 25 33%
7 30 33% 28 33%
8 33 67% 32 33%
9 36 67% 34 33%
10 37 67% 36 33%
11 40 67% 37 33%






Total pairs 352 534
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4.3 Tuning of the GA
An important question in making the GA approach described in section 3 was
what values to use for exploration weight and prospecting weight. Basically higher
defect densities prot from a higher weight for prospecting and mining (wr > ws)
while lower defect densities show GA results when the exploration weight is higher
(ws > wr).
To determine what are "high" and "low" defect rates, we rely on Sawaelpong et
al. [67] who report that 19-23% of exception handling routines have defects. They
consider 20% a high defect rate and 5% a low one. In their tuning experiments,
they vary ws and wr for search spaces varying from 800-2000 and found that for
high defect rates wr = 3 and ws = 1 had the highest defect coverage while for low
defect rates wr = 1 and ws = 3 performed better. When defect rates are in between
(neither high, nor low) unequal weights do not fare as well. This is summarized in
Table 4.2. For the high defect rate of 20% biasing towards prospecting and mining
uncovers between 88-92% of the defects, while for the lower defect rate of 15%, only
78% of the defects are found. Similarly, biasing towards exploration for the low
defect density of 5% nds between 95%-100% of the mitigation defects while this
biasing does not work as well for the higher defect rate of 10%: only between 73-
85% of the mitigation defects are found. It is thus important to consider expected
mitigation defect rate when selecting these weights in the tness function.
We next turn to the selection of values for crossover and mutation rate. We used a
crossover rate of CR=0.50 and a mutation rate of MR=0.30. Typical crossover rates
based on De Jong's simulations are between 0.5-0.6 [16, 22]. As for the mutation
rate, theoretical work reports a rule of thumb of 1/N (N is the number of genes,
in our case N = 2) [11]. By contrast typical mutation rates in the literature are
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Table 4.2: Percentage of Mitigation Defects Found
wr=3 ws=1 wr=1 ws=3
length(I) ×|F | 20% 15% 10% 5%
800 92 78 80 95
1000 88 78 85 100
2000 92 78 73 95
around 0.15 [16]. The mutation rate we chose is a compromise between the two. As
is common practice in GA experiments [2], we used 10 simulation runs per problem.
4.4 Comparsion GA vs. Random
We performed a series of simulation experiments to compare the performance of
the GA with random selection of test requirements ((p, e) pairs). Table 4.3 shows
the values of the parameters chosen. length(I) is the length of the test suite, |F |
is the number of failure types. length(I) × |F | is the size of the potential search
space (the GA removes infeasible pairs based on the SE matrix), D is the mitigation
defect density. This was chosen to be small, since it makes for a more dicult search
problem. The GA parameters were chosen as explained in section 4.3.
The results are shown in Table 4.4. The leftmost column shows length(I)× |F |.
The second column reports the number of (p, e) pairs needed to nd the defect
percentage reported in column three for the GA. The last column reports percentage
of mitigation defects found by random search using the same number of (p, e) pairs.
The GA nds all mitigation defects while random search never nds all defects and
is unable to nd any defects for 6 of the 10 problems.
The next question was whether random generation was just less ecient and
would have eventually caught up with the GA approach if allowed to generate more
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Table 4.3: Parameter settings for GA vs Random Comparison
length(I) F length(I) ×|F | D AL CR MR ws wr NR
40-400 5 200-2000 5% 80% 0.5 0.3 3 1 10
Table 4.4: Eectiveness: GA vs. Random
length(I)× |F | # of pairs (p,e)
GA Random
% Defect Found % Defect Found
200 31 100 50
400 34 100 50
600 39 100 25
800 34 100 0
1000 38 100 0
1200 38 100 0
1400 39 100 0
1600 32 100 0
1800 32 100 0
2000 35 100 33
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individuals. Table 4.5 explores this. It lists the number of individuals needed to
reach the rst defect, to reach 50% of the defects, and to reach 100% of the defects
for both GA and Random based generation. As before we varied population between
200 and 2000. If random generation did not reach a detection level, the table reports
n/a. For smaller search spaces (populations 200, 400, 600) Random generation
initially nds mitigation defects faster, but, unlike the GA approach it plateaus
and is unable to nd all mitigation defects. We also show initial faster nding of
mitigation defects for population 2000, but, again Random generation is unable to
achieve detection of all mitigation defects. For all other population sizes GA is more
ecient throughout.
4.5 Single Runs vs. Multiple Runs
The results of selecting the population for a generation are a set of test require-
ments (i.e. (p, e) pairs). They are used to generate failure mitigation paths and
executable test cases. These must be executed and validated. All of these steps
are manual, hence orders of magnitude more expensive than generating test require-
ments. This also makes the cost of multiple runs prohibitive. Multiple runs are
possible when the use of a GA is explored with a simulator as in [58][13]. However,
when actual test cases need to be generated, executed, and validated to determine a
test requirements' tness, this GA evaluation cost becomes prohibitive for multiple
runs. We then must be willing to accept a local rather than global optimum as long
as the mitigation defects are found, For quantitative results on evaluation cost see
section 6.5 in our case study. Note also the global minimum in terms of number of
test requirements is equal to the number of mitigation defects that exist.
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Table 4.5: Eciency: GA vs. Random
Search Space First defect Found First reach 50% First reach 100%
200
GA 9 14 29
R 7 12 n/a
400
GA 24 24 30
R 21 21 n/a
600
GA 25 25 28
R 21 21 n/a
800
GA 17 23 32
R 28 48 n/a
1000
GA 37 37 37
R n/a n/a n/a
1200
GA 32 32 36
R n/a n/a n/a
1400
GA 27 27 34
R 49 49 n/a
1600
GA 24 32 36
R 87 n/a n/a
1800
GA 20 24 26
R 68 n/a n/a
2000
GA 22 28 31
R 17 93 n/a
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Cantú-Paz [19] explore whether multiple runs of a GA can reach solutions of
higher quality or reach acceptable solutions faster. Their results suggest that with
a xed evaluation budget a single run reaches a better solution than multiple inde-
pendent runs.
We used the simulator with the data of subsystem CD of our case study in Chap-
ter 6 to evaluate single vs. multiple runs. We perform independently 10 dierent
runs. Table 4.6 shows the results. The rst column identies the generations. Next,
for each of the runs (Run #1 to Run #10) two results are reported per genera-
tion: the number of individuals in a given generation (test requirements) and the
cumulative population of defects found so far.
Table 4.6: Multiple Runs of GA
Run#1 Run#2 Run#3 Run#4 Run#5 Run#6 Run#7 Run#8 Run#9 Run#10
G1 11 0% 11 33% 11 33% 11 33% 11 33% 11 33% 11 33% 11 33% 11 33% 11 33%
G2 16 33% 15 33% 17 67% 16 33% 16 33% 16 33% 16 33% 15 33% 15 33% 15 33%
G3 18 33% 17 33% 21 67% 19 33% 19 67% 19 33% 18 33% 19 33% 18 33% 19 33%
G4 20 33% 18 33% 23 67% 20 67% 21 67% 20 33% 19 67% 22 33% 19 33% 21 33%
G5 23 33% 21 67% 24 67% 23 67% 24 67% 21 33% 23 67% 24 33% 21 67% 24 33%
G6 23 33% 23 67% 26 67% 26 67% 26 67% 26 33% 26 67% 26 33% 25 67% 27 33%
G7 24 33% 26 67% 28 67% 28 67% 27 67% 29 33% 27 67% 28 33% 26 67% 29 33%
G8 25 33% 30 67% 29 67% 31 67% 28 67% 30 33% 28 67% 29 33% 28 67% 30 33%
G9 27 33% 31 67% 33 67% 32 67% 29 67% 33 67% 30 67% 30 33% 30 67% 31 33%
G10 28 33% 32 67% 33 67% 33 67% 31 67% 36 67% 31 67% 30 33% 32 67% 32 33%
G11 30 33% 33 67% 35 67% 36 67% 33 67% 37 67% 32 67% 33 33% 35 67% 32 33%
G12 32 33% 34 67% 36 67% 38 67% 36 67% 40 67% 33 67% 35 33% 36 67% 34 33%
G13 34 33% 36 67% 38 67% 40 67% 38 67% 41 67% 34 67% 37 33% 37 67% 35 67%
G14 35 33% 37 67% 39 67% 40 100% 40 67% 41 100% 35 67% 38 33% 38 67% 38 67%
G15 38 33% 39 67% 41 100% 41 67% 36 67% 39 33% 40 67% 39 67%
G16 39 33% 40 67% 42 67% 37 67% 40 33% 40 100% 40 67%
G17 42 33% 41 67% 43 67% 38 67% 42 100% 41 100%
G18 44 33% 42 67% 43 100% 39 67%
G19 45 100% 42 100% 40 67%
G20 42 67%
G21 42 100%
554 568 434 393 548 400 595 498 451 498
As for eectiveness, each run nds all mitigation defects. The runs dier in
eciency. Run #7 needs the most generations (21), while Run #4 and Run #6
need the least (14). Similary, Run #7 generates the most test requirements (595)
while Run #4 needs the fewest (392). By only performing one run, we risk sacricing
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some eciency. However, any of these runs requires fewer test requirements than
an exhaustive search. As Chapter 6 will demonstrate, the cost of exhaustive search
is prohibitive in practice.
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Chapter 5
GA vs. Coverage Criteria
5.1 Coverage Criteria (CC)
We did compare the performance of the GA to random selection of fail-safe
scenarios, and the results show GA performance was better than random selection.
In this chapater, we compare the approach against Coverage Criteria dened by
Andrews et al. [6]:
Criteria 1 (C1): All combinations, i.e. all positions p, all applicable failure types e
(test everything). This is clearly infeasible for all but the smallest models. It would
require length(I) × |F | pairs if SE contains all "1"s.
Criteria 2 (C2): All unique nodes, all applicable failures. This only requires:∑k
j=1
∑|S|
i=1 (SE(i,j)=1) combinations i.e. the number of one entries in the State-
Faiture matrix (SE). When some nodes occur many times in a test suite only one
needs to be selected by some scheme. This could lead to not testing failure recovery
in all tests. An alternative is to require covering each test as well.
Criteria 3 (C3): All tests, all unique nodes, all applicable failures. Here we simply
require that when unique nodes need to be covered they are selected from tests that
have not been covered.
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A weaker criterion is not to require covering all applicable failures for each
selected position. Note that C2 and C3 require the same number of pairs. Its
eectiveness is the same, whether a failure f occurs in position p or p′ where
node(p) = node(p′) = s is irrelevant for mitigation failure detection. That is, a
test would nd (or not nd) a mitigation defect for a failure in state s, no matter
where in the test suite s occurs.
Criteria 4 (C4): All tests, all unique nodes, some failures (only one failure per
position, but covering all failures). Some failure means that collectively all failures
must be paired with a position at least once, but not with each selected position as
in criteria 3.
Coverage criteria are attractive, since they allow for systematic algorithmic gen-
eration of points of failure and failure types. Depending on the criteria, a strong
one may not scale to larger problems while a weaker one may not be eective. For
example, requiring all applicable failure events in all states in each test to be cov-
ered, is infeasible for all but the smallest behavioral models and a small number of
failure types. For smaller test problems, test criteria are feasible and may be better.
5.2 Design of Experiments
We extended the simulator in section 4.1 to run experiments to investigate the
following research questions:
• Under which conditions can we use the GA or the coverage criteria?
• How does the GA test strategy compare to the use of the four coverage criteria
(C1-C4) both with respect to eciency and eectiveness?
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• Is there a dierence in performance when we have a small search space vs. a
large one?
The simulator takes the same independent and dependent variables as described in
section 4.1.
We report on a series of simulation experiments that compares the two strategies
with respect to eectiveness and eciency. Specically, we compare the two strate-
gies in light of dierent problem sizes. By problem size we mean the combination
of number of failure types and size of the test suite. GAs tend to work well in large
search spaces, so the question becomes at what point is the problem too small for a
GA to be used meaningfully. Conversely, depending on the test criteria, some may
become rather expensive, i.e leading to a large number of testing requirements.
We investigate and compare the two strategies for large and small problems and
considers both eciency and eectiveness. We do this via simulation experiments.
To increase validity, we also present a comparisons of GA and coverage criteria for
generating test requirements via a series of case studies:
• Three web applications (student services, a mortgage system, and one of its
subsystems)
• Four safety critical systems (Two versions of a railroad crossing control system
(RCCS), an insulin pump, and an aerospace launch vehicle)
The case studies are investigated by seeding mitigation defects and evaluating whether




For the GA parameters, we use the same parameters as were identied and ex-
perimented with in section 4.1: mutation rate MR=0.3, crossover CR=0.5, number
of runs NR=10. We chose a defect rate D that is close to the one reported by
Sawaelpong et al. [67]: D=20%. Based on the results of tuning the GA in section
4.3 (see Table 4.2) we selected exploration weights wr=3 and ws=1. We vary the
size of length(I)× |F | from 10 to 2000. We keep the applicability level at the same
level as in the prior experiments. The duplication factor is kept at 2 for the small
search space (10-100). That means on average a specic state in the behavioral
model occurs in the test suite twice. Note that the duplication factor of one of the
RCCS example is about 3. The duplication factor for the case studies reported in
section 5.3 for the small search spaces vary from 2-14 (rounded to closes integer).
A lower duplication factor makes for a more dicult search problem since there
are fewer opportunities to nd a mitigation defect for a failure that occurs in a
particular state. For the larger search spaces, we set the duplication factor to 20.
This is smaller than the duplication factor of 31 for the large case study reported in
section 5.3, again, to make it a harder problem, so as to be conservative. Table 5.1
summarizes the parameter selection for the typical mitigation defect density of 20%.
Table 5.1: Simulation parameter for typical D=20%
length(I)× |F | DF CR MR wr ws NR
10-100 2 0.5 0.3 3 1 10
200-2000 20 0.5 0.3 3 1 10
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Table 5.2 summarizes the simulation parameters for the low defect density of
D=5%. Note that D=5% for length(I)× |F |=10 is not possible as it results in less
than one mitigation defect.
Table 5.2: Simulation parameters for low defect density D=5%
length(I)× |F | DF CR MR wr ws NR
20-100 2 0.5 0.3 1 3 10
200-2000 20 0.5 0.3 1 3 10
We now use the simulator with these parameters to compare GA performance
against coverage criteria (C1-C4).
5.2.2 GA vs. C1
C1 represents the equivalent of an exhaustive search as the test requirements
((p, e) pairs) state that all feasible combinations be tested. C1 guarantees 100%
mitigation defect coverage. Table 5.3 shows simulation results for a mitigation defect
density of 20%. The rst column shows the potential search space length(I) × |F |
(the GA removes infeasible pairs based on the SE Matrix). It varies from 200-2000.
The second column shows the number of pairs the GA generates. The third column
shows the percentage of mitigation defects found by the pairs reported in column 2.
Columns 4 and 5 report this information when using coverage criterion C1.
Both GA and C1 nd all mitigation defects, but GA does so much more ef-
ciently. Column 6 shows this quantitatively by computing the fraction of pairs
needed by the GA vs C1. The GA only needs between 3.4%-5% of the pairs re-
quired by C1, it is clearly more ecient. Both approaches are equally eective.
Next, we consider the typical mitigation defect rate of 20% with the small search
space. Table 5.4 shows these results. It is organized the same as Table 5.3. While
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the GA again generates fewer pairs it is not able to nd all mitigation defects until
length(I)×|F | reaches 70. Hence C1 is more eective for length(I)×|F | ∈ {10, 20,
30, 40, 50, 60}. It is also interesting to note that the relative eciency (column 6)
is not as good as for the larger search spaces. The GA now needs between 33.3%-
62.5% of the number of pairs C1 requires. We have to conclude then that for this
experiment, C1 is recommended over GA as long as length(I)× |F | ≤ 60.
Next, we turn to the low mitigation defect rate of 5%. Table 5.5 shows the results
for I × |F | ranging between 200-2000 while Table 5.6 shows it for length(I) × |F |
ranging from 20-100. Both tables are organized identical to Table 5.3.
A defect density of 5% represents a more dicult search problem. Table 5.5
shows that for the larger potential search space the GA nds all mitigation defects.
What is interesting is that it does not need many more pairs to do this than for the
larger mitigation defect rate. The relative eciency compared to the larger miti-
gation defect ratio is also similar (Table 5.3 shows a slightly wider range [3.4-5.0]
versus [3.8-4.6] in Table 5.5).
We next investigate the low mitigation defect rate D=5% for the small search
space. Results are reported in Table 5.6 (organized the same as Tables 5.3-5.5).
Note that it was not possible to investigate length(I) × |F | = 10, since with a
D=5% this would result in less than one defect, hence is not possible.
As before for the higher defect rate (Table 5.4), the GA is unable to detect all
mitigation defects for the very small search spaces (less than 80 in this case), hence
C1 is more eective. When the defect rate decreases, it takes a larger potential
search space (80 vs. 70) to become successful at nding all defects. Note that we do
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not report relative eciency until both GA and C1 nd all defects since comparing
eciency of an ineective approach compared to one that does nd all defects is
pointless.
Table 5.3: Large Search Space: GA vs. C1 - 20% defect density
length(I)× |F | GA GA C1 C1 GA/C1
# of pairs Defect % defect
pairs required%
200 7 100% 160 100% 4.3%
400 11 100% 320 100% 3.4%
600 17 100% 480 100% 3.5%
800 25 100% 640 100% 4.0%
1000 28 100% 800 100% 3.5%
1200 30 100% 960 100% 3.5%
1400 39 100% 1120 100% 3.1%
1600 53 100% 1280 100% 5.0%
1800 57 100% 1440 100% 4.0%
2000 70 100% 1600 100% 4.3%
5.2.3 GA vs. C2/C3
Next, we compare GA performance to coverage criteria C2 and C3. C2 and C3
result in the same number of test requirements. Although positions in a pair may
dier, the same combinations of states and failures are tested (see section 5.1). In
other words, C2 and C3 do not dier in what states and failures need to be covered,
only in whether states can be selected from any t ∈ BT or whether all t ∈ BT need
to be covered. This results in selection of dierent positions p for C2 vs. C3.
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Table 5.4: Small Search Space: GA vs. C1 - 20% defect density
length(I)× |F | GA GA C1 C1 GA/C1
# of pairs Defect % defect
pairs required%
10 5 50% 8 100% 62.5%
20 7 50% 16 100% 43.8%
30 8 50% 24 100% 33.3%
40 12 50% 32 100% 37.5%
50 16 67% 40 100% 40.0%
60 23 83% 48 100% 47.9%
70 26 100% 56 100% 46.4%
80 28 100% 64 100% 43.8%
90 32 100% 72 100% 44.4%
100 35 100% 80 100% 43.8%
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Table 5.5: Large Search Space: GA vs. C1 - 5% defect density
length(I)× |F | GA GA C1 C1 GA/C1
# of pairs Defect % defect
pairs required%
200 6 100% 160 100% 3.8%
400 12 100% 320 100% 3.8%
600 22 100% 480 100% 4.6%
800 27 100% 640 100% 4.2%
1000 34 100% 800 100% 4.3%
1200 43 100% 960 100% 4.5%
1400 46 100% 1120 100% 4.1%
1600 60 100% 1280 100% 4.7%
1800 61 100% 1440 100% 4.2%
2000 72 100% 1600 100% 4.5%
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Table 5.6: Small Search Space: GA vs. C1 - 5% defect density
length(I)× |F | GA GA C1 C1 GA/C1
# of pairs Defect % defect
pairs required%
20 9 0% 16 100%
30 11 0% 24 100%
40 15 0% 32 100%
50 16 50% 40 100%
60 20 50% 48 100%
70 24 50% 56 100%
80 30 100% 64 100% 46.9%
90 35 100% 72 100% 48.6%
100 37 100% 80 100% 46.3%
As before, we rst analyze the performance of GA vs coverage criteria for the
typical mitigation defect rate of 20% (both large and small problem), then for the
low mitigation defect rate of 5%. All other parameter values are as indicated in
section 5.2.1.
Table 5.7 shows the results for D=20% and length(I) × |F | ∈ {200,...., 2000}.
It is organized identical to the earlier result tables. Both GA and C2/C3 are able
to nd all mitigation defects (see columns 3 and 5). The number of pairs does not
dier as much as for GA vs. C1 (section 5.2.2), although GA needs fewer pairs. The
relative eciency of the GA is between 62.5% and 87.5%.
We next turn to the small potential search space. Table 5.8 shows results for
the small search spaces ranging from 10-100 and a mitigation defect density of
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Table 5.7: Large Search Space: GA vs. C2/C3 - 20% defect density
length(I)× |F | GA GA C2/C3 C2/C3 GA/(C2/C3)
# of pairs Defect % defect
pairs required %
200 7 100% 8 100% 87.5%
400 11 100% 16 100% 68.8%
600 17 100% 24 100% 70.8%
800 25 100% 32 100% 78.1%
1000 28 100% 40 100% 70.0%
1200 30 100% 48 100% 62.5%
1400 39 100% 56 100% 69.6%
1600 53 100% 64 100% 82.8%
1800 57 100% 72 100% 79.2%
2000 70 100% 80 100% 87.5%
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20%. The GA does not reach 100% eectiveness until a search space of 70, showing
C2/C3 is more eective for search spaces ranging from 10-60. The number of pairs
is comparable: C2/C3 ranges from 5-40 pairs, GA ranges from 5-35 pairs. We thus
recommend to use C2/C3 for potential search spaces of less than 70, and GA for
larger ones.
Table 5.8: Small Search Space: GA vs. C2/C3 - 20% defect density
length(I)× |F | GA GA C2/C3 C2/C3 GA/(C2/C3)
# of pairs Defect % defect
pairs required %
10 5 50% 5 100%
20 7 50% 8 100%
30 8 50% 12 100%
40 12 50% 16 100%
50 16 67% 20 100%
60 23 83% 24 100%
70 26 100% 28 100% 92.9%
80 28 100% 32 100% 87.5%
90 32 100% 36 100% 88.9%
100 35 100% 40 100% 87.5%
As before, we next consider the lower mitigation defect rate of D=5%. Table 5.9
shows results for the large potential search space while Table 5.10 shows results for
the small one. As with the higher mitigation defect rate, both GA and C2/C3 are
able to nd all defects for the larger search space.
What is interesting is that decreasing the defect rate does not appear to aect
the number of pairs the GA needs very much although the trend is for an increased
71
number of pairs for the smaller mitigation defect rate. This is also illustrated by
comparing relative eciency: for the lower defect rate, GA needs up to 93.8% of
pairs C2/C3 needs while for the higher one GA needs no more than 87.5% of the
number of pairs C2/C3 requires.
Similarly, when comparing results for the small search space between the lower
(Table 5.10) and higher (Table 5.8) defect rates, initially the GA is not able to nd
all defects (length(I) × |F | ≤ 80). When it nally does, it requires slightly fewer
pairs than C2/C3.
Overall, it appears that lowering the defect rate from 20% to 5% does not have a
huge impact in eectiveness or eciency. C2/C3 and GA are equally eective, with
GA being only slightly more ecient.
In summary, for large search spaces GA and C2/C3 are equally eective; the GA
has a slight advantage in eciency over C2/C3. Based on the results, we recommend
using coverage criteria for small search spaces (until 70 for D=20% and until 80 for
D=5%) over using a GA.
5.2.4 GA vs. C4
C4 is the weakest of the four coverage criteria and requires the fewest (p,e) pairs.
We rst compare results for large search spaces and defect rates of 20% (Table 5.11)
and 5% (Table 5.13). In both cases the results are very strong: The GA nds
all defects while C4 is unable to nd any. C4's relative higher eciency is hence
irrelevant. The criteria is too weak. We turn to the small search space next. Table
5.12 reports results for D=20% while Table 5.14 summarizes results for D=5%.
The GA does not nd all defects until length(I)× |F | reaches 70 (D=20%) and 80
(D=5%). Therefore, we can not recommend GA for small potential search spaces.
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Table 5.9: Large search space of GA vs. C2/C3 - 5% defect density
length(I)× |F | GA GA C2/C3 C2/C3 GA/(C2/C3)
# of pairs Defect % defect
pairs required %
200 6 100% 8 100% 75.0%
400 12 100% 16 100% 75.0%
600 22 100% 24 100% 91.7%
800 27 100% 32 100% 84.4%
1000 34 100% 40 100% 85.0%
1200 43 100% 48 100% 89.6%
1400 46 100% 56 100% 82.1%
1600 60 100% 64 100% 93.8%
1800 61 100% 72 100% 84.7%
2000 72 100% 80 100% 90.0%
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Table 5.10: Small Search Space: GA vs. C2/C3 - 5% defect density
length(I)× |F | GA GA C2/C3 C2/C3 GA/(C2/C3)
# of pairs Defect % defect
pairs required %
20 9 0% 8 100%
30 11 0% 12 100%
40 15 0% 16 100%
50 16 50% 20 100%
60 20 50% 24 100%
70 24 50% 28 100%
80 30 100% 32 100% 93.8%
90 35 100% 36 100% 97.2%
100 37 100% 40 100% 92.5%
What is interesting, however, is that C4 does not detect all defects for any of
the potential search spaces, although it does better than for the larger potential
search spaces. For the 20% defect rate (Table 5.12) it starts out with detecting
50% of the defects for length(I) × |F | = 10 and decreases steadily to 20% when
length(I) × |F | = 90. It appears that as the potential search space increases, its
ability to nd mitigation defects decreases. When considering the lower defect rate
D=5%, the results do not show a trend (Table 5.14, column 5) such as decreasing
eectiveness with increasing potential search space.
In summary, the GA is more eective than C4 for large search spaces for both
defect rates. It has issues nding defects for small search spaces. Overall, we cannot
recommend C4.
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Table 5.11: Large search space: GA vs. C4 - 20% defect density
length(I)× |F | GA GA C4 C4
# of pairs Defect % defect
pairs required %
200 7 100% 2 0%
400 11 100% 4 0%
600 17 100% 6 0%
800 25 100% 8 0%
1000 28 100% 10 0%
1200 30 100% 12 0%
1400 39 100% 14 0%
1600 53 100% 16 0%
1800 57 100% 18 0%
2000 70 100% 20 0%
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Table 5.12: Small Search Space: GA vs. C4- 20% defect density
length(I)× |F | GA GA C4 C4
# of pairs Defect % defect
pairs required
10 5 50% 2 50%
20 7 50% 5 50%
30 8 50% 8 50%
40 12 50% 10 50%
50 16 67% 13 50%
60 23 83% 15 43%
70 26 100% 18 43%
80 28 100% 20 38%
90 32 100% 23 20%
100 35 100% 25 20%
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Table 5.13: Large search space: GA vs. C4 - 5% defect density
length(I)× |F | GA GA C4 C4
# of pairs Defect % defect
pairs required %
200 6 100% 2 0%
400 12 100% 4 0%
600 22 100% 6 0%
800 27 100% 8 0%
1000 34 100% 10 0%
1200 43 100% 12 0%
1400 46 100% 14 0%
1600 60 100% 16 0%
1800 61 100% 18 0%
2000 72 100% 20 0%
77
Table 5.14: Small Search Space: GA vs. C4- 5% defect density
length(I)× |F | GA GA C4 C4
# of pairs Defect % defect
pairs required
20 9 0% 5 50%
30 11 0% 8 50%
40 15 0% 10 0%
50 16 50% 13 50%
60 20 50% 15 0%
70 24 50% 18 0%
80 30 100% 20 0%
90 35 100% 23 33%
100 37 100% 25 0%
5.3 Comparison of Various Case Studies and Model
Types
In this section, we compare dierent case studies with respect to size of PE
and eectiveness and eciency of using GA vs. C1-C4 when seeding 5% of the
mitigations with defects. We chose D=5% to make it a more dicult search problem.
Table 5.15 summarize the case studies. The rst column identies the type of model
used. There are three case studies using FSMWeb [9], one case study using an EFSM
(Extended Finite State Machine), and three case studies using a Communicating
Extended Finite State Machine (CEFSM). Column 2 identies the case studies and
provides a reference where details of the case study can be found. The rst is a
student services web application (CSIS), the second a large mortgage application,
78
Table 5.15: Summary of case studies using dierent behavioral models
Behavioral
Model













CSIS [9] 16 20 3 6 70 33.33%
Mortgage Syatem 127 224 10 266 3998 40.00%
Closing Documents Sub System 12 9 10 12 169 41.67%
EFSM[45] RCCS -1 [6] 4 8 4 4 24 81.25%
CEFSM [45]
Launch System [26] 21 34 14 5 49 45.92%
Insulin Pump [26] 15 23 4 11 74 61.67%
RCCS-2 [26] 14 19 4 11 58 60.71%
underwriting, and management system, the third is one of its subsystems that deals
with closing documents. These are all web applications. The Railroad crossing
control system (RCCS-1) in EFSM format is a simplied version of the RCCS-2 in
CEFSM format. Additionally, we also use CEFSM models of an aerospcae launch
vehicle and an insulin pump. These are all examples of safety critical systems. The
next two columns show the number of states and transitions, respectively. They
vary from 4 in the RCCS-1 to 127 in the mortgage system, and from 8 transitions
in RCCS-1 to 224 for the mortgage system. Column 5 shows the number of failure
types. CSIS only has 3, while the launch vehicle has 14. Column 6 lists the number
of tests for each case study, ranging from 4 to 266. The length of the test suite is
given in column 7. It ranges from 24 to 3998. The product of columns 5 and 7
denes the size of the search space (minus infeasible pairs). The last column shows
the applicability levels for each case study. Applicability levels are usually lower
when certain failures only apply in certain phases of processing. For example, in the
launch vehicle case study, failure types are specic to a launch phase and are not
applicable to earlier or later phases. The highest is for the RCCS-1.
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The mortgage system is the largest. The insulin pump and RCCS-2 have the
same number of test cases and the same number of failures, but they dier in the size
of the search space. RCCS-1 has the smallest search space. As mentioned before,
we seeded each case study with 5% defective mitigations. Table 5.16 shows the size
of the search space length(I)× |F | in column 2 for each case study summarized in
Table 5.15. The remaining columns show the number of (p, e) pairs needed when
using GA, C1, C2, C3, and C4, respectively. Except for C4, all nd 100% of the
defective mitigations. The last column shows the percentage of defective mitigations
found by C4.
As we showed in the simulation experiments, using the GA is much more ecient
than C1. It compares in eciency with C2 and C3. C4 is too weak a testing criterion
and is unable to nd all mitigation defects except for RCCS-1. For four of the seven
case studies, it is unable to nd any of the mitigation defects.
Table 5.16: Eciency Comparison





CSIS 210 14 97 16 16 9 0%
Mortgage System 39980 485 27986 508 508 127 0%
CD 1690 41 638 50 50 12 0%
RCCS-1 96 17 76 13 13 4 100%
Launch System 686 128 386 135 135 21 0%
Insulin Pump 296 25 189 37 37 15 50%
RCCS-2 232 29 138 34 34 14 50%
80
Chapter 6
Case Study - Mortgage System
6.1 General Description
We illustrate our approach on a commercial web application. The mortgage sys-
tem is an example of a critical web application as failures can be drastic: borrowers
lose their home, the company loses its value, and employees lose their jobs. Not all
system components are critical, e.g. components not related to the loan process.
The system provides dierent services in each stage of the loan process. It includes
the following functions:
1. Create the loan.
2. Acknowledge the loan based on the type of pricing.
3. Review the loan to make an approval decision.
4. Request legal documentation via external web services (Document disclosure).
5. Keep and update accounting information for funding and selling the loan
through selected warehouse banks and investors who buy loans.
6. Close the loan by shipping and tracking the loan's data with the investor.
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7. Manage various data used in the system e.g. adding/editing/deleting users or
investors via an administration tool.
8. Provide utilities for loan processing e.g. import/export loan data.
First, the loan ocer users (LO) start creating the loan in the system by entering
borrower information and loan data. The system integrates with other big warehouse
mortgage data systems to import loan data via an external web service. After
creating the loan, the quality control users (QC) will price the loan and set up
the loan type and loan program for acknowledgement. Next, reviewer users (RU)
evaluate the loan data and provide the decision (approve or decline). In some
situations, the reviewer could decide to suspend the loan. Once the loan is approved,
the loan specialist users (SU) make sure the loan documents are legal and assign loan
details. Loan specialist will request the legal document for the loan agreement using
an external web service. Accounting users (AU) ll out the required information for
funding the loan and assigning the loan to a warehouse bank based on the credit
available, such as the funding amount and funding date. Accounting users will also
enter selling information once the loan is sold to a target investor. The closer users
(CU) ship the loan to the investor and track investor deciencies. The loan tool
helps the users to generate and import loan data using dierent formats. Finally,
a management tool exists to administer loan data in the system (e.g. users, banks,
and investors data). This is accessible only for Admin users. The system requires
a user name and password to login. Based on user type dierent functions are
available. Figure 6.1 shows the loan processing by user type. The system is built
using ASP.net, C#, Telerik Rad Controls for ASP.net AJAX, Hibernate technology,
SQL server 2008R, and IIS7 technologies. The system was built by 20 sub-projects.
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It consists of 6887 les with a total size of about 1.48 Gigabytes. Table 6.1 shows
some technical details about the system.
Table 6.1: Technical details of Mortgage System
Cyclomatic Complexity 170476
Max. Depth of Inheritance 9
Max. Class Coupling 1490
Lines of Code 257592
Number of Files 6887
Size in Gigabytes 1.48
SQL database Tables 204
Number of web pages 127
Figure 6.1: Loan processing user types and access privileges.
6.2 FSMWeb Behavioral Model
6.2.1 Partition FSMWeb model
Figure 6.2 shows a logical view of mortgage system, and its HTML links. The
system requires the user to enter the user name and password. Then web services
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are available based on user type. The home page shows all loans that will be closed
in the current week. The user can also navigate to show loans in the next or previous
Figure 6.2: Mortgage System Logical View
week. Some user types can see all system loans in the home page except LO, SU
and RU who can only access their loans since every loan is tied to the LO, SU
and RU in the loan processing life cycle. Figure 6.3 illustrates valid navigation
across the top level partitions of the system. Loan processing data (LPD) can
be accessed either from the home page or by searching a specic loan. From the
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home page, the user can access specic LPD by clicking on the loan number that
appears in a selected week. In the search page, the result of a search is a list of
loans. The user can access any loan from the list by clicking on the loan number,
or if the search resulted in just one explicit loan, the system will be automatically
directed to view the LPD for that loan. Loan processing data (LPD) includes all
data information that is related to the loan processing as shown in Figure 6.1. LPD
is divided into nine dierent sub web services: Loan Prole (LP), Loan in process
(LIP), Closing Document (CD), Funding Form (FF), Accounting Form (AF), Audit
Form (UF), Loan Balancing (LB), Post Closing (PC), and Loan Notes (LN). The
LP page represents all main loan information such as loan number, borrower name,
loan amount etc. Loan in process (LIP) is a cluster service derived from the LPD
cluster. LIP is further divided into four clusters that include loan status (LS), lock
screen (KT), review screen (RT), and insurance screen (IT). The Loan status (LS)
form shows all important dates related to the loan processing. The Lock tab (KT)
represents all required data for acknowledgment of the loan prices. The Review tab
(RT) contains conditions that need to be met prior to closing and the disposition
data for the loan that shows if the loan is approved or not. All information related to
insurance companies are located on insurance tab (IT). Next, the Closing Document
(CD) cluster contains all pages related to legal loan documents and fees as well as
closing instructions. Funding information is showing in the Funding Form (FF)
cluster, and Accounting data related to the loan is represented in the Accounting
Form (AF) partition. A list of all audit questions related to the loan are in the Audit
Form (AF) cluster. The Loan Balance form (LB) cluster shows the loan balance. All
tracking and shipping data are in the Post Closing form (PC) cluster. Any comment
and notes are represented on the Note Form (LN) cluster. Navigation among the
LPD clusters is shown in Figure 6.4. The Loan Tool (LT) cluster includes all utility
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pages that relate to import or export of data to and from the system. Finally, the
Administration (Admin) cluster represents all management data used in the system.
Table 6.2 identies who will have the right to access a particular loan processing
service within the loan status which is required for every single loan function. For
example, the loan status must be in Open status and the user type has to be a
quality control user (QC) in order to lock the loan and have access to the lock tab
(KT) cluster in the LDP cluster. Table 6.2 shows all cluster services at various levels
next to the user type and loan status for each service.
Figure 6.3: Aggregate FSMs with Partition and Top Level Navigation
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Table 6.2: Decomposition of Mortgage system into Partitions
AFSM Cluster User Type Loan status
Entry Portal (w0) All Any
Home Page All Any
Search Page (SP) Simple Search /Advance Search All Any
Loan Processing Data (LPD)
Loan Notes Form (LN) All Any
Loan Prole Form (LP) LO Open
LIP
Loan status tab (LS) All Any
Lock Tab (KT) QC Open-Lock
Review Tab (RT) RU Lock-Suspended
Approve with condition
Insurance Tab (IT) RU Lock-Suspended
Approve with condition
Closing Document Tab (CD) SU Approve to close
Approve with condition
Funding Form (FF) AU Approve to close
Funding - Sold
Accounting Form (AF) AU Approve to close
Funded  Sold
Audit Form (UF) QC Not Funded or Sold
Post Closing Form (PC) CU Funded  Sold
Loan Balance Form (LB) QC/LO Approve to close
Approve with condition
Note (LN) All Any
Loan Tool (LT)
Title policy Entry (LT1) CU Funded - Sold
Deed of Trust Mass (LT2) CU Funded - Sold
Import Investor deciencies (LT3) QC Funded - Sold








Figure 6.4: Loan Processing Data (LPD) Cluster
The full model of this commerical web application consists of (127) LWPs, (22)
clusters, and (224) transitions. Due to page limitations, we present only a key
portion to illustrate the approach. We will detail the Closing Documents (CD)
cluster as an example. Figure 6.5 shows the navigation among the logical web pages
that represent the Closing Documents (CD) service. Table 6.3 shows the nodes and
logical web pages related to (CD). Table 6.5 shows the notations of the aggregate
FSMs that is presented in Figure 6.3. The navigation is based on the following
design decisions for the mortgage system:
• The Loan status should be Approved by (RU) user.
• Only (SU) user role has access to the service.
• SU can request the loan documents via an calling external web service either
through the Documents to Close page (DC) or the Closing instructions (CI)
page.
Obviously, other choices for which navigation is allowable could be dened, but this
initial set is used to illustrate the testing technique. We also decided to simplify
the design somewhat. For example, we are not showing cancel buttons for each web
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page. Thus the example shows how one would deal with this kind of navigation
without the extra clutter of showing all cancel buttons one might have.
Figure 6.5: FSM For Closing Documents (CD) Service
Table 6.3: Nodes for CD Form-FSM
Node LWP Explanation
np3 Selection tab menu Select service from tab
DC Documents to close Request legal document and showing requested documents
CI Closing Instructions Request legal document and showing closing fees
SI Show past instructions Show the history of requested documents
Similarly, we dene logical web pages and navigation among them for the Home
cluster. There is only one cluster node in the Home cluster as shown in Figure 6.6.
Next, we describe the logical web pages for the Search Page (SE) cluster. Figure 6.7
Figure 6.6: Logical Web pages and Navigation for Home Cluster
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shows the logical web pages and the navigation among them. Table 6.4 summarizes
these nodes and corresponding logical web pages.
Figure 6.7: Logical Web pages and Navigation for Search Cluster
Table 6.4: Nodes for SE Form-FSM
Node LWP Explanation
SP Simple Search Page use simple query form to search for loan
SR Search Result Page Display the result of search
EE Export to Excel Export the result of the search to Excel
AS Advance Search Page Search for any loan based on a description
6.2.2 Input Constraints for Logical Web Pages
Table 6.5 shows all annotations on Aggregate FSM transitions for the top level
navigation of the mortgage system (see Figure 6.3). Table 6.6 and Table 6.7 show the
input constraints for Home and Search clusters. The FSM transition constraints for
LPD of Figure 6.4 are shown in Table 6.8. Table 6.9 demonstrates all FSM transition
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constraints for the CD cluster as shown in Figure 6.5. In the transition annotation
tables, the leftmost column encodes each set of constraints (Σ). The second column
describes the action of the transitions, the third identies the constraints, the forth
column identies transitions by their pre- and post-nodes, and the fth column (Ω)
lists the next node, or output. This information is used to provide a partial test
oracle for the test input. As an example, the rst row in table 6.9 is a transition
from np3 (menu selection bar) to access the Documents to Close page (DC) tab. The
codes are assigned arbitrarily as a matter of convenience: as a reference for the full
constraint in the constraint columns (column 3). The outputs (in the column marked
Ω) are the target states of the transitions. These will be used during execution as a
test oracle to check against the state the application actually reached.
6.2.3 Generate Test Paths through Clusters
For the Closing Documents (CD) service, we apply transition coverage to the
FSMs, generating test sequences to cover each transition. A test sequence is a
sequence of FSM edges and their annotations (constraints). Test sequences for the CD
FSMs is shown in Table 6.10. The rst column indicates which edges are covered, the
second column indicates the constraint sequence (using the input alphabet dened
in the Σ columns in Table 6.9. Thus, the rst sequence in Table 6.10 for the CD
FSM covers edges:(np3,CI) (CI,SI)(SI, CI)(CI,np3) from Table 6.10 and the FSM in
Figure 6.5,and uses the test sequence of constraints: p3_1, p3_o. We apply edge
coverage to FSMs for generating test cases as given in Table 6.11. For more detail
on graph based testing criteria see [3]. Test paths of the LPD cluster are given in
Table 6.12. Table 6.13 and Table 6.14 represent the test paths for the Home and
Search pages. Test paths for Closing Documents (CD) are shown in Table 6.15.
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Table 6.5: Annotation of Aggregate FSMs for Mortgage System
Σ Actions Constraints Transition Ω
z Dummy edge, reect access R(n0,Click) (Home/SE/LT/ n0
to menu bar LPD/Admin,n0)








Access Loan Tool tab R(tab=LT,Click), (n0,LT) LT
R(User Type in
(CU,QC,AU,RU),
Loan Status in (Open,Lock,
Approve to
Close,Funded,Sold))
d Access Admin tab R(tab=Admin,Click), (n0,Admin) Admin
R(User Type=Admin)
e Access to LPD R(A(Borrower
Name,Click)),
(Home,LPD) LPD
A(User Type, Loan Status)
f
Access to LPD O(R(Loan Number,Click), (SE,LPD) LPD
R(Search Result match
Specic Loan,Click))
i Login the system R(User Name,Password) (w0,n0) n0
o Log out the system R(Logout,Click) (w0,n0) w0
Table 6.6: Input Constraint for Home Cluster
Σ Actions Constraints Transition Ω
a1 View Next or Previous Week R(C1(left,right),Click) (VC,VC) VC
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Table 6.7: Input Constraint for Search Cluster (SE)





b2 Switch to Ad-
vanced Search
R(Advanced Search,Click) (SP,AS) AS
b3 Switch to Simple
Search
R(Simple Search,Click) (AS,SP) SP
b4 SP's Result of
searching match
List of loans
R(A(Search Query List),Click) (SP,SR) SR
b5 Excel Export
the list result of
searching




R(O(Export, Cancel),Click) (EE,SR) SR
b7 AS's Result of
searching match
List of loans





O(R(Search List=Specic Loan, Click), (SR/AS/SP, LPD) LPD
R(Search Text=Specic Loan,Click),
R(Search Loan Number,Click))
z Back to n0 R(Logout, Click) (SP/AS,n0) n0
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Table 6.8: Annotated Aggregation FSMs for LPD Cluster
Σ Actions Constraints Transition Ω






Access LP tab R(tab=LP,Click) (ne,LIP) LIP
Editing: R(User type=LO, Loan sta-
tus=Open)
Viewing: A(User type , Loan status)




Access CD tab R(tab=CD,Click) (ne,CD) CD
Editing: R(User type=SU, Loan Status in
Approve to Close, Approve with Condition)
Viewing: A(User type,Loan status)
p4
Access FF tab R(tab=FF,Click) (ne,FF) FF
Editing: R(User type=AU, Loan Status in
Approve to Close,Funded,Sold)
Viewing: A(User type,Loan status)
p5
Access AF tab R(tab=AF,Click) (ne,AF) AF
Editing: R(User type=AU, Loan Status in
Approve to Close, Funded,Sold)
Viewing: A(User type,Loan status)
p6
Access UF tab R(tab=UF,Click) (ne,UF) UF
Editing: R(User type=QC, A(Loan Status))
Viewing: A(User type,Loan status)
p7
Access LB tab R(tab=LB,Click) (ne,LB) LB
Editing: R(User type in QC,LO, Loan Sta-
tus in Approve to Close,Approve with Con-
dition)
Viewing: A(User type,Loan status)
p8
Access PC tab R(tab=PC,Click) (ne,PC) PC
Editing: R(User type=CU,Loan Status in (Funded,Sold))




Editing/Viewing: A(User type,Loan Status)
p10 Add note R(Add,Click) (LN,AN) AN





R((import button,Click), User type in Ad-
min,LO, Loan Status =Open)
(LP,LP) LP
p13 Revert Funding R ((Revert button,Click), User type=AU,
Loan Status = Funded)
(FF,FF) FF
z Back to n0 R(n0,Click) (ne,n0) n0
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Table 6.9: Input Constraint for Closing Documents (CD) FSM
Σ Actions Constraints Transition Ω
p3_1 Access CD R((tab= CD, Click), User
type=SU, Loan Status in Ap-
prove to close,Approve with
condition )
(np3,DC) DC
p3_2 Access CI R((tab= CI, Click), User
type=SU, Loan Status in






R((Sync from IDS,Click), User
type=SU, Loan Status in Ap-






R((Sync from IDS,Click), User
type=SU, Loan Status in Ap-
prove to close,Approve with con-
dition)
(CI,CI) CI
p3_2_2 Access SI R((Show Past Instructions
,Click), User type=SU, Loan Sta-
tus in Approve to close,Approve
with condition)
(CI,SI) SI




po Back to ne R(ne,Click) (np3,ne) ne
Table 6.10: Test Sequence for Closing Documents (CD) FSM
Edge Sequence Constraint Sequence Constraint
(np3,DC) (DC,np3) p3_1,p3_o R((tab= CD,Click), User
type=SU, Loan Status in
Approve to close,Approve with
condition )
(np3,CI) (CI,SI)(SI,CI)(CI,np3) p3_2,p3_2_2,p3_2_3,p3_o O(R((tab= CI,Click),R((Show
Past Instructions ,Click)), User
type=SU, Loan Status in Ap-
prove to close,Approve with
condition )
(np3,CI) (CI,CI) (CI,np3) p3_2,p3_2_1,p3_2_2,p3_o R((tab= CI,Click), User
type=SU, Loan Status in
Approve to close,Approve with
condition)
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6.2.4 Aggregate Paths to Generate Abstract Tests
The aggregation sequence is based on the input constraint abbreviations of Ta-
ble 6.9. This means that each input needs to be replaced with the corresponding
constraint in Table 6.9. For each node in the mortgage system services aggregate
sequence, the test sequences for the lower level FSMs must be substituted. For
example, the LPD cluster appears twice in two dierent abstract test cases of Ag-
gregate FSMs. The LPD cluster is covered by the nine test sequences given in Table
6.12. If the test criterion were to generate sequences with all combinations of paths,
substitution would result in 9+9=18 paths.
Table 6.16 summarizes the number of tests through individual cluster FSMs,
their length as well as the number of aggregated abstract test paths and their length.
Note that it takes approximately 2 months to test the whole system.
As a more detailed example, we will perform the substitution for T1 and T3 paths
from Table 6.11. This means substituting test sequences in Table 6.12 for LPD in
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Table 6.16: Statistics of Tests Size
Mortgage System CD Cluster
Number of tests through FSMs 106 3
Size of test suite (Number of nodes) 127 12
number of aggregated tests 266 12
Size of aggregated test suite 3998 169
order to resolve all test paths for (CD). This results in a total of 12 abstract test
paths as shown in a Table 6.17 and Table 6.18.
Table 6.17: Paths generated by substitution of T1




6.3 Failure Applicability and Mitigation Require-
ments
Again using the Mortgage system, we will detail the cluster Closing Docu-
ments(CD). Table 6.19 lists mitigations for all failure types and gives an example of
each.
Corresponding mitigation requirements are summarized in Table 6.20 which also
species the corresponding mitigation models and associated weaving rules for each
failure type. The last column in the table refers to the weaving rule number dened
in Table 3.8. Table 6.21 shows the State-Event matrix for the (CD) cluster. It
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Table 6.18: Paths generated by substitution of T3
Clusters Test No. Test Path
SE-LPD-CD TCD4 w0,n0,SP,SR,EE,SR,ne,np3,DC,DC,np3,ne,n0,w0
SE-LPD-CD TCD5 w0,n0,SP,SP,AS,SR, ne,np3,DC,DC,np3,ne,n0,w0







indicates that not all failure types are applicable in all states although some are.
For example, f1 (no network connection) is applicable in all states. f2 (session is
expired) is not applicable only for the entry portal web page (node w0). Similarly,f6
(user switches back and forth in the browser) can occur in all states except the entry
portal web page w0. In the (DC) state, all failure types except f10 can occur (DC
doesn't export data). The last row and column show dpe and dps which are used
to construct the initial population.
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Table 6.19: Failure types in Cluster Closing Documents(CD)
Failure Type Mitigation Example
f1: unavailability Go to Fail Safe State No network connec-
tion
f2: time out End ALL Session expire
f3:Parameter incompatibility Fix & proceed Input error (Integer
vs. string)
f4: response error Rollback Database server re-
sponse error
f5: Misunderstood behaviour End Activity Access tab needs spe-
cic user role.
f6: Workow inconsistency Ignore back and forth user
browser navigation
f7: incorrect order Fix & proceed Required loan process
step
f8: Browser incompatibility Retry Java Script for view-
ing does not work cor-
rectly
f9: Interface change Roll Back External service
changes the mapping
f10: incorrect service Alternative incorrect service to ex-
port data grid into a
le
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Table 6.20: Mitigation Requirement
MM Explanation Model WR#
MM1 Go to Fail Safe State: keep
the system running even if
there is no connectivity
see Figure 6.8-a, MT1 =
{mt11} where mt11 = si, sg
and sg = LWP : errorpage
8
MM2 End All: session expire, so
start over from the start
node
MT2 = φ and sb =
w0,where sb is the start node
5
MM3 Fix & proceed: parameter
incompatibility such as data
mismatch
see Figure 6.8-b, MT3 =
{mt31} where mt31 = si, si
3
MM4 Rollback: database server
error
MT4 = φ where sb = DC
,and sb is DC state where
trying to save data
6
MM5 End Activity: misunder-
stood behaviour such as try
to access CD cluster with-
out having SU user role
MT5 = φ where sf =
np3,and sf is a menu selec-
tion bar of CD cluster
4
MM6 Ignore: workow inconsis-
tency
Internal compensate 7
such as using browser navi-
gation
MM7 Fix & proceed: incorrect or-
der
see Figure 6.8-c ,
MT7 = {mt71} where
mt71 = si,mti, si
3
MM8 Retry: Java Script error MT8 = φ where node(p)r 2
MM9 Rollback: Interface change MT9 = φ where sb = np3 6
MM10 Alternative: incorrect ser-
vice
see Figure 6.8-d , MT10 =
{mt1,mt2} where mt1 =
si, n1, n2, si and mt2 =
si, n1, n3, si
1
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w0 n0 VC ne np3 SP SR AS EE DC CI SI dpe
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1.0
2 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0.9
3 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0.3
4 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0.3
5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0.3
6 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0.9
7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0.1
8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0.2
9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0.2
10 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0.3
dps 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.5 0.4 0.4 0.3 0.9 0.7 0.5
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Figure 6.8: Mitigation Models.
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6.4 Generate Test Requirements
In our case study and from Table 6.16, we know that the CD cluster has a test
suite of length 169. Given the 10 failure types, the total search space including
infeasible positions is 169*10=1690. However, the number of infeasible pairs in
search space is 1052 which is about 62% of the total search space in the CD cluster.
Because not all failures are applicable in behavioral states, the feasible search space
is 638 which is about 38% of all pairs. By contrast, the Mortgage system overall has
a test suite length of 3998 with a total search space of 39980 (including infeasible
pairs). The feasible search space is 13034 which is about 32% of all pairs.
To illustrate our approach, we use the GA on the CD cluster using the abstract
tests determined in Table 6.17 and 6.18. Table 6.22 shows the behavioral test paths
BT for them. It identies the clusters it covers, the test number, the sequence
of nodes and the length of each test path. The last row shows the length of the
concatenated test paths.
Table 6.22: Total Length of abstract test paths T1 and T3
Clusters Test No. Test Path Total Length
Home-LPD-CD TCD1 w0,n0,VC,VC,ne,np3,DC,DC,np3,ne,n0,w0 12
Home-LPD-CD TCD2 w0,n0,VC,VC,ne,np3,CI,CI,np3,ne,n0,w0 12
Home-LPD-CD TCD3 w0,n0,VC,VC,ne,np3,CI,SI,CI,np3,ne,n0,w0 13
SE-LPD-CD TCD4 w0,n0,SP,SR,EE,SR,ne,np3,DC,DC,np3,ne,n0,w0 14
SE-LPD-CD TCD5 w0,n0,SP,SP,AS,SR,ne,np3,DC,DC,np3,ne,n0,w0 14
SE-LPD-CD TCD6 w0,n0,SP,AS,SP,AS,SR,ne,np3,DC,DC,np3,ne,n0,w0 15
SE-LPD-CD TCD7 w0,n0,SP,SR,EE,SR,ne,np3,CI,SI,CI,np3,ne,n0,w0 15
SE-LPD-CD TCD8 w0,n0,SP,SP,AS,SR,ne,np3,CI,SI,CI,np3,ne,n0,w0 15
SE-LPD-CD TCD9 w0,n0,SP,AS,SP,AS,SR,ne,np3,CI,SI,CI,np3,ne,n0,w0 16
SE-LPD-CD TCD10 w0,n0,SP,SR,EE,SR,ne,np3,CI,CI,np3,ne,n0,w0 14
SE-LPD-CD TCD11 w0,n0,SP,SP,AS,SR,ne,np3,CI,CI,np3,ne,n0,w0 14
SE-LPD-CD TCD12 w0,n0,SP,AS,SP,AS,SR,ne,np3,CI,CI,np3,ne,n0,w0 15
Total length of |I|: 169
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The initial population creates individuals (p, e) as follows:
• Pick each failure type with Max(dps). This results in 10 pairs:
(DC, f1); (CI, f2); (SP, f3); (AS, f4); (SI, f5); (SR, f6);
(DC, f7); (DC, f8); (DC, f9); (SI, f10)
• Pick remaining nodes with Max(dpe). This results in 6 pairs:
(w0, f1); (n0, f1); (V C, f1); (ne, f1); (np3, f1); (EE, f1)
Table 6.23 shows the failure mitigation test paths (FMT) for the rst generation.
The rst column identies the test, the second column shows the test requirement
(p,e) used to construct the test. The next two columns state failure type and node
at position p. The fth column identies the mitigation model as described in Table
6.20. The last two column states the resulting fail safe mitigation test fmt and
which behavioral test bt was used to create it. Notice that f10 has two mitigation
test paths for MM10 as explained in Table 6.20 and hence two failure mitigation
tests for pair (105,10).
Next, we explore eectiveness of the GA for this case study. We assumed a
mitigation defect rate of 5% and seeded the CD subsystem with three defects, similar
to what used in [5] as the lower defect density. Since the number of ones in the state-
event matrix (see Table 6.21) is 50, 50 × 5% = 2.5. The number of seeded defects
after rounded up to 3. It represents a more dicult search problem for the GA that
helps to assess the robustness of the approach.
Table 6.24 shows how many pairs and number of generations were needed to
detect all defects. The GA generated 47 (p,e) pairs to nd all 3 mitigation defects.
There are a total of 21 generations.
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Table 6.23: Initial FMT for rst generation
# (p,e) Failure Node MM used FMT BT used
1 (46,1) f1 DC MM1 w0,n0,SP,SR,EE,SR,ne,np3,DC,sg TCD4
2 (19,2) f2 CI MM2 w0,n0,VC,VC,ne,np3,CI,w0,n0,VC,VC,ne,np3,CI,CI,np3,ne, TCD2
n0,w0
3 (40,3) f3 SP MM3 w0,n0,SP,SP,SR,EE,SR,ne,np3,DC,DC,np3,ne,n0,w0 TCD4
4 (56,4) f4 AS MM4 w0,n0,SP,SP,AS,AS ,SR,ne,np3,DC,DC,np3,ne,n0,w0 TCD5
5 (32,5) f5 SI MM5 w0,n0,VC,VC,ne,np3,CI,SI,np3 TCD3
6 (41,6) f6 SR MM6 TCD4 TCD4
7 (61,7) f7 DC MM7 w0,n0,SP,SP,AS,SR,ne,np3,DC,mti,DC,DC,np3,n_e,n0,w0 TCD5
8 (75,8) f8 DC MM8 w0,n0,SP,AS,SP,AS, SR,ne,np3,DC,DC,DC,np3,ne,n0,w0 TCD6
9 (8,9) f9 DC MM9 w0,n0,VC,VC,ne,np3,DC,DC,np3 TCD1
10 (105,10) f10 SI MM10 w0,n0,SP,SP,AS,SR,ne,np3,CI,SI,n1,n2,SI,CI,np3,ne,n0,w0 TCD8
10 (105,10) f10 SI MM10 w0,n0,SP,SP,AS,SR,ne,np3,CI,SI,n1,n3,SI,CI,np3,ne,n0,w0 TCD8
11 (1,1) f1 w0 MM1 w0,sg TCD1
12 (2,1) f1 n0 MM2 w0,n0,sg TCD1
13 (3,1) f1 VC MM3 w0,n0,VC,sg TCD1
14 (5,1) f1 ne MM4 w0,n0,VC,VC,ne,sg TCD1
15 (6,1) f1 np3 MM5 w0,n0,VC,VC,ne,np3,sg TCD1
16 (42,1) f1 EE MM6 w0,n0,SP,SR,EE,sg TCD4
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From Table 6.24, the GA nds the rst defect in the rst generation and it takes
7 generations to nd the next defect, but it takes only 4 more generations to nd
the third defect.
Table 6.24: Eectiveness of GA
# of Generation # of pairs Defect Found %












Table 6.25 shows the FMTs for the last generation. There are 41 pairs which are
converted into failure mitigation test paths.
Table 6.26 shows the fmts that detected the 3 mitigation defects. Pair (7,1)
nds the defect for f1 (unavailability of network) at state (DC) using the behavioral
test case TCD1: w0,n0,VC,VC,ne,np3,DC,DC,np3,ne,n0,w0. The mitigation of f1 is to
keep the system running even when there is no connectivity by going to the Fail Safe
state sg. This is an error page describing the defect and asking to contact system
administration. The mitigation model is MM1 as shown in Table 6.20. The failure
mitigation test path (fmt) is given by: w0,n0,VC,VC,ne,np3,DC,sg. Similarly, the
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Table 6.25: FMT for last generation
# (p,e) Failure Node MM used FMT BT used
1 (33,3) f3 SI MM3 TCD3 TCD3
2 (60,3) f3 DC MM3 w0,n0,SP,SP,AS,SR,ne,np3,DC,DC,DC,np3,ne,n0,w0 TCD5
3 (75,4) f4 DC MM4 w0,n0,SP,AS,SP,AS, SR,ne,np3,DC,DC,DC,np3,ne,n0,w0 TCD6
4 (165,4) f4 CI MM4 TCD12 TCD12
5 (89,5) f5 CI MM5 w0,n0,SP,SR,EE,SR,ne,np3,CI,np3 TCD7
6 (133,5) f5 ne MM5 TCD10 TCD10
7 (56,6) f6 AS MM6 TCD5 TCD5
8 (135,6) f6 CI MM6 TCD10 TCD10
9 (7,6) f6 DC MM6 TCD1 TCD1
10 (105,6) f6 SI MM6 TCD8 TCD8
11 (46,7) f7 DC MM7 w0,n0,SP,SR,EE,SR,ne,np3,DC,mti,DC,np3,ne,n0,w0 TCD4
12 (90,7) f7 SI MM7 TCD7 TCD7
13 (120,8) f8 CI MM8 w0,n0,SP,AS,SP,AS, SR,ne,np3,CI,CI,SI,CI,np3,ne,n0,w0 TCD9
14 (19,9) f9 CI MM9 w0,n0,VC,VC,ne,np3,CI,np3 TCD2
15 (129,9) f9 SP MM9 TCD10 TCD10
16 (148,9) f9 np3 MM9 TCD11 TCD11
17 (81,10) f10 w0 MM10 TCD7 TCD7
18 (32,10) f10 SI MM10 w0,n0,VC,VC,ne,np3,CI,SI,n1, n2,CI,np3,ne,n0,w0 TCD3
19 (32,10) f10 SI MM10 w0,n0,VC,VC,ne,np3,CI,SI,n1, n3,CI,np3,ne,n0,w0 TCD3
20 (159,1) f1 SP MM1 w0,n0,SP,AS,SP,sg TCD12
21 (47,1) f1 DC MM1 w0,n0,SP,SR,EE,SR,ne,np3,DC,DC,sg TCD4
22 (56,1) f1 AS MM1 w0,n0,SP,SP,AS,sg TCD5
23 (107,1) f1 np3 MM1 w0,n0,SP,SP,AS,SR,ne,np3,CI,SI,CI,np3,sg TCD8
24 (15,1) f1 VC MM1 w0,n0,VC,sg TCD2
25 (7,1) f1 DC MM1 w0,n0,VC,VC,ne,np3,DC,sg TCD1
26 (5,1) f1 ne MM1 w0,n0,VC,VC,ne,sg TCD1
27 (38,1) f1 w0 MM1 w0,sg TCD4
28 (85,1) f1 EE MM1 w0,n0,SP,SR,EE,sg TCD7
29 (130,1) f1 SR MM1 w0,n0,SP,SR,sg TCD10
30 (119,1) f1 np3 MM1 w0,n0,SP,AS,SP,AS,SR,ne,np3,sg TCD9
31 (153,1) f1 n0 MM1 w0,n0,SP,SP,AS,SR,ne,np3,CI,CI,np3,ne,n0,sg TCD11
32 (136,2) f1 CI MM2 w0,n0,SP,SR,EE,SR,ne,np3,CI,CI,sg TCD10
33 (158,2) f1 AS MM2 w0,n0,SP,AS,sg TCD12
34 (6,2) f1 np3 MM2 w0,n0,VC,VC,ne,np3,sg TCD1
35 (7,2) f2 DC MM2 w0,n0,VC,VC,ne,np3,DC,w0,n0,VC,VC,ne,np3,DC,DC,np3, TCD1
ne,n0,w0
36 (32,2) f2 SI MM2 w0,n0,VC,VC,ne,np3,CI,SI,w0,n0,VC,VC,ne,np3,CI,SI,CI,np3, TCD3
ne,n0,w0
37 (157,2) f2 SP MM2 w0,n0,SP,w0,n0,SP,AS,SP,AS,SR,ne,np3,CI,CI,np3,ne,n0,w0 TCD12
38 (101,2) f2 SR MM2 w0,n0,SP,SP,AS,SR,w0,n0,SP,SP,AS,SR,ne,np3,CI,SI,CI,np3, TCD8
ne,n0,w0
39 (131,2) f2 EE MM2 w0,n0,SP,SR,EE,w0,n0,SP,SR,EE,SR,ne,np3,CI,CI,np3,ne, TCD10
n0,w0
40 (152,2) f2 ne MM2 w0,n0,SP,SP,AS,SR,ne,np3,CI,CI,np3,ne,w0,n0,SP,SP,AS,SR, TCD11
ne,np3,CI,CI,np3,ne,n0,w0
41 (94,2) f2 n0 MM2 w0,n0,SP,SR,EE,SR,ne,np3,CI,SI,CI,np3,ne,n0,w0,n0,SP,SR, TCD7
EE,SR,ne,np3,CI,SI,CI,np3,ne,n0,w0
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mitigation defect for f2 is found by using pair (32,2) (state SI in test path TCD3) and
constructing the fmt using the weaving rule "End All" and starting over. Lastly,
the mitigation defect for f3 is found using pair (60,3) (state DC in test path TCD5).
The mitigation is constructed by repeating the edge that showed the failure and
then proceeding. In our case, it is the edge (DC,np3).
Table 6.26: fmti that found defects
FMT Failure State BT used GA pairs MM used Explanation
fmt1 f1 DC TCD1 (7,1) MM1 w0,n0,VC,VC,ne,np3,DC, sg
fmt2 f2 SI TCD3 (32,2) MM2 w0,n0,VC,VC,ne,np3,CI,SI,w0,n0,VC,VC,ne,np3,CI,SI,
CI,np3,ne,n0,w0
fmt3 f3 DC TCD5 (60,3) MM3 w0,n0,SP,SP,AS,SR, ne ,np3,DC,DC, DC,np3,ne,n0,w0
This study applied our test generation method to the CD sub system, a subset
of the full mortgage handling system. We apply the GA to the whole system. We
seed the same percentage of defects. This results in 25 defects. Table 6.27 shows the
total number of generations needed and the cumulative number of pairs generated
to expose all mitigation defects. The GA needs 42 generations to nd all defects.
There are 485 pairs resulting in 504 failure mitigation tests (FMTs) for the whole
system. As it did for the Closing Documents (DC) subsystem, the GA nds all
mitigation defects.
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Table 6.27: The results of run GA on the whole system
# of Generation # of pairs Defect Found %











































6.5 Comparison of Eort GA vs. Exhaustive Search
At several points, we claimed that exhaustive search, i.e converting all feasible
pairs to executable tests, executing, and validating them is prohibitive. To investi-
gate this claim, we measured the time it took to translate a set of test requirements
into executable tests, executing and validating the results. We then computed av-
erage eort per node in the test path. We computed length of failure mitigation
test suite for exhaustive search for both the CD subsystem and the whole system
and multiplied with the average eort per node to a arrive at an eort estimate for
exhaustive search.
Table 6.28 shows the results. For the CD subsystem, the test requirements
using GA requires 352 pairs, the total length of all failure mitigation test 3565.
Estimated average test eort is about 6 work days (note work day=8 hours) while
using exhaustive search requires more than 11 work days of testing. However, for
the whole system, the dierences are much more drastic: more than 155 work days
for GA vs. about 525 work days for exhaustive search more than three times as long
given that both nd all mitigation defects, the choice is obvious.
Table 6.28: Time Budget Comparison between GA vs. Exhaustive search











GA 352 3565 2674 45 5.6
Exhaustive search 638 7195 5396 90 11.25
The Whole system
GA 8276 99312 74484 1241 155.23
Exhaustive search 27986 335920 251940 4199 524.88
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Table 6.29 shows the number of nodes, transitions, the total number of behavioral
test paths BT , and the the total length of concatenated I. Note that the eort
estimates reported in Table 6.28 refer to mitigation testing only and do not include
testing primary functionality.
Table 6.29: The size of BT for CD vs. Mortgage system
# of nodes # of transitions size of BT Length (I)
CD subsystem 12 9 12 169




Based on the changes to the artifact used in the test generation approach in
chapter 3, we classify tests as retestable, reusable, or obsolete. Changes to our
various models (behavioral model BM , mitigation modelsMM , weaving rulesWR,
type of failures F , or state-event matrix SE) having varying impact on which tests
in the failure mitigation test suite FMT are retestable, reusable or obsolete. To
make generating a regression test suite more ecient, we provide an approach for
partial regeneration of obsolete test cases that takes advantage of the fact that our
test generation approach has phases. We determine at which point in the generation
process a test path becomes obsolete. Only the steps from that point on need to be
repeated. Figure 7.1 shows the regression testing process and references the sections
that describe the changes. Table 7.1 lists the variables and a short explanation how
they are used in the regression testing process.
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Figure 7.1: Regression Testing Process
Table 7.1: Variables description used in regression testing process
Variable Explanation
BM behavioral model
BM ′ modied behavioral model
BT behavioral test suite
Continued on next page
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Table 7.1  Continued from previous page
Variable Explanation
BTo obsolete behavioral tests
BTr retestable behavioral tests
BTu reusable behavioral tests
BTse behavioral tests that visits states in Sse
BT ′ additional behavioral tests needed to satisfy coverage requirements
for BM ′
BT ′′ behavioral test suite for BM ′ where BT ′′ = BTr ∪BT ′
BTa behavioral tests where BTa = BT ′ ∪BTr ∪BTu
Sse the subset of states whose applicability changed due to the changes
to SE
N set of behavioral nodes
E set of behavioral edges
No set of deleted or modied nodes
ON set of obsolete test paths due to node changes
Continued on next page
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Table 7.1  Continued from previous page
Variable Explanation
Eo set of deleted or modied edges
OE set of obsolete test paths due to edge changes
Nr set of retestable nodes
SE state-event matrix before change
SE ′ modied state-event matrix due to changes to BM,F
SEa the new state-event matrix due to added failure types Fa
I concatenation of behavioral tests BT
I ′ concatenation of behavioral tests BT ′′
Ise concatenation of of impacted behavioral tests due to the changes
to SE
Length(I ′) is the length of the concatenation of new behavioral tests BT ′.
Length(Ise) is the length of the concatenation of impacted tests due to changes
to SE.
SP search space before change
Continued on next page
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Table 7.1  Continued from previous page
Variable Explanation
SP ′ modied search space
SPa the new search space due to added failure types Fa
F set of Failure types
p Position of Failure
e Failure Type
(p, e) where (1≤ p ≤ |I| ) and (1 ≤ e ≤ |F | )
PE set of selected (p, e) pairs before change
PE ′ new set of selected (p, e) pairs
Fd set of deleted failures Fd = {fd1, · · · , fdm} when m is the number
of deleted failure types
Fa set of added failures Fa = {fa1, · · · , fan} when n is the number of
new failure types
Finf set of failure types that become infeasible due to changes to SE
F ′ the set of impacted failures due to deleted failures
Continued on next page
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Table 7.1  Continued from previous page
Variable Explanation
Fse the set of failures whose applicability changed due to the changes
to SE
MMj mitigation model before change where 1 ≤ j ≤ k and k = |F | is
the number of failure types
MM ′j modied mitigation model for failure type j
MMaj added mitigation model for added failures Fa
MMd the set of mitigation model for deleted failures Fd
MTj mitigation test cases before change
MT ′j new mitigation tests for MM
′
j
MTjo obsolete mitigation tests of failure type j
MTjr retestable mitigation tests of failure type j
MTju reusable mitigation tests of failure type j
MTaj mitigation tests for MMaj




j = MTjr ∪MT
′
j
Continued on next page
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Table 7.1  Continued from previous page
Variable Explanation
modMM is the changed mitigation model where j ∈ mod = {j|1 ≤ j ≤
|F | ∧MM ′j 6= MMj}
PEMM ′ set of selected (p, e) pairs where e ∈ modMM
FMT failure mitigation tests before change
FMTr failure mitigation tests based on the retestable test cases BTr
FMT ′ failure mitigation test derived from BT ′
FMTFd the removable failure mitigation tests of deleted failure types Fd
FMTFa the failure mitigation tests based on added new failure types Fa
FMT ′′ the full new failure mitigation test suite
FMT ′MM the new failure mitigation tests derived from the changes to MM
′
j.
FMTrt the failure mitigation tests that are derived from MTjr.
FMTMMu the failure mitigation tests that are derived from MTju.
FMTo the failure mitigation tests that are derived from MTjo.
EI the set of failure types that are impacted by MM ′j.
Continued on next page
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Table 7.1  Continued from previous page
Variable Explanation
PEI the set of pairs that are impacted by MM ′j.
FMTI the set of failure mitigation tests that are impacted by MM ′j.
FMTc the failure mitigation tests impacted due to added failure types Fa.
FMTo the obsolete failure mitigation tests due to the changes to SE.
WR weaving rules for MMj where j = 1, .., |F |
WR′ modied weaving rules for MMj where j = 1, · · · , |F |
WRa the new weaving rules for new mitigation model MMaj
WRd the set of weaving rules for deleted failures Fd
modWR are the failure types for which weaving rules changed
PEWR the set of pairs that are impacted by WR′.
The process steps to build a regression test suite outlined in Figure 7.1 is based
on the types of changes to various artifacts:
1. Changes in the behavioral model (BM):
We classify the behavioral tests (BT ) as obsolete (BTo), retestable (BTr), or
reusable (BTu). We determine if any parts of the new behavioral model (BM ′)
have not been tested and generate new tests (BT ′) for them. We construct
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the new behavioral test suite (BT ′′) resulting from (BTr), and (BT ′). If there
are no changes to F , we build a new state-event matrix (SE ′) and a modied
search space (SP ′), then select (p, e) pairs (PE ′)1. In case of added failure
types, we add the new failure types to the new state-event matrix (SE ′) and
to the new search space (SP ′). If mitigation models are not changed, we use
the mitigation tests (MT ) from the existing mitigation models (MM) that
are built for each failure type. Then we generate the new failure mitigation
tests (FMT ′′) by weaving mitigation tests (MT ) into (BT ) using weaving
rules (WR). In case the mitigation models are changed (MM ′), we classify
the mitigation tests (MT ) as obsolete, retestable, or reusable. We generate
new mitigation tests (MT ′) if there are any parts of new mitigation models
(MM ′) that have not been tested. Next, we weave the new mitigation test
suite (MT ′′) to generate new failure mitigation tests (FMT ′′). In case of the
changes to the weaving rules (WR), we apply the new weaving rules to the
mitigation tests (MT ) if there are no changes to mitigation models (MM);
otherwise, we use the new rules (WR′) with the new mitigation test suite
(MT ′′) to generate new failure mitigation tests (FMT ′′).
2. Changes in the state-event matrix (SE):
If there are no changes to BM or F , the changes to SE requires building a new
search space (SP ′) as the changes in the SE matrix aect the applicability of
the node-failure relation. We select (p, e) pairs. If mitigation models are not
changed, we then weave the mitigation tests (MT ) to create the new failure
mitigation tests (FMT ′′) using weaving rules (WR).
If there are changes to BM as well we follow the same steps that are described
1If the new search space is suciently large, we use GA [5] to construct PE, otherwise coverage
criterion (CC)[6] are the best choice to construct PE.
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in step one for classifying (BT ), and generate the new behavioral test suite
(BT ′′). We add the new nodes if they exist as new columns in the new state-
event matrix (SE ′). We build the new search space (SP ′) based on the changes
to SE and BM .
If there are added failure types, we simply extend the SE to include the new
failure types and build the new search space (SP ′) based on all changes. Next,
we apply GA to select (p, e) pairs and weave them to generate new failure
mitigation tests (FMT ′′). If there are any changes to the mitigation models
(MM) or weaving rules (WR), we also apply step 4 and 5 below.
3. Changes in failure types (F ):
Adding new failures requires building a new state-event matrix (SE ′) by
adding a new row to the matrix for each new failure type. Then, we con-
struct a new search space (SP ′) and select (p, e) pairs for the new failure
types only. We build new mitigation models (MM ′) for the new failure types,
and create new mitigation tests (MTa).
If there are no changes to BM andWR, we generate the new failure mitigation
tests (FMT ′′) by weaving the new mitigation tests (MTa) into behavioral tests
(BT ). Otherwise, we use the new behavioral test suite BT ′′ resulting from the
new behavioral model BM ′. Next, we weave BT ′′ using both the new mit-
igation tests (MTa) for the new failure types and the existing (MT ) for the
old failure types to generate new failure mitigation tests (FMT ′′). In case of
changes to the mitigation models (MM) or weaving rules (WR), we follow
steps 4 and 5 below. If failure types are deleted, we simply delete all the as-
sociated mitigation models, weaving rules and failure mitigation tests for the
deleted failure types.
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4. Changes in mitigation models (MM):
We only need to consider changes to individual mitigation models since all
other changes to various artifacts such as changes to BM , SE, or F are
already covered. Assume changes are to mitigation model MMj resulting
in MM ′j. Similar to the changes in BM , we classify the mitigation tests MTj
for the mitigation model MMj into obsolete (MTjo), retestable (MTjr), or
reusable (MTju). We generate new mitigation tests (MT
′
j) for edges that are
not covered in the modied mitigation model (MM ′j), so the new mitigation
test suite is MT ′′j = MTjr ∪ MT
′
j . This process applies to each mitigation
model that has changed. Next, we weave MT ′′e into position (p, e) to build
the new failure mitigation tests (FMT ′′). If there are added failure types,
we include the new mitigation tests (MTa) derived from the new mitigation
models (MMa) that have been built for the new failure types. As a result, the
new mitigation test suite is MT ′′ = MTjr ∪MT
′
j ∪MT ′a. In case of changes
to (WR), we apply the new weaving rules to the new mitigation test suite
(MT ′′) to generate new failure mitigation tests (FMT ′′).
5. Changes in weaving rules (WR):
Since all other changes to BM , SE, or F are already dealt with, we need
only consider changes to WR. Let WR′e be the modied weaving rule for
failure type fe. We reweave all mitigation tests (MTe) for failure type (e) at
all positions p (1 ≤ p ≤ |I|, (p, e) ∈ PE) using the new weaving rule (WR′e)
for failure type e to generate the new failure mitigation tests (FMT ′′). As
before, if there are any changes to (BM) and (MM), they have been dealt
with in priors steps.
6. We execute FMT ′′.
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We use a simple example to illustrate the process in each step of our regression
testing framework. It is introduced in subsection 7.1. The remaining subsections
explain this process of building a regression test suite in more detail and use the
example to illustrate each step.
7.1 Example
To illustrate our approach, we extend the example from section 3.2.1. Figure 7.2
shows three FSMs and two levels of hierarchy. This is our behavioral model BM .
It also shows FSM1 and FSM2 before and after changes resulting in FSM1′ and
FSM2′. Table 3.3 and Table 3.4 in section 3.2.1 shows paths through each FSM
that achieve edge coverage, including derivation rules and the test path lengths.
Figure 7.2: Behavioral Models BM , BM ′
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In section 3.3, The SE is dened as shown in Table 3.5. In section 3.5.1, Table
3.7 shows the potential search space of length(I) × F . In section 3.6, Table 3.6
shows the corresponding mitigation models and associated weaving rules for each
failure type and Table 3.9 shows the selected pairs PE and resulting FMT .
The next section describes the regression test generation in detail. We dene
changes to the models in the example as we formalize the algorithms in each step
to illustrate how they work.
7.2 Changes to the Behavioral Model (BM)
The types of changes in the FSMWeb behavioral model are as follows [7]:
1. node change: delete, modify ( i. e. change the node type from LWP to cluster
or vice versa). Node addition is covered by edge changes.
2. edge change: modify in/out edge (i. e. modify the edge's input-action con-
straint)2, delete in/out edge, add in/out edge with or without new node
Based on existing work by Andrews et al. [7], The behavioral test suite (BT ) will
be classied as obsolete (BTo), retestable (BTr), or reusable (BTu)
where BT = BTo ∪ BTu ∪ BTr
Figure 7.2 showed the changes to the behavioral model. They are:
• For FSM1: we delete edge (n4, n3), add node n8 and edges (n3, n8),(n8, n4).
• For FSM2: we delete edge (n6, n7), add node n9 and edges (n6, n9),(n9, n7).
The following subsections describe the steps based on changes to BM .
2Modifying the source or target node of an edge, that is, redirecting the edge, is covered by
edge deletion and subsequent edge addition
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7.2.1 Classify BT into obsolete, reusable and retestable be-
havioral tests
The test classication rules are as follows:
• Obsolete Tests Paths (BTo)
Andrews et al. [7] dene a set of rules for dening obsolete test paths based on
type of change: Node deletion aects all paths that include the deleted node,
rendering it obsolete. Node modications change the type of node from LWP
to a cluster node or vice versa. This type of modication aects the paths as
the node needs to be replaced by another node or a sequence of nodes. Thus,
both node deletions and node modications render test paths obsolete that
tour these nodes: let the set of behavioral test paths be BT = {bt1, . . . , btl}.
Let No ={n| n ∈ N; n is deleted or modied } where N is the set of behavioral
nodes, then the set of obsolete test paths due to node changes is given by
ON ={bti| ∃ n ∈ No : bti visits n}, where bti is a behavioral test path. For our
example, No = φ, and ON = φ.
Edge deletion makes any test paths that tour the edge obsolete. Any edge
modication that requires changes in the inputs, guards, actions, outputs,
and messages associated with it, will also make test paths obsolete that visit
the modied edge.
Let Eo ={e| e ∈ E; e is deleted or modied} where E is the set of behavioral
edges, then the set of obsolete test paths due to edge changes is given by
OE ={bti | ta tours e ∈ Eo }. For our example, Eo = {(n4, n3), (n6, n7)}, and
OE = {bt2, bt3}. Thus, the set of obsolete behavioral test paths is given by:
BTO = ON ∪ OE. Hence BTo = φ ∪OE = {bt2, bt3}.
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• Retestable Test Paths (BTr)
In [7], retestable tests are dened as those that are still valid and test portions
of the application and visit part of the FSMWeb model that are aected by the
changes. This can be determined in dierent ways. For example, [7] considers
any node n that is one edge away from a modied or deleted node as impacted
by the change, except for the source and sink nodes of the AFSM. Using this
denition:
Nrnode ={n| ∃ e : (n, n̂) or (n̂, n); n̂ ∈ No;n 6= nsource; n 6= nsink }. Since in
our example No = φ, Nrnode = φ as well. When edges are changed, the set of
retestable edges depends on the type of change. When edges are deleted or
modied, we assume that the starting and ending nodes of the changed edges
are potentially impacted and hence nonobsolete tests that visit these nodes
are retestable (except for the source and sink nodes of the model):
Nredm = {n|ê ∈ Eo; ê = (ni, n) or ê = (n, ni);n 6= nsource;n 6= nsink}. In the
example Nredm = {n3, n4, n6, n7}.
Similarly, when we add new edges, existing nodes at which these new edges
start or end are considered potentially aected by the modication and hence
non-obsolete tests that visit these nodes are retestable (Except for the source
and sink nodes of the model):
Let E be the set of edges in BM . Let E ′ is the set of added edges in BM ′
Then E ′ \ E is the set of added edges.
Nrea = {n|n ∈ Nj : ê = (n, ni) or ê = (ni, n); ê ∈ E ′ \ E, ni ∈ N ′;n 6=
nsource;n 6= nsink}
In the example, E ′ \ E = {(n3, n8), (n8, n4), (n6, n9), (n9, n7)}
=⇒ Nrea = {n3, n4, n6, n7}. This happens to be the same as Nredm .
The set of retestable nodes is then given by Nr = Nrnode ∪ Nredm ∪ Nrea and
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the set of retestable abstract test paths is
BTr = {bti | bti visits n ∈ Nr, bti ∈ BT} \ BTO
In the example, Nr = {n3, n4, n6, n7}
=⇒ BTr = {bt1, bt2, bt3} \ {bt2, bt3} = {bt1} In our example, the only non-
obsolete test path bt1 is also retestable.
• Reusable Test Paths (BTu)
Those tests are neither obsolete nor retestable. BTu = BT \ (BTo∪BTr). The
example has no reusable test paths BTu = φ.
• New Test Paths (BT ′)
New test cases need to be designed whenever current test cases do not meet
coverage requirements for BM ′. This happens when edges or nodes are added.
Obsolete test cases can also cause gaps in coverage that need to be addressed
with new tests. In the example, the following edges in the modied model
BM ′: {(n3, n8), (n8, n4), (n6, n9), (n9, n7)} are not covered. Thus, new test
paths are generated: bt′1 = {n1, n3, n4, n2}, bt′2 = {n1, n3, n8, n4, n2}, and bt′3 =
{n1, n5, n6, n9, n7, n2}. As a result, the new test paths BT ′ = {bt′1, bt′2, bt′3}.
The new test suite will be as follows: BT ′′ = BTr ∪BT ′. In the example, Table 7.2
shows the classication of behavioral test paths BT and the new test path BT ′ for
the modied model. So, the new test suite will be as follows:
BT ′′ = BTr ∪BT ′ = {bt1, bt′1, bt′2, bt′3}.
7.2.2 Build New SE' matrix
Any change in the BM such as adding, modifying, or deleting node requires to
rebuild the state event(SE) matrix. When adding a new node, we add a new column
to SE, and similarly when deleting a state, we delete a column from SE. We also
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Table 7.2: Classication of BT after the changes
BT Path Classication
bt1 n1, n5, n7, n2 Retestable
bt2 n1, n5, n6, n7, n2 Obsolete
bt3 n1, n3, n4, n3, n2 Obsolete
BT ′ Path Classication
bt′1 n1, n3, n4, n2 New
bt′2 n1, n3, n8, n4, n2 New
bt′3 n1, n5, n6, n9, n7, n2 New
need to recalculate dpe and dps.
The new state-event matrix SE ′ is shown in Table 7.3. It is the same as the original
SE except for the added column for the new states n8, and n9.
Table 7.3: New State-Event Matrix SE′
Behavioral States/
Failure Type (f )
n1 n2 n3 n4 n5 n6 n7 n8 n9 dpe
1 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 0.44
2 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 0.44
3 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 0.67
4 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0.22
dps 0.25 0.50 0.25 0.50 0.75 0.50 0.75 0.25 0.25
7.2.3 Build New Search Space SP' and FMT
The new search space used only consider the new tests BT ′. This is because the
failure mitigation tests derived from retestable behavioral tests BTr are still valid
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and can be reused. Let FMTr be the failure mitigation tests that were built from
tests in BTr. Thus, FMTr ⊆ FMT .
Additionally, we need to determine failure mitigation test for the new testsBT ′. This
requires constructing a new search space SP ′ for BT ′. Let BT ′ = {bt′1, bt′2, ..., bt′z}
where z is number new of test cases. Concatenating the new test suite such that:
I ′ = (bt′1 ◦ bt′2 ◦ ... ◦ bt′z)
The second dimension in the search space is given by the number of failure types
E = |F |. The new search space SP ′ is dened as:
SP ′ = {(p, e)|1 ≤ p ≤ length(I ′), 1 ≤ e ≤ E, se′(node(p),e) = 1}
We use SP' to select new pairs PE ′ where PE ′={(p, e)|(p, e) ∈ SP ′∧ GA or CC
selected (p, e)}. We assume that any changes in mitigation models have been dealt
with and the new mitigation test suite MT ′ has been built or that MT ′ = MT if
no changes occurred. We generate failure mitigation tests FMT ′ with PE ′. As a
result, the failure mitigation regression test suite consists of the failure mitigation
tests FMTr based on the retestable tests BTr plus the tests generated via PE ′ (i.e
FMT ′). The failure mitigation regression test suite is:
FMT ′′ = FMTr ∪ FMT ′
In the example, only bt1 is retestable, and according to Table 3.9, only number
fmt1 and fmt9 are constructed based on bt1, thus FMTr = {fmt1, fmt9}. Table
7.2 shows the new test paths BT ′ = {bt′1, bt′2, bt′3}.
We concatenate the tests in BT ′: I ′ = (bt′1 ◦ bt′2 ◦ bt′3)
Then, I ′ = n1, n3, n5, n2, n1, n3, n6, n5, n2, n1, n5, n6, n8, n7, n2 where length(I ′) = 15.
The new search space: SP ′={(p, e)|1 ≤ p ≤ 15, 1 ≤ e ≤ 4, se′(node(p),e) = 1} (see table
7.4).
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I ′/F n1 n3 n4 n2 n1 n3 n8 n4 n2 n1 n5 n6 n9 n7 n2
f1 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 0
f2 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0
f3 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 1
f4 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 1
We use SP' to select new pairs PE ′. Next, we generate new failure mitigation
tests FMT ′′ using the existing weaving rules that are dened in Table 3.6. Table 7.5
shows the selected (p, e) pairs and resulting FMT ′′ for the modied model BM ′. The
rst column in Table 7.5 numbers each failure mitigation test (fmt1− fmt12). The
second column lists each (p, e) pair in PE ′. The third column refers to the failure
type whose mitigation is tested. The fourth column states the node at position
p. The fth column identies the new behavioral test used in constructing fmti
(i = 1, · · · , 12). The sixth column identies which mitigation model is used as
described in Table 3.6. The seventh column lists which mtij is used as described in
Table 3.6. The last column shows the failure mitigation tests. Table 7.5 shows the
new failure mitigation regression tests FMT ′′ that includes FMTr pulse FMT ′. The
rst two rows for tests number 1 and 2 are behavioral retestable ones and the tests
number 3 to 12 are the new ones. The number of mitigation tests is incremented as
a result of building a new failure regression test suite.
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Table 7.5: FMT ′′ for modied model BM ′.
# pairs PE ′ Failure Node BT used MM used mtij used FMT
1 (2,1) f1 n5 bt1 MM1 mt11 n1, n5, sg
2 (4,3) f3 n2 bt1 MM3 mt31 n1, n5, n7, n2, n2
3 (6,2) f2 n3 bt′2 MM2 mt21 n1, n3, n1, n3, n8, n4, n2
4 (7,3) f3 n8 bt′2 MM3 mt31 n1, n3, n8, n8, n4, n2
5 (14,4) f4 n7 bt′3 MM4 mt41 n1, n5, n6, n9, n7, s1, s2, n2
6 (14,4) f4 n7 bt′3 MM4 mt42 n1, n5, n6, n9, n7, s1, s3, n2
7 (3,1) f1 n4 bt′1 MM1 mt11 n1, n3, n4, sg
8 (4,4) f4 n2 bt′1 MM4 mt41 n1, n3, n4, n2, s1, s2, n2
9 (4,4) f4 n2 bt′1 MM4 mt42 n1, n3, n4, n2, s1, s3, n2
10 (12,2) f2 n6 bt′3 MM2 mt21 n1, n5, n6, n1, n5, n6, n9, n7, n2
11 (8,1) f1 n4 bt′2 MM1 mt11 n1, n3, n8, n4, sg
12 (11,3) f3 n5 bt′3 MM3 mt31 n1, n5, n5, n6, n9, n7, n2
7.3 Changes to State-Event Matrix (SE)
Two types of changes can occur in SE ′: (1) some failures become applicable
in some states (changes from 0 to 1) or (2) not applicable (changes from 1 to 0).
In many cases, the system requirements are changed for some states that impact
some failure types to be feasible or infeasible for those states. For example, when
typed input (which can be incorrect) is replaced with button selection, an incorrectly
typed input no longer occurs. Similarly, if power backup is provided, loss of power
no longer is applicable. On the other hand, when new requirements are added that
require mitigations where none were required before, this changes entries in the SE
matrix from 0 to 1.
• Case A: Feasible to infeasible (changes from 1 to 0)
Let Finf be the failure types that have became infeasible. Then Einf =
{e|fe ∈ Finf}. Any failure mitigation tests that were derived from a pair
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(p, e) where the node in position p is a node for which the failure e is no
longer applicable is now obsolete. These obsolete tests are given by FMTo =
{fmt|fmt ∈ FMT ∧ fmt based on pair (p, e) : se(node(p),e) = 1, se′(node(p),e) = 0
and 1 ≤ e ≤ |F |, node(p) ∈ S}. Note that failure mitigation test suite
FMT \ FMTo is reusable, not retestable, since we have run these tests al-
ready and they are not aected by the change.
Back to our example in section 7.1, assume failure type f3 is no longer appli-
cable in state n6. From Table 3.7 and Table 3.9, we have three tests associated
with f3 but only one position using n6. The node in position 7 is n6. Hence,
only the pair (7,3) is obsolete. It was used to create fmt3 which is now obso-
lete, and position 7 is the only position using n6. Thus, FMTo = {fmt3}.
Note that we do not have to rerun the remaining tests in Table 3.9, since they
have already been executed.
• Case B: Infeasible to feasible (changes from 0 to 1)
This requires building a new search space for failures that have became ap-
plicable. Let Fse be the subset of failure types that become now feasible such
that Fse ⊂ F . Let Sse be the subset of states that become applicable for any
failure fj where fj ∈ Fse and Sse ⊂ S.
Using our example, let failure type f1 become applicable in state n6 and f4
become applicable in state n5. Thus, Fse = {f1, f4}, and Sse = {n5, n6}. The
new SE ′ is dened in Table 7.6. It includes both making f3 inapplicable in
state n6. as well as making failures f1 and f4 applicable in states n5 and n6
respectively.
The new search space SP ′ and new selected pairs are based on the follow-
ing:
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Table 7.6: New State-Event Matrix SE'
Behavioral States/
Failure Type (f )
n1 n2 n3 n4 n5 n6 n7 dpe
1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 0.71
2 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 0.43
3 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 0.58
4 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0.43
dps 0.25 0.50 0.25 0.50 1.00 0.50 1
 Remove tests from BT that do not visit states in Sse (states for which
certain failure types have become applicable). The remaining behavioral
tests BTse will be: BTse = {bti|∃si ∈ Sse : bti visits si}.
Next, we concatenate BTse. Let Ise be the concatenation of BTse.
In the example, the aected node n5 exists only in bt1 and bt2, and n6
exists only in bt2. Thus, BTse = {bt1, bt2}, and the concatenation Ise =
{bt1 ◦ bt2}.
 Remove all failures that are not in Fse. In our example, we exclude f2
and f3.
 Rebuild the new search space such as SP ′ = {(p, e)|1 ≤ p ≤ length(Ise), 1 ≤
e ≤ |Fse|, se′(node(p),e) = 1}. Table 7.7 shows the new search space SP ′
marking each feasible entry as a "1". The new search space is: SP ′ =
{(p, e)|1 ≤ p ≤ 9, 1 ≤ e ≤ 2, se′(node(p),e) = 1 ∧ node(p) ∈ Sse}.
134
Table 7.7: The New Search Space SP ′
I bt1 bt2
Position (p) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
F/N n1 n5 n7 n2 n1 n5 n6 n7 n2
f1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 0
f4 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1
 Select a new set of pairs PE ′ where PE ′={(p, e)|(p, e) ∈ SP ′}. Table
7.7 marks where the two nodes in Sse = {n5, n6} occur, resulting in PE ′.
PE ′ = {(7, 1), (2, 4), (6, 4)}.
Note, that the denition of PE ′ requires to select as test requirements all
occurrences of nodes s ∈ Sse. If such nodes occur many times, it may be
useful to restrict the number of times that position p are selected where
node(p) ∈ Sse. We can use coverage criteria C2 or C3 for this. We usually
expect that the search space is not large enough to use the GA.
 Generate new failure mitigation tests FMT ′′ as in chapter 3. Table 7.8
shows the selected pairs and new failure mitigation regression tests.
Section 7.5 describes the case when there are multiple changes to the
artifacts (BM,SE, F ).
Table 7.8: Selected pairs and constructing FMT ′′ for Fse.
# Selected pairs (PE ′) Failure Node BT used MM used mtij used FMT ′′
9 (7,1) f1 n6 bt2 MM1 mt11 n1, n5, n6, sg
10 (2,4) f4 n5 bt1 MM4 mt41 n1, n5, s1, s2, n7, n2
11 (2,4) f4 n5 bt1 MM4 mt42 n1, n5, s1, s3, n7, n2
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7.4 Changes to Failure Types (F)
First, we assume that the changes to failure types are the only changes. Later,
we will discuss the situation when changes to multiple artifacts occur. We describe
the change in failure type as follows:
• Delete failure types Fd = {fd1, · · · , fdm} where m is the number of deleted
failure types: F ′ = F \ Fd
An example of deleting a failure type: a faulty network can no longer cause
a network connection error by using a backup router to quickly swap out the
faulty network. Suppose, we delete the failure types (f2 and f3) from our
example. Thus, Fd = {f2, f3}.
Next, we remove the mitigation models {MMd1 , · · ·MMdm} and weaving rules
{WRd1 , · · ·WRdm}. Any failure mitigation tests that test proper mitigation
for a failure f ∈ Fd is removed as well. Let FMTFd ⊆ FMT such that
each t ∈ FMTFd was constructed to test a failure type f ∈ Fd. FMTFd =
{fmt|fmt ∈ FMT ∧ fmt based on pair (p, e′) ∈ PE where fe′ ∈ Fd and
1 ≤ p ≤ Length(I)}. Note that FMT \ FMTFd is reusable, not retestable,
since we have executed these tests already.
Back to our example, we remove the mitigation modelsMMFd = {MM2,MM3}
and weaving rules WRFd = {WR2,WR3}. From Table 3.9, the deleted fail-
ure mitigation tests are FMTFd = {fmt2, fmt3, fmt6, fmt8, fmt9}. Table 7.9
shows the reusable tests after deleting failures f2 and f3.
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Table 7.9: Reusable tests after deleting failures f2 and f3
# Selected pairs (PE) Failure Node BT used MM used mtij used FMT
1 (2,1) f1 n5 bt1 MM1 mt11 n1, n5, sg
2 (8,4) f4 n7 bt2 MM4 mt41 n1, n5, n6, n7, s1, s2, n7, n2
3 (8,4) f4 n7 bt2 MM4 mt42 n1, n5, n6, n7, s1, s3, n2
4 (8,1) f1 n7 bt2 MM1 mt11 n1, n5, n6, n7, sg
• Add new failure type Fa = {fa1, · · · , fan} where n is the number of new failure
types:
In this case, we need to build a state-event matrix for the new failure, con-
struct a search space for the concatenated test suite and the new failures, and
generate (p,e) pairs. We also must dene mitigation models and weaving rules
for the new failures and create failure mitigation tests based on the (p,e) pairs
selected. Note that we do not need to rerun FMT , nor include existing failure
types in the construction of the search space. Thus, a new state-event matrix
SEa is an n× |S| matrix where
SEa(i, j) =

1 if failure type j applies in node ni ∈ S
0 otherwise
Note that number of states i = 1, · · · , |S| and number of failures types j =
1, · · · , n. Using our example, we add two new failure types (f5 and f6), so
Fa = {f5, f6}. Next, we have to build a new state-event matrix (SEa) that
includes the new failure types Fa as shown in Table 7.10.
Next, we create new mitigation models MMa = {MMa1, · · · ,MMan} for
each failure type in Fa. Let WRa = {WRa1 · · ·WRan} be the weaving rules
for the new mitigation models. Next, we generate the new mitigation test
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Table 7.10: New State-Event Matrix SEa
Behavioral States/
Failure Type (f )
n1 n2 n3 n4 n5 n6 n7 dpe
5 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0.14
6 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0.29
dps 0.00 0.50 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.50 0.50
suites MTa = {MTa1, · · ·MTan}. In the example, we add new mitigation
models MMa = {MM5,MM6} and new weaving rules (WR5 and WR6) for
the new failure types. They are shown in Table 7.11. The rst mitigation
model returns to state n6 after a database error, the second returns to the
start node n1 and ends the test.
Next, we create new mitigation test paths MTsa using the new mitigation
models. In our case there are no paths required, since the only task is specied
by the weaving rule.
Table 7.11: New Mitigation Requirements
MM Explanation Model WR#
MM5 Retry: database
server error
MT5 = φ where
node(p)r is the state in
which we are trying to
save data node(p) =
n6 and r = 1 (retry
once)
2
MM6 End Activity: mis-
understood behaviour
such as try to access
node without having
specic user role
MT6 = φ where sf =
n1,and sf is the start
node and stop
4
Then, we build the new search space. The new search space is dened
with the concatenated behavioral test suite BT and the new failure types as
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follows: SPa = {(p, e)|1 ≤ p ≤ length(I), 1 ≤ e ≤ n, sea(node(p),e) = 1}. We
select a new set of pairs (p, e) ∈ PEa where PEa={(p, e)|(p, e) ∈ SPa (p,e)
selected}. How we select the (p, e) pairs depends on the size of the new search
space. If it is large enough, we use the GA, otherwise coverage criteria are
more appropriate.
In the example, the new search space SPa = {(p, e)|1 ≤ p ≤ 14, 1 ≤ e ≤
2, sea(node(p),e) = 1} is shown in Table 7.12. Because the search space is too
small for using GA, we use coverage criteria (C2) for selecting pairs (i.e all
unique nodes, all applicable failures). Using coverage certeria C2 results in
selecting three pairs as shown in Table 7.13.
Table 7.12: New Search Space SPa due to the added failure Fa
bt1 bt2 bt3
n1 n5 n7 n2 n1 n5 n6 n7 n2 n1 n3 n4 n3 n2
f5 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
f6 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 1
Finally, new failure mitigation tests FMTFa are generated from pairs in
PEa. Hence, FMT ′′ = FMTFa
In the example, new failure mitigation test FMTFa are generated based on
new weaving rules WR5 and WR6 for the new failure types in Fa = {f5, f6}.
Table 7.13 shows the selected pairs and FMT ′′.
Table 7.13: Selected pairs and constructing FMTFa from them.
# Selected pairs (PE) Failure Node BT used MM used mtij used FMTFa = FMT
′′
1 (7,5) f5 n6 bt2 MM5 mt51 n1, n5, n6, n6, n7, n2
2 (3,6) f6 n7 bt1 MM6 mt61 n1, n5, n7, n1
3 (4,6) f6 n2 bt1 MM6 mt61 n1, n5, n7, n2, n1
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Note, we assume that the addition of new failures does not impact existing
failure mitigations. Otherwise, we would need to include mitigation tests
for failures that have been aected by mitigation of new failures. This can
happen when the mitigations for two dierent failure types share some of the
mitigation code. Let impacted failures types Fc = {f1, · · · , fq} be the failures
impacted by new mitigation requirements, where q is the number of aected
failures. Let the impacted failure mitigation tests FMTc = {fmt|fmtj built
from pair (p, e) ∈ PE where fe ∈ Fc}. The new failure mitigation tests derived
from Fc will be as follows: FMT ′′ = FMTFa ∪ FMTc.
Note: FMT does not have to be rerun and FMTc is a selection not a creation
of new tests.
In our example, suppose that mitigation of new failures impacts existing failure
mitigation. Let failure type f1 be impacted by new mitigation requirements. As a
result, Fc = {f1}, and from Table 7.9 (after deleting failure mitigation tests based
on deleted failures FMTFd), the impacted failure mitigation tests are FMTc =
{fmt1, fmt4}. The new failure mitigation tests FMT ′′ are shown in Table 7.14.
The rst two test requirements address impacted failure f1, the others are identical
to those in Table 7.13.
Table 7.14: Selected pairs and FMT ′′
# Selected pairs (PE) Failure Node BT used MM used mtij used FMT ′′
1 (2,1) f1 n5 bt1 MM1 mt11 n1, n5, sg
2 (8,1) f1 n7 bt2 MM1 mt11 n1, n5, n6, n7, sg
3 (7,5) f5 n6 bt2 MM5 mt51 n1, n5, n6, n6, n7, n2
4 (3,6) f6 n7 bt1 MM6 mt61 n1, n5, n7, n1
5 (4,6) f6 n2 bt1 MM6 mt61 n1, n5, n7, n2, n1
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7.5 Changes to BM , Failure Types (F) and State-
Event Matrix (SE)
When BM, F and SE have been changed at the same time, we need to perform
the following steps:
• Classify BT into BTr, BTu, and BTo as in section 7.2.1.
• Generate new behavioral test cases BT ′ due to the changes to BM .
• Create new mitigation models MMaj; add the weaving rules for the new fail-
ures Fa, and generate new mitigation tests MTaj for new failure types Fa.
• Delete the mitigation models and weaving rules, and failure mitigation tests
FMTFd for all deleted failure in Fd.
• Remove any obsolete mitigation tests FMTo due to the changes to SE for any
inapplicable failure types.
• Dene the subset of failure types Fse and subset of states Sse that are aected
and become now feasible due to the changes to SE.
• Build a new state-event matrix SE ′ that includes any new states due to the
changes to BM and the added failure types due to the changes to F . Also,
because of the changes to SE, the new state-event matrix SE ′ includes any
failure types in Fse.
• Construct three new search spaces as follows (see Figure 7.3):
 The rst search space (SP ′1) is for existing failure types F and new test
paths BT ′.
 The second search space (SP ′2) is for new failure types Fa and for all tests
141
(new and non-obsolete tests) such that BTa = BT ′ ∪ BTr ∪ BTu. Since
new failure types could be applicable for nodes that exist in BTu, we need
to test the mitigation requirements for Fa among reusable behavioral tests
that visit these nodes.
 The third search space (SP ′3) is due to the changes to SE for newly
feasible failure types in Fse and aected behavioral tests BTse. Note that
if Fse ' F and BTse ' BTa then it means basically to regenerate tests
from scratch for the modied model.
Figure 7.3: The new search space SP' due to the Changes to BM, SE, and F
The new state-event matrix SE ′ will be constructed as in section 7.2.2 based on
the changes to BM , section 7.3 based on the changes to SE, and section 7.4 based
on the changes to F . Using the example, we will use the same changes to BM as in
section 7.2, and the changes to the SE are the same in section 7.3. Finally, deleted
and added failure types will be similar as in section 7.4.
The search space SP ′ will be three dierent matrices. One matrix SP ′1 represents
the length of BT ′ concatenation times the number of old failure types F . Note
that we remove deleted failure Fd such as F \ Fd. The second matrix SP ′2 is the
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concatenation of BTa = BT ′ ∪ BTr ∪ BTu in one dimension and the added failure
types Fa. The third matrix SP ′3 represents the length of concatenation of aected
tests BTse due to the changes to SE times the feasible failure types in Fse. Let IBT ′
be the concatenation of BT ′, and IBTa be the concatenation of BTa. Let Ise be the
concatenation of BTse. Thus, new search space will be as follows:
SP ′1 = {(p, e)|1 ≤ p ≤ length(IBT ′), 1 ≤ e ≤ |F |, se′(node(p),e) = 1}
SP ′2 = {(p, e)|1 ≤ p ≤ length(IBTa), 1 ≤ e ≤ |Fa|, se′(node(p),e) = 1}
SP ′3 = {(p, e)|1 ≤ p ≤ length(Ise), 1 ≤ e ≤ |Fse|, se′(node(p),e) = 1}
From our example and based on the changes to BM (see Figure 7.2), we delete
edge (n4, n3), and add n8 and edges (n3, n8), (n8, n4) to FSM1. Also, we delete
edge (n6, n7), and add n9 and edges (n6, n9), (n9, n7) to FSM2. The changes to
BM result into classifying BT as follows: BTo = {bt2, bt3} , BTr = {bt1}, BTu = φ,
and new test paths BT ′ = {bt′1, bt′2, bt′3}.
Because of the changes to SE, f1 becomes applicable in state n6 and f4 becomes
applicable in state n5. Thus, Fse = {f1, f4}, and Sse = {n5, n6}. We exclude any
test that does not visit n5 or n6. Since bt2 and bt3 become obsolete and only bt1 is
reusable and visits n5, BTse = {bt1, bt′3}. Note that f3 is already deleted due to the
changes to F regardless of the changes to SE.
In the example, we delete the failure types (f2 and f3), and add new failure types
(f5 and f6). Thus, Fd = {f2, f3}, and Fa = {f5, f6}.
Next, we build the new (SE ′) as shown in Table 7.15.
Tables 7.16-7.18 show the three search spaces. Note that each one has dierent







Table 7.15: New State-Event Matrix SE′
Behavioral States/
Failure Type (f )
n1 n2 n3 n4 n5 n6 n7 n8 n9 dpe
1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0.56
4 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0.33
5 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0.22
6 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0.33
dps 0.25 0.50 0.00 0.50 0.25 0.50 0.75 0.25 0.25






IBT ′/F n1 n3 n4 n2 n1 n3 n8 n4 n2 n1 n5 n6 n9 n7 n2
f1 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 0
f4 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 1
The next step is to select a new set of pairs from each search space. Based on
the size of the search space, we use GA if it is large enough, otherwise a coverage
criterion. Because there are three dierent search spaces, we have to select three
dierent set of pairs. Tables 7.16-7.18 mark the pairs selected by C2. Finally ,





Table 7.19, Table 7.20, and Table 7.21 show the selected pairs and failure mitigation











Note that failure f4 has multiple mitigation paths, hence |FMT ′1| > |PE ′1| and








IBTa/Fa n1 n5 n7 n2 n1 n3 n4 n2 n1 n3 n8 n4 n2 n1 n5 n6 n9 n7 n2
f5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
f6 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 1
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Ise/Fse n1 n5 n7 n2 n1 n5 n6 n9 n7 n2
f1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 0
f4 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 1
|FMT ′3| > |PE ′3|.
Table 7.19: Constructing FMT ′1 with PE
′
1.
# pairs PE ′1 Failure Node BT' used MM used mtij used FMT
′
1
1 (1,1) f1 n1 bt′1 MM1 mt11 n1, sg
2 (3,1) f1 n4 bt′1 MM1 mt11 n1, n3, n4, sg
3 (11,1) f1 n5 bt′3 MM1 mt11 n1, n5, sg
4 (12,1) f1 n6 bt′3 MM1 mt11 n1, n5, n6, sg
5 (14,1) f1 n7 bt′3 MM1 mt11 n1, n5, n6, n9, n7, sg
6 (4,4) f4 n2 bt′1 MM4 mt41 n1, n3, n4, n2, s1, s2, n2
7 (4,4) f4 n2 bt′1 MM4 mt42 n1, n3, n4, n2, s1, s3, n2
8 (11,4) f4 n5 bt′3 MM4 mt41 n1, n5, s1, s2, n5, n6, n9, n7, n2
9 (11,4) f4 n5 bt′3 MM4 mt42 n1, n5, s1, s3, n5, n6, n9, n7, n2
10 (14,4) f4 n7 bt′3 MM4 mt41 n1, n5, n6, n9, n7, s1, s2, n7, n2
11 (14,4) f4 n7 bt′3 MM4 mt42 n1, n5, n6, n9, n7, s1, s3, n7, n2
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Table 7.20: Constructing FMT ′2 with PE
′
2
# Selected pairs (PE ′2) Failure Node BTa used MM used mtij used FMT
′
2
1 (11,5) f5 n8 bt′2 MM5 mt51 n1, n3, n8, n8, n4, n2
2 (16,5) f5 n6 bt′3 MM5 mt51 n1, n5, n6, n6, n9, n7, n2
3 (3,6) f6 n7 bt1 MM6 mt61 n1, n5, n7, n1
4 (4,6) f6 n2 bt1 MM6 mt61 n1, n5, n7, n2, n1
5 (17,6) f6 n9 bt′3 MM6 mt61 n1, n5, n6, n9, n1
6 (18,6) f6 n7 bt′3 MM6 mt61 n1, n5, n6, n9, n7, n1
Table 7.21: Constructing FMT ′3 with PE
′
3.
# Selected pairs (PE ′3) Failure Node BTse used MM used mtij used FMT
′
3
1 (1,1) f1 n1 bt1 MM1 mt11 n1, sg
2 (2,1) f1 n5 bt1 MM1 mt11 n1, n5, sg
3 (3,1) f1 n7 bt1 MM1 mt11 n1, n5, n7, sg
4 (7,1) f1 n6 bt′3 MM1 mt11 n1, n5, n6, sg
5 (2,4) f4 n5 bt1 MM4 mt41 n1, n5, s1, s2, n5, n7, n2
6 (2,4) f4 n5 bt1 MM4 mt42 n1, n5, s1, s3, n5, n7, n2
7 (3,4) f4 n7 bt1 MM4 mt41 n1, n5, n7, s1, s2, n7, n2
8 (3,4) f4 n7 bt1 MM4 mt42 n1, n5, n7, s1, s3, n7, n2
9 (3,4) f4 n2 bt1 MM4 mt41 n1, n5, n7, n2, s1, s2, n2
10 (3,4) f4 n2 bt1 MM4 mt42 n1, n5, n7, n2, s1, s3, n2
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7.6 Changes to Mitigation Models (MM)
We assume that BT ′, F ′, SE ′, and PE ′ have been constructed based on changes
to corresponding artifacts and algorithms in sections 7.2,7.3,7.4, and 7.5. We also
assume that MT ′j have been constructed for any changed model: j ∈ modMM =
{j|1 ≤ j ≤ |F | ∧MM ′j 6= MMj}. When changes to mitigation models occur, we
need to follow:
• determine a mitigation test paths for the changed mitigation model(s).
• determine retestable FMT and pairs upon which they are based that use
mitigation tests from the changed model(s).
Note that we do not have to consider PE ′2 or PE
′
3 since they are based on new
mitigation models, not changed ones, or failure types that used to be inapplicable,
hence no retestable failure mitigation tests exist. Note that SE ′3 only species
feasible pairs that did not exist in the prior version. Note also that PE ′1 describes
new test requirements from which new failure mitigation tests are created (regardless
of changes to the mitigation models).
Hence we only need to consider two cases:
• failure mitigation tests that are based on retestable mitigation tests. These
need to be rerun.
• failure mitigation tests that were built based on failure types for the modied
mitigation model. These need to be rebuilt with the new mitigation tests set.
Note that we need to exclude any obsolete failure mitigation tests FMTo.
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7.6.1 Determine Mitigation Test Paths for Changed Mitiga-
tion Models
Since the mitigation model is similar to the behavioral model (FSMWeb), the
same concept is applied to the mitigation test paths using [7]. The same classica-
tion will be used in terms of obsolete, reusable, or retestable test paths. We classify
mitigation tests (MTj) of failure type fj as obsolete (MTjo), retestable (MTjr),
and reusable (MTju). We determine new mitigation test cases (MT
′
j) for uncovered
edges in the mitigation model of failure type fj.
Back to our example, the mitigation model MM4 for failure type f4 is modied as
shown in Figure 7.4. We modify the model from export to Excel to be exported
to Word format. We delete edges: (s1, s2), (s2, sf ). The deleted edges make mit-
igation test mt41 obsolete. Thus, MT4o = {mt41}. We also add node (s4) and
edges: (s1, s4), (s4, sf ). As a result, a new mitigation test path is needed: mt′41 =
{si, s1, s4, sf}. Thus, MT ′4 = {mt′41}. Since mitigation test mt42 = {si, s1, s3, sf}
visits si, this makes mt42 retestable. Consequently, MT4r = {mt42}. Since only one
mitigation model has been changed, modMM = {4}. The new mitigation test for
MM ′4 is MT
′′
4 = MT4r ∪MT ′4 = {mt42,mt′41}.
7.6.2 Failure Mitigation Tests Based Retestable Mitigation
Tests
As stated before these tests need to be rerun. They constitute the retestable
failure mitigation tests FMTrt. They are dened as follows: FMTrt = {fmt|fmt ∈
FMT based on: (p, j) ∈ PE, j ∈ modMM ,mtj ∈MTjr}. We need to rerun FMTrt.
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Figure 7.4: Modied Mitigation Model MM4.
From Table 3.9, the only failure mitigation tests used for f4 are fmt4 and fmt5.
However, fmt4 is obsolete because of using mt41, and fmt5 becomes retestable be-
cause of using mt42. Hence FMTrt = {fmt5}.
7.6.3 Build New Failure Mitigation Tests
Here we need to make sure that all mtj ∈ MT ′j (j ∈ modMM) are used to
build new failure mitigation tests. This requires identifying all pairs: PEMM ′ =
{(p, j)|j ∈ modMM} and then using mtj ∈ MT ′j to build the new failure mitigation
tests FMT ′MM . FMT
′
MM = {fmt′| based on (p, e) ∈ PEMM ′ using mtj ∈MT ′j , j ∈
modMM}. These new tests need to be run.
In the example and from Table 3.9, PEMM ′ = {(8, 4)} and MT ′4 = {mt′41}. We
generate new failure mitigation test usingmt′41. Thus, fmt
′
4 = {n1, n5, n6, n7, s1, s4, n7, n2}.
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7.6.4 Potential Impact on Other Failure Mitigations
Changes to failure mitigations can impact mitigations of other failures whose
models have not changed. This can happen when they share portions of the mitiga-
tion code, for example. In such a case, the failure mitigation tests for these failures
need to be rerun. Let EI be the failure types impacted. Then all failure mitigation
tests based on PEI = {(p, e)|e ∈ EI} need to be rerun. The failure mitigation tests
FMTI = {fmt|fmt ∈ FMT , based on (p, e) ∈ PEI} are the impacted set of tests.
From the example, we assume the changes toMM ′4 has aected the failure mitigation
associated with failure type f1. Using Table 3.9, EI = {1}, PEI = {(2, 1), (8, 1)}
and FMTI = {fmt1, fmt7}. These need to be rerun.
In summary, the regression test suite FMT ′′ to execute consists of retestable tests
FMTrt, new failure mitigation tests FMT ′MM and tests for failures that are im-
pacted by mitigation model changes in other failures FMTI . Hence FMT ′′ =
FMTrt ∪FMT ′MM ∪FMTI . Table 7.22 shows the new failure mitigation regression
tests as follows:
FMT ′′ = {fmt5} ∪ {fmt′4} ∪ {fmt1, fmt7} = {fmt1, fmt′4, fmt5, fmt7}
Table 7.22: PE and resulting FMT ′′.
# pairs (PE) Failure Node BT used MM used mtij used FMT
1 (2,1) f1 n5 bt1 MM1 mt11 n1, n5, sg
2 (8,4) f4 n7 bt2 MM4 mt′41 n1, n5, n6, n7, s1, s4, n7, n2
3 (8,4) f4 n7 bt2 MM4 mt42 n1, n5, n6, n7, s1, s3, n2
4 (8,1) f1 n7 bt2 MM1 mt11 n1, n5, n6, n7, sg
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7.7 Changes to Weaving Rules (WR)
When a weaving rule is modied, we need to identify which (p, e) pairs are
aected and we need to regenerate tests that were created using the old weaving
rule, as these failure mitigation tests are now obsolete. Let modWR = {failure
types for which weaving rule changed}. Let PEWR = {(p, e)|(p, e) ∈ PE ∧ e ∈
modWR}. We generate new failure mitigation tests for these (p, e) pairs. Then
FMT ′ = {fmt′|(p, e) ∈ PEWR used to construct fmt′}. We simply regenerate
failure mitigation tests using appropriate coverage criteria and rerun these tests.
In the example, we update the weaving rule "End All" for failure f2 to be "Fix and
proceed". Hence PEWR = {(11, 2), (6, 2)} (cf Table 3.9). Tests fmt2 and fmt8 are
obsolete and need to be regenerated. Table 7.23 shows the result.Using Table 3.9,
we use the new weaving rule wr′f2 and generate new failure mitigation tests FMT
′′
for them using the new weaving rule for pairs in PEWR. New failure mitigation test
for f2 need to be constructed for pairs (11,2) and (6,2). The new failure mitigation
tests are shown in Table 7.23.
In case of multiple changes to artifacts, we do not have to consider PE ′1 or PE
′
3,
since they are based on new mitigation models (and weaving rules), not changed ones
or failures that used to be inapplicable, hence no retestable failure mitigation tests
exist. Since PE ′1 describes new test requirements, we would have already constructed
failure mitigation tests with the new weaving rules as described in section 7.5. FMT ′
refers to reconstruction of existing tests.
Table 7.23: PEWR and resulting FMT
′′.
# pairs (PE) Failure Node BT used MM used mtij used FMT
2 (11,2) f2 n3 bt3 MM2 mt21 n1, n3, n3, n4, n3, n2
8 (6,2) f2 n5 bt2 MM2 mt21 n1, n5, n5, n6, n7, n2
151
7.8 Discussion
We build the framework for selective regression testing of fail-safe testing. We
provide a systematic method by showing the formalization steps for each type of
change to the various models (BM,MM,WR,F, SE) and build a regression test
suite based on each type of change, allowing for multiple changes to artifacts. If the
new search space is suciently large, we use GA [5] to construct the new test re-
quirements, otherwise coverage criterion (CC)[6] are the best choice. In case changes
to the behavioral model are the only change and the changes did not add many new
states/edges or delete many states/edges, there will be few new mitigation tests.
When failure types no longer apply or when some failure types become not applica-
ble in some nodes (entries in SE matrix change from 1 to 0), the number of failure
mitigation tests becomes smaller. However, when new failure types are required to
be mitigated, or some failure types become applicable in states where they were
not applicable before, the number of failure mitigation tests increases. Therefore,
the changes to behavioral models BM , the changes to SE, or adding new failure
types have higher impact as more work is involved such as building a SE ′, search
space SP1 − SP3, and generating more failure mitigation tests. On the other hand,
changes to mitigation models or weaving rules have less impact because they are
local changes. Multiple changes to the artifacts can become very expensive and may
require to create a full new test suite. Also in this case, we are also more likely to
use a GA.3
3This is a trade-o situation, that is beyond the scope of this dissertation and will be considered
in future work research.
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7.9 Case Study
We use the behavioral model of the Closing Documents (CD) sub system in
section 6.1 to illustrate our regression testing framework. The next subsections
describe the changes to artifacts(BM ,F ,SE,MM ,WR) and how we build the search
space and generate the regression failure mitigation tests for all the changes.
7.9.1 Changes to BM
Figure 7.5 shows the changes to the behavioral model of the CD subsystem. We
have added a new node (FF), and edges p3_n1, p3_n2, and deleted a node (SI)
and the edges related to it.
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Figure 7.5: Changes to BM of CD sub-system.
7.9.1.1 Classify BT and Build BT ′
The following steps describe the changes to BM :
• Classify BT int BTo, BTr, and BTu:
 The set of deleted nodes No = {SI}, then the set of obsolete test paths
due to node changes ON = {TCD3, TCD7, TCD8, TCD9}. The set of deleted
edges Eo = {(CI, SI), (SI, CI)}, then the set of obsolete test paths due
to edge changes OE = {TCD3, TCD7, TCD8, TCD9}. Thus, obsolete tests
BTo = ON ∪OE = {TCD3, TCD7, TCD8, TCD9}.
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 The set of added edges E ′ \ E = {(np3, FF ), (FF, np3)}, and the set of
retestable nodes Nr = {np3, CI}.
Thus, retestable tests BTr = {TCD2, TCD10, TCD11, TCD12}.
 Reusable tests BTu = BT \ (BTo ∪BTr) = {TCD1, TCD4, TCD5, TCD6}.
• The following edges in the BM ′:{(np3, FF ), (FF, np3)} are not covered. Thus,
the new tests BT ′ = {Tnew1, Tnew2, Tnew3, Tnew4} as shown in Table 7.24.
Table 7.24 shows the classication of behavioral tests BT and the new tests BT ′.
The rst column shows the clusters of aggregation sequence for CD subsystem. The
second column shows the test number, third column the test path and the last col-
umn the classication of test path based on the changes to BM .
Table 7.24: Classication of BT
Clusters Test No. Test Path Classication
Home-LPD-CD TCD1 w0,n0,VC,VC,ne,np3,DC,DC,np3,ne,n0,w0 Reusable
Home-LPD-CD TCD2 w0,n0,VC,VC,ne,np3,CI,CI,np3,ne,n0,w0 Retestable
Home-LPD-CD TCD3 w0,n0,VC,VC,ne,np3,CI,SI,CI,np3,ne,n0,w0 Obsolete
SE-LPD-CD TCD4 w0,n0,SP,SR,EE,SR,ne,np3,DC,DC,np3,ne,n0,w0 Reusable
SE-LPD-CD TCD5 w0,n0,SP,SP,AS,SR,ne,np3,DC,DC,np3,ne,n0,w0 Reusable
SE-LPD-CD TCD6 w0,n0,SP,AS,SP,AS,SR,ne,np3,DC,DC,np3,ne,n0,w0 Reusable
SE-LPD-CD TCD7 w0,n0,SP,SR,EE,SR,ne,np3,CI,SI,CI,np3,ne,n0,w0 Obsolete
SE-LPD-CD TCD8 w0,n0,SP,SP,AS,SR,ne,np3,CI,SI,CI,np3,ne,n0,w0 Obsolete
SE-LPD-CD TCD9 w0,n0,SP,AS,SP,AS,SR,ne,np3,CI,SI,CI,np3,ne,n0,w0 Obsolete
SE-LPD-CD TCD10 w0,n0,SP,SR,EE,SR,ne,np3,CI,CI,np3,ne,n0,w0 Retestable
SE-LPD-CD TCD11 w0,n0,SP,SP,AS,SR,ne,np3,CI,CI,np3,ne,n0,w0 Retestable
SE-LPD-CD TCD12 w0,n0,SP,AS,SP,AS,SR,ne,np3,CI,CI,np3,ne,n0,w0 Retestable
Home-LPD-CD Tnew1 w0,n0,VC,VC,ne,np3,FF,np3,ne,n0,w0 New
SE-LPD-CD Tnew2 w0,n0,SP,SR,EE,SR,ne,np3,FF,np3,ne,n0,w0 New
SE-LPD-CD Tnew3 w0,n0,SP,SP,AS,SR,ne,np3,FF,np3,ne,n0,w0 New
SE-LPD-CD Tnew4 w0,n0,SP,AS,SP,AS,SR,ne,np3,FF,np3,ne,n0,w0 New
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7.9.1.2 Build SE' matrix
The new state-event matrix SE ′ is shown in Table 7.25. It is the same as the
original SE in Table 6.21 except for the added column for the new state FF .





w0 n0 VC ne np3 SP SR AS EE DC CI FF dpe
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1.0
2 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0.9
3 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 0.3
4 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0.3
5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0.3
6 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0.9
7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0.1
8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0.2
9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0.2
10 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0.2
dps 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.5 0.4 0.4 0.3 0.9 0.7 0.7
7.9.1.3 Build new search space SP'and FMT
We consider only the new BT ′ in building SP ′. Concatenating BT ′ such as:
I ′ = (Tnew1 ◦Tnew2 ◦Tnew3 ◦Tnew4). The length of I ′ is 51, and the number of failure
types is E = |F | = 10. Thus, the new search space SP ′ = {(p, e)|1 ≤ p ≤ 51, 1 ≤
e ≤ 10, se′(node(p),e) = 1}. We select new pairs PE ′ using SP ′. Since the search space
size is reasonable to use GA, we apply GA for selecting new pairs PE ′. Next, we
generate new failure mitigation tests FMT ′′ using the existing weaving rules that
are dened in Table 6.20.
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Table 7.26 shows the selected (p, e) pairs and resulting FMT ′′ for the modied
model BM ′. The rst column in Table 7.26 numbers each failure mitigation test
(fmt1− fmt29). The second column lists each (p, e) pair in PE ′. The third column
refers to the failure type whose mitigation is tested. The fourth column states the
node at position p. The fth column identies the new behavioral test used in
constructing fmti (i = 1, · · · , 29). The sixth column identies which mitigation
model is used as described in Table 3.6. The seventh column lists which mtij is
used as described in Table 3.6. The last column shows the failure mitigation tests.
Table 7.26 shows the new failure mitigation regression tests FMT ′′ that includes
FMTr pulse FMT ′. The (fmt1−fmt15) are behavioral retestable ones and the tests
number 9 to 20 are the new ones. The number of mitigation tests is incremented as
a result of building a new failure regression test suite.
157
Table 7.26: Constructing FMT ′′ for modied model BM ′
# (p,e) Failure Node MM used FMT' BT used
1 (165,4) f4 CI MM4 TCD12 TCD12
2 (133,5) f5 ne MM5 TCD10 TCD10
3 (135,6) f6 CI MM6 TCD10 TCD10
4 (19,6) f6 CI MM6 TCD2 TCD2
5 (19,9) f9 CI MM9 w0,n0,VC,VC,ne,np3,CI,np3 TCD2
6 (129,9) f9 SP MM9 TCD10 TCD10
7 (148,9) f9 np3 MM9 TCD11 TCD11
8 (15,1) f1 VC MM1 w0,n0,VC,sg TCD2
9 (130,1) f1 SR MM1 w0,n0,SP,SR,sg TCD10
10 (136,2) f1 CI MM2 w0,n0,SP,SR,EE,SR,ne,np3,CI,CI,sg TCD10
11 (158,2) f1 AS MM2 w0,n0,SP,AS,sg TCD12
12 (157,2) f2 SP MM2 w0,n0,SP,w0,n0,SP,AS,SP,AS,SR,ne,np3,CI,CI,np3,ne,n0,w0 TCD12
13 (131,2) f2 EE MM2 w0,n0,SP,SR,EE,w0,n0,SP,SR,EE,SR,ne,np3,CI,CI,np3,ne, TCD10
n0,w0
14 (152,2) f2 ne MM2 w0,n0,SP,SP,AS,SR,ne,np3,CI,CI,np3,ne,w0,n0,SP,SP,AS,SR, TCD11
ne,np3,CI,CI,np3,ne,n0,w0
15 (19,3) f3 CI MM3 TCD2 TCD2
16 (47,3) f3 FF MM3 w0,n0,SP,AS,SP,AS,SR,ne,np3,FF,FF, np3,ne,n0,w0 Tnew4
17 (30,1) f1 SR MM1 w0,n0,SP,SP,AS,SR,sg Tnew3
18 (4,2) f2 VC MM2 w0,n0,VC,VC,w0,n0,VC,VC,ne,np3,FF,np3,ne,n0,w0 Tnew1
19 (7,5) f5 FF MM5 w0,n0,VC,VC,ne,np3,FF,np3,ne,n0,w0 Tnew1
20 (40,3) f3 SP MM3 w0,n0,SP,AS,SP,SP,AS,SR,ne,np3,FF,np3,ne,n0,w0 Tnew4
21 (22,6) f6 ne MM6 Tnew2 Tnew2
22 (16,1) f1 EE MM1 w0,n0,SP,SR,EE,sg Tnew2
23 (32,2) f2 np3 MM2 w0,n0,SP,SP,AS,SR,ne,np3,w0,n0,SP,SP,AS,SR,ne,np3,FF,np3,
ne,n0,w0
Tnew3
24 (12,10) f10 n0 MM10 Tnew2 Tnew2
25 (28,4) f4 SP MM4 w0,n0,SP,SP,SP,AS,SR,ne,np3,FF,np3,ne,n0,w0 Tnew3
26 (43,6) f6 AS MM10 Tnew4 Tnew4
27 (35,1) f1 ne MM1 w0,n0,SP,SP,AS,SR,ne,np3,FF,np3,ne,sg Tnew3
28 (1,3) f3 w0 MM3 w0,w0,n0,VC,VC,ne,np3,FF,np3,ne,n0,w0 Tnew1
29 (39,6) f6 n0 MM2 w0,n0,w0,n0,SP,AS,SP,AS,SR,ne,np3,FF,np3,ne,n0,w0 Tnew4
158
7.9.2 Changes to SE
We assume failure f7 becomes inapplicable in state DC and f7 becomes applica-
ble in state AS. From Table 6.25, we have one two tests associated with f7 but only
one position using DC. The node in position 46 is DC. Only the pair (46,7) is ob-
solete. It was used to create fmt16 which is now obsolete hence FMTo = {fmt16}.
Hence Fse = {f7}, and Sse = {AS}. The new SE ′ is dened in Table (7.27). It
includes both making f7 inapplicable in state DC as well as making f7 applicable
in state AS respectively. From Table 7.24, behavioral tests that visits states in Sse
are BTse = {TCD5, TCD6, TCD8, TCD9TCD11, TCD12}.





w0 n0 VC ne np3 SP SR AS EE DC CI SI dpe
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1.0
2 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0.9
3 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0.3
4 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0.3
5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0.3
6 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0.9
7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0.1
8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0.2
9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0.2
10 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0.3
dps 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.5 0.4 0.4 0.3 0.9 0.7 0.5
We rebuild the new search space SP ′ = {(p, e)|1 ≤ p ≤ 116, 1 ≤ e ≤ 1, se′(node(p),e) =
1 ∧ node(p) ∈ Sse}. We select a new pairs PE ′ using coverage criteria C2. Table
7.28 shows the selected pairs and new failure mitigation tests.
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Table 7.28: Selected pairs and Constructing FMT ′′ for Fse
# (p,e) Failure Node MM used FMT' BT used
26 (78,7) f7 AS MM7 w0,n0,SP,AS,AS,SP,AS,SR,ne,np3,CI,CI,np3,ne,n0,w0 TCD12
7.9.3 Changes to F
7.9.3.1 Delete Failure types
We delete f1 as a faulty network can no longer cause a network connection error
by using a backup router to quickly swap out the faulty network, and f2 as session ex-
piration failure is no longer valid. Hence the deleted failure types are Fd = {f1, f2},
we remove the mitigation models {MM1,MM2} and weaving rules {WR1,WR2}
for the failures f ∈ Fd. From Table 6.25, the deleted failure mitigation tests are
FMTFd = {fmt25, fmt26, fmt27, fmt28, fmt29, fmt30, fmt31, fmt32, fmt33, fmt34, fmt35,
fmt36, fmt37, fmt38, fmt39, fmt40, fmt41, fmt42, fmt43, fmt44, fmt45, fmt46}.
Table 7.29 shows reusable failure mitigation tests after deleting f1 and f2.
7.9.3.2 Add Failure types
We add a mitigation requirement for power outage as explained (failure f11).
Hence Fa = {f11}. We have to build a new state-event matrix (SEa) that includes
the new failure types Fa as shown in Table 7.30. Then, we create a new mitigation
model MMa = {MM11} and weaving rule WR11 for the new mitigation model (see
Table 7.31).
The new search space is dened with the concatenated behavioral test suite
BT and the new failure types as follows: SPa = {(p, e)|1 ≤ p ≤ 169, 1 ≤ e ≤
1, sea(node(p),e) = 1}. Because the search space is too small for using GA, we use
coverage criteria (C2) for selecting pairs as shown in Table 7.32.
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Table 7.29: Reusable tests after deleting failures f1 and f2
# (p,e) Failure Node MM used FMT BT used
1 (33,3) f3 SI MM3 TCD3 TCD3
2 (2,3) f3 n0 MM3 TCD1 TCD1
3 (60,3) f3 DC MM3 w0,n0,SP,SP,AS,SR,ne,np3,DC,DC,DC,np3,ne,n0,w0 TCD5
4 (75,4) f4 DC MM4 w0,n0,SP,AS,SP,AS, SR,ne,np3,DC,DC,DC,np3,ne,n0,w0 TCD6
5 (165,4) f4 CI MM4 TCD12 TCD12
6 (5,5) f5 VC MM5 TCD1 TCD1
7 (89,5) f5 CI MM5 w0,n0,SP,SR,EE,SR,ne,np3,CI,np3 TCD7
8 (133,5) f5 ne MM5 TCD10 TCD10
9 (41,6) f6 SR MM6 TCD4 TCD4
10 (42,6) f6 EE MM6 TCD4 TCD4
11 (56,6) f6 AS MM6 TCD5 TCD5
12 (135,6) f6 CI MM6 TCD10 TCD10
13 (7,6) f6 DC MM6 TCD1 TCD1
14 (19,6) f6 CI MM6 TCD2 TCD2
15 (105,6) f6 SI MM6 TCD8 TCD8
16 (46,7) f7 DC MM7 w0,n0,SP,SR,EE,SR,ne,np3,DC,mti,DC,np3,ne,n0,w0 TCD4
17 (90,7) f7 SI MM7 TCD7 TCD7
18 (93,8) f8 ne MM8 TCD7 TCD7
19 (120,8) f8 CI MM8 w0,n0,SP,AS,SP,AS, SR,ne,np3,CI,CI,SI,CI,np3,ne,n0,w0 TCD9
20 (19,9) f9 CI MM9 w0,n0,VC,VC,ne,np3,CI,np3 TCD2
21 (129,9) f9 SP MM9 TCD10 TCD10
22 (148,9) f9 np3 MM9 TCD11 TCD11
23 (81,10) f10 w0 MM10 TCD7 TCD7
24 (32,10) f10 CI MM10 w0,n0,VC,VC,ne,np3,CI,n1, n2,SI,CI,np3,ne,n0,w0 TCD3
25 (32,10) f10 CI MM10 w0,n0,VC,VC,ne,np3,CI,n1, n3,SI,CI,np3,ne,n0,w0 TCD3
26 (19,3) f3 CI MM3 TCD2 TCD2





w0 n0 VC ne np3 SP SR AS EE DC CI FF
11 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
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Table 7.31: New Mitigation Requirements of f11
MM Explanation Model WR#
MM11 End Activity: power
outage
MT11 = φ where sf =
w0,and sf is the start
node and stop
4
Table 7.32: Selected pairs and Constructing FMTFa
# (p,e) Failure Node MM used FMT' BT used
14 (1,11) f11 w0 MM11 w0,w0 TCD1
15 (2,11) f11 n0 MM11 w0,n0,w0 TCD1
16 (3,11) f11 VC MM11 w0,n0,VC,w0 TCD1
17 (5,11) f11 ne MM11 w0,n0,VC,VC, ne, w0 TCD1
18 (6,11) f11 np3 MM11 w0,n0,VC,VC, ne,np3, w0 TCD1
19 (7,11) f11 DC MM11 w0,n0,VC,VC, ne,np3,DC, w0 TCD1
20 (19,11) f11 CI MM11 w0,n0,VC,VC,ne,np3,CI,w0 TCD2
21 (32,11) f11 SI MM11 w0,n0,VC,VC,ne,np3,CI,SI,w0 TCD3
22 (40,11) f11 SP MM11 w0,n0,SP,w0 TCD4
23 (41,11) f11 SR MM11 w0,n0,SP,SR,w0 TCD4
24 (42,11) f11 EE MM11 w0,n0,SP,SR,EE,w0 TCD4
25 (56,11) f11 AS MM11 w0,n0,SP,SP,AS,w0 TCD5
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7.9.4 Changes to BM, F, and SE
We apply the same changes as described in previous subsections at the same time.
The new SE ′ is dened in Table (7.33). It includes both making f7 inapplicable in
state DC as well as making f7 applicable in state AS respectively. Also, it includes
the changes to BM by showing new state FF .





w0 n0 VC ne np3 SP SR AS EE DC CI FF dpe
3 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 0.33
4 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0.33
5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0.25
6 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0.92
7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0.17
8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0.17
9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0.17
10 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0.08
11 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1.0
dps 0.22 0.22 0.22 0.22 0.22 0.44 0.33 0.44 0.22 0.78 0.56 0.67
We build the search space is based on all the changes to BM , F , and SE. Since
we already classify BT into BTr, BTu, BTo and generate new behavioral test paths
BT ′ as described in subsection 7.9.1, we build the rst search space SP ′1 for existing
failure type F and new test paths BT ′. Based on the changes to F as describe in
subsection 7.9.3, we remove Fd from F such as F \Fd. As a result of concatenating
the new tests I ′ = (Tnew1 ◦ Tnew2 ◦ Tnew3 ◦ Tnew4), the length(IBT ′) = 51. Thus,
SP ′1 = {(p, e)|1 ≤ p ≤ 51, 1 ≤ e ≤ 9, se′(node(p),e) = 1}.
From subsection 7.9.3, we dene the new mitigation model, weaving rules and mit-
igation tests for the new failure Fa. Also, we delete the mitigation models, weaving
rules and failure mitigation tests FMTfd for all deleted failure in Fd. Then we build
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the second search space SP ′2 for new failure types Fa and for all tests (new and
non-obsolete tests) BTa. Thus, BTa = BTr ∪BTu ∪BT ′ =
{TCD2, TCD10, TCD11, TCD12, TCD1, TCD4, TCD5, TCD6, Tnew1, Tnew2, Tnew3, Tnew4}. The
length of |BTa| = 110. SP ′2 = {(p, e)|1 ≤ p ≤ 110, 1 ≤ e ≤ 1, se′(node(p),e) = 1}.
Based on the changes to SE as described in subsection 7.9.2, we remove any obsolete
tests FMTo for any inapplicable failure types, and we dene the subset of failure
types Fse and subset of states Sse that are aected and become feasible. We build
the third search space SP ′3 due to the changes to SE for feasible failure types in
Fse and aected behavioral tests BTse. From Table 7.24, behavioral tests that visits
states in Sse are BTse = {TCD5, TCD6, TCD11, TCD12, Tnew3, Tnew4}. Note we exclude
obsolete tests due to the BM changes. Thus, SP ′3 = {(p, e)|1 ≤ p ≤ 85, 1 ≤ e ≤
1, se′(node(p),e) = 1}.
We remove all failure mitigation tests for any failure f ∈ Fd. From Table
6.25, the deleted failure mitigation tests FMTFd = {fmt25, fmt26, ...to..., fmt46}
and retestable failure mitigation tests:
FMTr = {fmt5, fmt8, fmt12, fmt14, fmt20, fmt22, fmt47}.
We need to determine failure mitigation test based on:
• Selected pairs PE ′1 using SP ′1 which is the new tests BT ′ and F \ Fd.
• Selected pairs PE ′2 using SP ′2 which is BTa and new failure types Fa.
• Selected pairs PE ′3 using SP ′3 which is BTse and Fse.
Table 7.34 shows the regression failure mitigation tests for FMT ′1 using PE
′
1.
Note that failure mitigation tests (fmt1− fmt8) are derived from retestable behav-
ioral tests BTr and the rest from new tests BT ′. The rst column in Table 7.34
numbers each failure mitigation test. The second column lists each (p, e) pair in
PE ′. The third column refers to the failure type whose mitigation is tested. The
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forth column states the node at position p. The fth column identies the miti-
gation model used. The sixth column shows the construction of failure mitigation
test. The last column refers to the behavioral test used.
Since SP ′2 and SP
′
3 have a small search space, we use coverage criteria C2. Table
7.35 and Table 7.36 shows the regression failure mitigation tests for FMT ′3 using





Table 7.34: Constructing FMT ′1 with PE
′
1
# (p,e) Failure Node MM used FMT' BT used
1 (165,4) f4 CI MM4 TCD12 TCD12
2 (133,5) f5 ne MM5 TCD10 TCD10
3 (135,6) f6 CI MM6 TCD10 TCD10
4 (19,6) f6 CI MM6 TCD2 TCD2
5 (19,9) f9 CI MM9 w0,n0,VC,VC,ne,np3,CI,np3 TCD2
6 (129,9) f9 SP MM9 TCD10 TCD10
7 (148,9) f9 np3 MM9 TCD11 TCD11
8 (19,3) f3 CI MM3 TCD2 TCD2
9 (47,3) f3 FF MM3 w0,n0,SP,AS,SP,AS,SR,ne,np3,FF,FF, np3,ne,n0,w0 Tnew4
10 (7,5) f5 FF MM5 w0,n0,VC,VC,ne,np3,FF,np3,ne,n0,w0 Tnew1
11 (40,3) f3 SP MM3 w0,n0,SP,AS,SP,SP,AS,SR,ne,np3,FF,np3,ne,n0,w0 Tnew4
12 (22,6) f6 ne MM6 Tnew2 Tnew2
13 (12,10) f10 n0 MM10 Tnew2 Tnew2
14 (28,4) f4 SP MM4 w0,n0,SP,SP,SP,AS,SR,ne,np3,FF,np3,ne,n0,w0 Tnew3
15 (43,6) f6 AS MM10 Tnew4 Tnew4
16 (1,3) f3 w0 MM3 w0,w0,n0,VC,VC,ne,np3,FF,np3,ne,n0,w0 Tnew1
17 (39,6) f6 n0 MM2 w0,n0,w0,n0,SP,AS,SP,AS,SR,ne,np3,FF,np3,ne,n0,w0 Tnew4
7.9.5 Changes to MM
The mitigation model MM10 for failure type f10 has been modied as shown
in Figure 7.6. We modify the model from export to Excel to be exported to
Word format. We delete edges: (n1, n2), (n2, sf ). The deleted edges make miti-
gation test mt101 obsolete. Thus, MT4o = {mt101}. We also add node (n4) and
edges: (n1, n4), (n4, sf ). As a result, a new mitigation test path is needed: mt′101 =
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Table 7.35: Constructing FMT ′2 with PE
′
2
# (p,e) Failure Node MM used FMT' BT used
14 (1,11) f11 w0 MM11 w0,w0 TCD1
15 (2,11) f11 n0 MM11 w0,n0,w0 TCD1
16 (3,11) f11 VC MM11 w0,n0,VC,w0 TCD1
17 (5,11) f11 ne MM11 w0,n0,VC,VC, ne, w0 TCD1
18 (6,11) f11 np3 MM11 w0,n0,VC,VC, ne,np3, w0 TCD1
19 (7,11) f11 DC MM11 w0,n0,VC,VC, ne,np3,DC, w0 TCD1
20 (19,11) f11 CI MM11 w0,n0,VC,VC,ne,np3,CI,w0 TCD2
21 (27,11) f11 SP MM11 w0,n0,SP,w0 TCD4
22 (28,11) f11 SR MM11 w0,n0,SP,SR,w0 TCD4
23 (29,11) f11 EE MM11 w0,n0,SP,SR,EE,w0 TCD4
24 (43,11) f11 AS MM11 w0,n0,SP,SP,AS,w0 TCD5
25 (117,11) f11 FF MM11 w0,n0,VC,VC,ne,np3,FF,w0 Tnew1
Table 7.36: Constructing FMT ′3 with PE
′
3
# (p,e) Failure Node MM used FMT' BT used
26 (47,7) f7 AS MM7 w0,n0,SP,AS,AS,SP,AS,SR,ne,np3,CI,CI,np3,ne,n0,w0 TCD12
{si, n1, n4, sf}. Thus,MT ′10 = {mt′101}. Since mitigation testmt102 = {si, n1, n3, sf}
visits si, this makes mt102 retestable. Consequently, MT10r = {mt102}. Since only
one mitigation model has been changed, mod = {10}. The new mitigation test for
MM ′10 is MT
′′
10 = MT10r ∪MT ′10 = {mt102 ,mt′101}. From table 6.25, we identify
all aected pairs PEMM ′ = {(32, 10)} then using MT ′10 to build the new failure
mitigation test FMT ′. Table 7.37 shows the new failure mitigation test; however,
if we consider the changes to BM , this failure mitigation tests becomes obsolete as
it was built based on obsolete behavioral test TCD3.
Table 7.37: FMT ′ for modied mitigation model MM10
# (p,e) Failure Node MM used FMT BT used
24 (32,10) f10 SI MM10 w0,n0,VC,VC,ne,np3,CI,SI,n1, n4,CI,np3,ne,n0,w0 TCD3
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Figure 7.6: Modied Mitigation Model MM10.
7.9.6 Changes to WR
We update the weaving rule "End Activity" for failure type f5 to be "Fix and
proceed". Next from Table 6.25, we identify aected pairs PEWR = {(89, 5)} then
using new weaving rule to build the new failure mitigation test FMT ′. Table 7.38
shows the new failure mitigation test; however, if we consider the changes to BM ,
this failure mitigation tests becomes obsolete as it was built based on obsolete be-
havioral test TCD7.
Table 7.38: FMT ′ for modied weaving rule WR
# (p,e) Failure Node MM used FMT BT used




In future work, the dissertation could be extended in many ways:
• New system domains:
This dissertation is focused on the web applications domain. We plan to
apply the technique in dierent system domains such as medical systems,
robotic devices, ight control systems or other safety critical systems, so we
could apply and compare the mitigation patterns of safety critical systems
versus the mitigation patterns of web applications. By involving new system
domains, we investigate dierent failure types and how they might occur in
dierent system domains. This would also require using behavioral models
other than FSMWeb.
• New Behavioral models:
We will use dierent behavior models for our approach such as UML activity
and sequence diagrams, Petri Nets, EFSMs or CEFSMs. These models have
been used in dierent application domains. We will show the generalizability
of our approach by investigating other behavioral models that have the ability
to describe communicating processes.
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• More Simulation Experiments:
We will investigate robustness of our current results experimenting with a
wider range of values for simulation parameters such as applicability level,
defect density, and duplication factor. We noticed during our experiments
that a low defect density with a low applicability level in a large search space
has been a very tough problem since the feasible region is not big enough and
this aects the GA's performance. For example, some of the safety critical
systems have a very large number of failure types but they are only applicable
in particular phases which means a sparse (SE) matrix. Also, the duplication
factor has an enormous eect on defect detection. Thus, exploring high and
low values for dierent combinations of simulation parameters could increase
understanding of our approach. Hence, future work will take us into two
dierent directions:
 investigate the compound impact of varying more individual parameters.
 investigate further the types of parameter values occurring in case studies.
• Improve Fitness Function:
We plan to add cost of failure as an additional dimension to the approach
when selecting test requirements. Failure Mode and Eect Criticality Analysis
(FMECA) is one analysis method that is used to calculate the anticipated risk
and criticality of failures in a system. We incorporate the ideas of cost and
FMECA into black-box testing using GA that would enhance system reliability
and performance. We could add failure criticality as a third dimension to the
tness function, or we can incorporate FMECA into the Applicability Matrix.
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• Regression Testing Case study:
We need to apply our frame work for selective regression testing with case
studies, so we can show applicability and generalizability of our technique.
Also, by using dierent case studies, we show how our formalization steps
for each type of change to the various models (BM,MM,WR,F, SE) are
applicable. Moreover, we could illustrate how our regression testing framework
in generating a regression test suite is ecient.
• Trade-O Analysis: Full Retest vs. Selective Regression Testing:
In regression testing, multiple changes to the artifacts can become very ex-
pensive and may require to create a full new test suite; however, this is a
trade-o situation. We plan to build a test cost model that identies the con-
ditions under which our selective regression testing is less expensive than the
retest-all strategy. Trade-o analysis could help to assess the cost-benets of
our technique. For example, comparing various regression testing approaches
could help in selecting a regression testing approach that achieves a favorable
reduced cost.
• Trade-O Analysis: Cost of Testing vs. Cost of Failure
One of the motivations for testing proper failure mitigation was that defective
mitigations can be costly. On the other hand, testing also carries its own cost.
This is another trade-o situation that can be investigated.
• Building Tools:
We will build tools to generate executable tests. This would decrease the
cost of testing. At the moment only a tool for dening FSMWeb models and




Testing proper mitigation of failures in web applications is important since de-
fects in mitigation code can cause expensive outages, such as compromising proper
debiting of credit cards and other nancial harm. We presented a systematic MBT
approach to derive fail-safe tests for web applications. It leverages an existing func-
tional test suite. A fault model and mitigation model are used to dene mitigation
tests in a rigorous manner. Weaving rules specify how to weave mitigations into
the functional tests at selected points of failure in the functional test suite. This
requires determining which type of failure is to be injected at which position in the
test suite ((p,e)pairs). A genetic algorithm is used to determine points of failure
and type of failure that needs to be tested.
First, we build a simulation that helps in investigating and understating our
approach. We address the threats that are related to the choice of simulation pa-
rameters used in the GA as follows:
• The weights wr and ws are based on tuning experiments performed in our work
[5]. We select the values based on the simulation results. The tuning relies
on the use of published mitigation defect rates (around 20%) (i.e Sawaelpong
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et al. [67]). We also experiment with a much lower defect rate (5%). This
supports our use of a common defect rate of 20%, contrasting it with a low
one (5%) as well. While it may be possible to tune these weights for higher
eciency, this would expose to potential overtting. We are hence willing to
accept that the GA is not always optimally tuned.
• As for the choice of mutation rate and crossover, we use values that have
been suggested in the literature, as pointed out in section 5.2.1. Similarly, the
number of runs the GA makes is commonly used as well [2].
• We next turn to the choice of parameter values for each experiment. Test suite
size length(I) ranges from 5-1000 while |F | ranges from 2-10. This falls within
the range described for the case studies in Table 5.15, except for the large
Mortgage system (length(I)=3998). That means that if the trends observed
in our simulation experiments do not hold for larger search spaces, validity
is limited to the sizes we experimented with. Similarly, our choice of failure
types spans the ranges reported for the case studies, hence is realistic.
• The applicability level was set close to the highest found in the case studies.
Higher applicability levels increases the search space and make the problem
more dicult, i.e. our results are conservative. To the degree future case
studies follow the same pattern, the simulation results should carry over. If
a future application has very dierent characteristics, careful consideration of
the dierences and their impact becomes important, as generalizability is not
assured.
• As for the duplication factor values, we derived them from the case studies
presented in section 5.3. The low DF=2 is used for the small search space
while DF=20 is used for the large ones. To be conservative (i.e. dening a
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more dicult search problem), we used the smallest DF found in the case
studies (DF=2) and a smaller DF=20 than the one found in the largest case
study (DF=31). In the case studies, DF ranges from 2-31.
Clearly, when applications deviate by a large amount from this, the experimen-
tation results are aected. Specically, a higher duplication factor results in fewer
pairs needed to nd mitigation defects as the probability of selecting a position
with a node that is associated with a mitigation defect increases (it occurs more fre-
quently in I ). In summary, we selected simulation parameter values guided by either
literature or case studies. If a future case study has very dierent characteristics,
our results may not hold.
Second, we compare GA versus Random in generating fail-safe scenarios. We
showed how to tune the tness function and compared the performance of the GA
to random selection of fail-safe test mitigation requirements. We showed how to tune
the tness function and compared the performance of the GA to random selection
of fail-safe scenarios. We show that the GA performance was better than random
selection and that the approach was robust when the search space increased.
Third, we compare eciency and eectiveness of using a GA vs. coverage cri-
teria when testing proper mitigation of failures in safety-critical systems and web
applications. The goal was to evaluate and compare the use of GA [5] versus the
use of coverage criteria (C1-C4) advocated in [6], neither of which provided such a
comparison.
We designed and implemented a simulator so as to be able to vary problem
size (search space) mitigation defect density, and type of approach used (GA versus
C1-C4). The simulator also assumes that history (i.e. position of a state si in I )
makes no dierence. If it does, C2 and C3 will show dierences in detecting defects.
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Next, we consider choice of measures for the dependent variables. Eectiveness is
measured by the proportion of mitigation defects found. This is common for many
experiments as a measure of eectiveness, see for example [76]. Notice that both GA
and coverage criteria generate test requirements rather than executable test cases.
If a human tester were to take these requirements, they would have to turn them
into tests, execute them, and validate them. There is potential for error in each of
these steps that could aect eectiveness results. Hence our simulation results need
to be interpreted (like many other GA simulation, e.g. [29]) as a best case scenario.
Eciency is measured in terms of (p,e) pairs (i.e. number of test requirements).
Some test requirements may take more eort to turn into test cases than others,
hence one can argue that it might not always reect testing eort spent. On the
other hand, test requirements have been used in the past to predict test eort [17].
Our comparisons show that for large search spaces the GA is more ecient (more
so when compared to C1 than to C2/C3) while GA, and C1-C3 are equally eective.
C4 was rather ineective and cannot be recommended.
We also showed that dropping the defect rate from a more common 20% as
reported in [67] to a much lower 5% did not result in a large increase in test require-
ments, i.e. the GA is relatively robust in this range (although an extremely low
mitigation defect rate might change that. However, empirical data does not support
such a low mitigation defect rate occurring in practice).
The simulation results are more in favor of C1-C3 when search spaces are small.
Additionally, dropping the mitigation defect rate had an eect on how big the search
space had to be for the GA to be eective.
We also presented results of case studies where we investigated and compared per-
formance of GA and C1-C4 for several reasons:
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1. They provided guidance on what ranges of parameter values to use in the
simulation study.
2. They showed applicability of results to a number of behavioral models, appli-
cation domains and model sizes.
3. While the actual number of test requirements that GA vs. C1-C4 produce
may vary from the simulation results, the nature of the recommendation stays
the same. We thus were able to investigate on a snapshot basis duplication
factors between 4 and 31 and applicability levels between 40%-81%, failure
types ranging between 2-14, and length(I) ranging from 24-3998.
Fourth, we explored the use of GA to test proper mitigation of failures in an
actual web application. We reported summary results for a large web application,
a mortgage system, as well as detailed results of its Closing Documents subsystem.
We showed that the GA found seeded mitigation defects. We also showed scalability
of our approach to a large commercial web application. Since a GA is able to deal
with large search spaces, it was a good choice for the case study presented.
We also used the case study to evaluate how good the initial population is by
comparing the initial population selected via defect potential (Algorithm 3) against
multiple runs of randomly selected initial populations (10 runs). The results clearly
show that using defect potential to generate test requirements outperforms random
selection.
Multiple runs are possible when the use of a GA is explored with a simulator as
in [58][13]. However, when actual test cases need to be generated, executed, and
validated to determine a test requirements tness, this GA evaluation cost becomes
prohibitive for multiple runs. We accept a local rather than global optimum as
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long as the mitigation defects are found, For quantitative results on evaluation
cost see section 6.5 in our case study. Note also the global minimum in terms
of number of test requirements is equal to the number of mitigation defects that
exist. Additionally, Cantú-Paz [19] explore whether multiple runs of GA can reach
solutions of higher quality or reach acceptable solutions faster. Their results suggest
that with a xed evaluation budget a single run reaches a better solution than
multiple independent runs.
Finally, we built a framework for selective regression testing of fail-safe testing.
We provide a systematic method by showing the formalization steps for each type
of change to the various models (BM,MM,WR,F, SE) and build a regression test
suite based on each type of change, allowing for multiple changes to artifacts. If
the new search space is suciently large, we use GA [5] to construct the new test
requirements, otherwise coverage criterion (CC)[6] are the best choice. We show full
formalization based on type of changes to the behavioral model (BM), failure types
(F), state-event matrix (SE), and mitigation model (MM). We show how to build
a new search space (I') and how to build the new failure mitigation tests (FMT').
The changes to behavioral models BM , changes to SE, or adding new failure types
have higher impact as more work is involved.
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